Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process that engages citizens in public investment decisions through a mix of deliberation, representation, and voting. This chapter describes how this democratic innovation has been practiced, elaborates its goals, provides an overview of its origins and diffusion, and reviews research on its outcomes for citizen engagement, local governance, and community empowerment. These findings are illustrated by two case studies. Porto Alegre, Brazil, not only represents the birthplace of PB, but also is an example of uniquely pronounced changes in government responsiveness to underserved communities and in the strength of civil society organizations after PB’s implementation. New York City’s program is fairly representative of PB as practiced in the Global North. Controlling a smaller share of city budgets, processes like PBNYC have been more able to replicate Porto Alegre’s model of equitable citizen engagement than to transform urban governance or the organization of local civil society.

Despite rather satisfactory overall GDP growth rates (6 per cent), development has been slowed down by vigorous population growth (2.8 per cent) and made uncertain by the absence of a true growth engine. Recent growth performances result more from the effects of favourable terms of trade and foreign financing flows on domestic demand than from autonomous supply-driven growth. The issue of growth sustainability also arises in connection with high investment rates over the last few years. It is not clear whether the economy can maintain such a high rate of accumulation without heavily relying on foreign financing. Dependence on this is excessive. A third challenge is to be found on the social side. Poverty is declining only slowly, and social spending is limited. That growth has not trickled down more systematically to all segments of the population is a problem because it weakens the transformative role of development. Offshore natural gas reserves could soon provide more resources for Tanzania’s public sector. Yet natural resource windfalls are difficult to manage and may be a source of economic and institutional instability.

Do people see clean energy investments as delivering local economic benefits? That is, investments producing well-paying jobs that last and use the local workforce? Compared to careers in healthcare, for example, people are more skeptical of the local economic benefits of the clean energy industry. While our surveys show that the national public holds these industries in better regard than coal, for example, this gap declines in areas with more fossil fuel-intensive industries. Our interviews with energy companies confirm these findings. We also discuss the tax revenue challenges communities face when they have long depended on a single revenue source and clean energy does not always support local finances.

More than any other Hellenistic dynasty, the Attalids patronized city gymnasia. A much needed explanation for that curious philanthropic habit is provided, and it is argued that the Pergamenes helped transform the gymnasium into the “second agora” of the post-Classical polis. While the financial instability of the gymnasium and its agglomerative architectural ensemble made it an attractive target for royal donors, the ideological appeal was paramount. In the mid-second century BCE, the gymnasium may have represented itself as “the city writ small,” but this was a fiction, concocted by its elite membership and reinforced by the Attalids, ever anxious to present themselves as champions of the polis without ceding real power to the populace. The social distance of the gymnasium from other polis institutions was the critical factor for the entry of the Attalids, who partnered with towering civic benefactors to remake the space just as the royal capital reformed itself with a gymnasium as the anchor of the new urban plan.

The budgetary earmark was a key feature of public finance in the expanded Attalid kingdom and contributed to the success of the Pergamene imperial project. The dynamics and meaning of this administrative technique are thus explored in depth. Earmarking not only increased the quantity of money available to royal bureaucrats; it also made money into a medium for messaging. In a pointedly transparent manner, specific royal taxes and other revenues were earmarked for specific public goods. A series of inscriptions record the neat and final arrangements, but it is possible and even illuminating to reconstruct the entanglements of the process of negotiation by which these earmarks came into existence. The creation of an earmark required an interlocking of royal and civic fiscal institutions that further entrenched Attalid rule. The earmarking process posed ideological risks, as kings delved into the domain of private property and devolved agency to local actors, while also providing an arena for the display of providential care (pronoia) for royal subjects.

The literature on America’s unwritten constitution is rigorous and compelling, but it tends to focus almost entirely on how the federal Constitution has evolved through informal processes. In this chapter, I argue that our understanding of America’s unwritten constitution would be improved if we broadened the inquiry to include state constitutions. Unlike the federal Constitution, where Article V’s near-impossible amendment rules force essentially all reforms into informal pathways, the states have designed amendment rules and facilitated political cultures that encourage frequent formal amendment of constitutional text. Consequently, to the extent that unwritten constitutional commitments exist in the states, they are not the product of necessity, and they may shed new light on how constitutional rules evolve. In this chapter, I show that in various significant areas, states have indeed fostered robust unwritten constitutions and that state constitutionalism is characterized by a complex, competitive, and highly contextual interaction between codified and unwritten constitutional commitments.

Defeat in the Franco-Prussian War stimulated an overhaul of the fiscal-military system, but in a way that largely suited the notables. The government rebuffed considerable pressure for an income tax, instead largely opting to raise indirect taxes and a new tax on securities; the post-Revolutionary tax system survived, minimising the burden on the landed classes. The greatest changes were for the army, with the imposition of universal military service. Thus, this concluding chapter underscores the durability of the post-Revolutionary fiscal system that emerged in the early nineteenth century.

Following Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the victorious allies imposed 700 million francs of reparations on the French – around 10 per cent of GDP. To pay these, the Restoration developed the final element of the nineteenth-century French fiscal system: public credit, which the government modelled largely on that of Britain. With the payment of reparations, the Restoration reintegrated France into the international order, facilitating the stabilisation of Europe and thus that of France’s domestic politics. At the same time, Napoleonic conscription was overhauled, and replaced with a system of limited military service that lasted until the 1870s. Though often overlooked by historians, the Restoration therefore did much to facilitate the creation of a sustainable, stable post-revolutionary fiscal-military state.

While the foundations of the fiscal-military state changed little either side of 1830, the new Orleanist regime did much to extend the state’s developmental dimension. The government took responsibility for the development of the railway network, which entailed extensive public investment in the 1840s. In part, this extension of public works was motivated by a desire to manage the ‘social question’, the fear of a potentially subversive underclass; indeed, despite the limited extension of the franchise after 1830, the July Monarchy was attentive to public opinion. The desire for popular legitimation also pushed the regime to seek glory abroad through the conquest of Algeria, which entailed higher military expenditure, as did an international crisis in 1840. As under the Restoration, the growth of public expenditure was financed through credit, which enabled the government to avoid painful tax reforms, while increasing the numbers of people invested in public credit and thus with a stake in the social and political order.

With the collapse of the ancien régime following a fiscal crisis, the Revolutionaries of the 1790s sought to design a more equitable tax system, based on direct taxes; most indirect taxes were abolished. These new taxes, though, proved insufficient to meet France’s needs, particularly given the collapse of public credit due to political instability. Committed to honouring the debt incurred by the ancien régime, and facing the mounting expenses of a major European war after 1792, the Revolutionary governments failed to stabilise the fiscal situation. Instead, they were pushed to compensate for insufficient tax receipts by levying forced loans, imposing price controls and printing money, which produced hyperinflation by the mid-1790s. These drastic measures, and their failure to resolve the fiscal problems of the 1790s, did much to discredit the Revolutionary regimes, and consequently facilitated the emergence of post-revolutionary politics under Napoleon.

France was at the centre of a transnational process of nineteenth-century European state formation. Since states have often reformed themselves as a result of interaction with one another, the book begins by taking a wide angle on the development of the French case, situating it within the context of state formation in Europe and the Americas. Not only were the French influenced by the progress of rival states, they also shaped the way in which other European and American states were formed. Under Napoleon, for instance, the French exported their tax system across Europe, shaping the subsequent development of taxation in large parts of Germany, Italy and the Low Countries. Also discussed here is the historiography of the French state, and its emphasis on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period of 1789–1815 as the formative years of the nineteenth-century French state. This book, by contrast, demonstrates the importance of the post-Napoleonic period in state formation, and the opening chapter outlines this argument.

The mid-1850s were years of economic boom, which gave way to a slump at the end of the decade. To maintain railway construction, the ongoing rebuilding of French cities and to counter economic malaise, government spending on public works rose. The regime also sought to stimulate the economy through fiscal reform; a trade treaty with Britain in 1860 formed part of a programme intended to reduce taxes and streamline the state. Affairs abroad, though, complicated this agenda. Profiting from the destabilisation of the international order that followed the Crimean War, France intervened militarily in support of Italian unification, while simultaneously seeking greater prestige through a policy of all-out global interventionism in the Middle and Far East and Mexico. The costs of interventionism abroad, combined with ongoing expenses in Algeria and on public works, eroded the regime’s latitude to lower taxes, straining the legitimacy of the fiscal system. Meanwhile, defeat in Mexico added to this discontent, producing a crisis of the fiscal-military system, which weakened the regime, easing its collapse in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War.