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Individuals less closely professionally connected to the deceased may simply be a witness of fact at court instead of being an interested person. Some people worry that being an interested person means that they are in ‘trouble’ with the coroner or more likely to face censure. This is not usually the case. This chapter gives an understanding of what an interested person is, in the context of an inquest, and the advantages and disadvantages of that position.
Risks or vulnerabilities can arise from any death and part of any professional’s role is to be alert to remediating them as part of patient safety. This chapter will look at how to identify these risks. It will also consider what to do when criticism occurs, and how to remediate to allow for a satisfactory or moderated outcome.
It will be clear from Chapter 4 that we consider regulation of corporate governance to be prominent in a good corporate governance model. This chapter builds upon that model by focusing on the regulation of corporate governance in particular. It deals specifically with the various mechanisms, legislative and non-legislative, which regulate the corporation and which set in place, collectively, a framework by which good governance can be achieved. Overall, this collective body of mechanisms forms part of what has recently been described as an emerging ‘law of corporate governance’. The regulation of corporate governance in Australia is achieved through binding and non-binding rules, international recommendations and industry-specific standards, the commentaries of scholars and practitioners, and the decisions of judges. The legislature acts to facilitate the achievement of good corporate governance directly by refining corporate law, and indirectly through the entire panoply of rules and regulations which have an impact on the corporation and its activities. There are other agencies that also assume a role in the regulation of corporate governance.
To date the mainstreaming of equality and human rights law into public sector organisations has been underwhelming with the implementation of these norms being ad hoc and inconsistent. Existing research on factors that influence implementation has been either too general or too disjointed. This article has two aims to advance research on the implementation of equality and human rights: (i) to outline factors that influence the implementation of these norms and (ii) provide a more settled foundations for future research on equality and human rights implementation. It does this through interviews, undertaken in 2018–2019, with individuals responsible for leading the implementation of equality and human rights law within public sector organisations (specifically regulators, inspectorates and ombudsmen) in England and Wales. On the basis of this, the article makes suggestions for how the implementation of equality and human rights can be advanced further through changes to the regulatory environment.
Regulators are different from elected officials because regulators are not motivated by electoral incentives. But then, what motivates regulators? This chapter makes the case that all regulators are motivated by a desire to uphold and increase their reputation for technical expertise. In addition, political appointees are accountable to the elected officials who have the power to remove them.
The technical and market knowledge a business possesses -- its Information, in the language of the 4Is -- can be an important asset in advocating with regulators. Information can be leveraged in two ways. First, the business can share Information that is mission-relevant for the regulator. Doing so helps regulators avoid crises and, therefore, helps regulators cultivate their reputation for technical competence. Second, alternatively, the business can threaten to attack the regulators reputation for competence. Both strategies leverage the regulators desire to preserve and increase their reputation for technical competence.
This chapter addresses the fundamental rules of contract law and introduces nine of the significant regulators operating within the Australian commercial landscape. Contracts are of enormous importance in most established economies as they provide a means by which promises made as part of a commercial bargain can be legally enforced. Contracts also underlie a large number of transactions entered into by the principal commercial regulators in this country, and so the chapter provides a useful backdrop against which we can explore more specific concepts in Australian commercial law.
This article proposes a new perspective for analysing regulatory reforms by emphasising the important role of policy entrepreneurs. We provide a framework for understanding the interaction between appointed regulators and politicians, as well as other players in the policy arena, by emphasising the strategies that entrepreneurial regulators use to promote their agendas. Analysing the individual regulatory entrepreneur’s barriers, goals and strategies helps us gain a better microunderstanding of how regulatory reforms are actually achieved. We maintain that when regulators act as policy entrepreneurs, they change policy outcomes by adopting strategies that promote their agendas. We develop this argument by analysing two case studies of regulatory reforms in Israel: one in the banking sector and one involving changes in competition policy.
The Equality and Human Rights Commission was created in 2006 with wide-ranging powers to protect human rights, promote equal opportunities and encourage mutual respect between different groups. Alongside the Commission, individuals through the courts, and sector-specific enforcers (such as ombudsmen and regulators) have also been given equality and human rights enforcement powers. Within this enforcement landscape, the Commission has struggled to craft an enforcement role for itself. For the first time, this paper, through the mapping of these different actors in their shared regulatory space, outlines a role for the Commission in equality and human rights enforcement. This role consists of three primary tasks: (i) taking action that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable to perform; (ii) overcoming some of the limitations of private enforcement in the courts; and (iii) coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers. The paper concludes by exploring how the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) can effectively fulfil this role.
This paper shows that the revolving door generates inequality of influence between financial firms and creates economic distortions. We first develop a theoretical model, introducing the notion of “bureaucratic capital” and stressing how the revolving door generates inequality in bureaucratic capital leading to inequality in profits. Then this prediction is tested, using a new database that tracks the revolving door process involving the 20 biggest US “diversified banks.” We show that regulators who supply a large stock of bureaucratic capital are more likely to be hired by the top five banks. We also develop indices of the inequality of influence between banks. We show that banks in the top revenue quintile concentrate around 80% of revolving door movements. Goldman Sachs appears as the prime beneficiary of this process, capturing approximately 30% of the total stock of bureaucratic capital.
We compute the regulator of the Beilinson–Deninger–Scholl elements in terms of special values of $L$-functions of modular forms. The main tool is the Rogers–Zudilin method.
VQ-domain proteins are known to interact with WRKY transcription factors and have been reported to be involved in plant defence responses to environmental stresses in Arabidopsis. Thus, elucidation of the defence mechanisms during the interaction of VQ-domain proteins and WRKY transcription factors could provide useful insights into the regulation of VQ-domain protein-mediated WRKY transcription factors. As the focus of this review, we summarize the genomic analysis of the VQ-domain proteins as one of the WRKY-interacting proteins and their biological effects during plant stress conditions in Arabidopsis and rice.
In this article, we examine how regulators, prosecutors, and courts might support and encourage the efforts of organizations to not only reintegrate after misconduct but also to improve their conduct in a way that reduces their likelihood of re-offense (rehabilitation). We explore a novel experiment in creative sentencing in Alberta Canada that aimed to try to change the behaviour of an industry by publicly airing the root causes of a failure of one the industry’s leaders. Drawing on this case and prior work, we articulate a model for a responsive and restorative approach to organizational misconduct that balances the punitive role of regulators and courts with new roles in supporting and overseeing rehabilitation.
There are two infinitesimal (i.e., additive) versions of the K-theory of a field F: one introduced by Cathelineau, which is an F-module, and the other introduced by Bloch-Esnault, which is an F*-module. Both versions are equipped with a regulator map, when F is the field of complex numbers.
We will introduce an extended version of Cathelineau's group, and a complex-valued regulator map given by the entropy. We will also give a comparison map between our extended version and Cathelineau's group.
Our results were motivated by two unrelated sources: Neumann's work on the extended Bloch group (which is isomorphic to indecomposable K3 of the complex numbers), and the study of singularities of generating series of hypergeometric multisums.
The technique of radioimmunoassay following sample resolution by HPLC was used to assay the amounts of the cytokinins zeatin (Z), zeatin riboside (ZR) and isopentenyladenine (IPA), the combined amounts of gibberellins1+3 (GA1+3), and the amounts of indole acetic acid (IAA) and abscisic acid (ABA) during germination in grains of sorghum. Concentrations of GA1+3 were low throughout germination and did not appear to be related to the time of germination. In the mature, non-germinated grain, the concentration of each of the other plant growth regulators was much higher in the smaller component comprised of the embryonic axis and scutellum than in the much larger endosperm tissue. During the germination period studied (64 h), these concentrations declined, with a peak in the amount of the cytokinin IPA and a small peak in Z+ZR (24 h) in the embryo following the first visible signs of root protrusion and coincident with a large enhancement in amylase activity. The high concentration of ABA in the embryo tissue prior to germination was noteworthy. It is suggested that the interaction of ABA and the cytokinins IPA and Z+ZR may play a significant role in controlling sorghum germination.
In this paper, we give multihomogeneous estimates for the group of relations linking multiplicatively dependent algebraic numbers. In the process, we raise a question in the style of Lehmer's problem, concerning multidimensional covolumes in the lattice of units. The proofs are based on the Brill-Gordan duality theorem on orthogonal lattices, and the paper closes with an algebraic version of the theorem, concerning orthogonal abelian subvarieties of an arbitrarily polarized abelian variety.
The working party was required to establish what actuarial information is needed by the financial world for the proper evaluation of a bid for a quoted insurance company, and, in the light of these findings, to consider what may be required in the way of guidance to actuaries. The report considers the issuesw hich occur when life insurance companies aresu bject to takeovers and to other changes of ownership. The Takeover Code has many implications in such situations and these are discussed fully, particularly any conflicts of interest and the independence or otherwise of the actuaries involved. The interests of policyholders are considered and advice is proffered to actuaries. A Guidance Note is being issued.
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