This chapter discusses the account of profits, disgorgement, and other forms of gain-based relief. It will consider the difference between compensation, restitution and disgorgement. It will then consider the account of profits, and the operation of bars to relief and other limiting factors.

The primary rationales of the account of profits have been identified as deterrence and prophylaxis (that is, preventing a defendant from gaining from wrongdoing). Deterrence looks not to the dispute in question, but to the future conduct of the specific defendant (specific deterrence) and the future conduct of other potential defendants (general deterrence). By stripping the defendant of her gain (or part of her gain), the defendant (and other potential defendants) will be deterred from engaging in similar conduct in the future. It is argued that the remedies discussed in this chapter have a deterrent flavour.

Australian courts may grant ‘reasonable fee’ awards where defendants have used certain property or infringed certain rights in a tortious manner. ‘Reasonable fee’ refers to a method of calculating a monetary award for a wrong; namely, where the court awards the objectively ascertained fee that the parties would have agreed upon for permitting the defendant’s conduct. Reasonable fee awards may be made in various forms, including through an award of compensation, in an action for money had and received through ‘waiver of tort’, as ‘restitutionary damages’, or under Lord Cairns’ Act in lieu of an injunction. They are generally awarded for common law causes of action. As discussed in this chapter, the rationale for reasonable fee damages is highly contested. In previous editions of this book, we conceptualised reasonable fee awards as being gain-based and discussed them in the chapter on gain-based relief. The latest cases from the apex courts of the United Kingdom and Singapore suggest that reasonable fee awards are an instance of ‘substitutive compensation’. It remains to be seen whether Australian courts will adopt this approach.

This chapter considers self-help remedies, which involve the plaintiff making good her own rights without the intervention of the judiciary. The focus of this book is on remedies that are awarded pursuant to a judicial order. However, an exclusive consideration of judicial remedies would ignore the fact that most disputes are settled outside the courts and that most parties prefer non-judicial settlements. It may be queried whether self-help remedies are really remedies in the strict sense of the word. They do not involve a court order; instead, the court gives permission to a plaintiff to act in a particular way. Nevertheless, in a broader sense, the plaintiff is allowed to redress her grievance by vindicating her own rights. By allowing a plaintiff to redress her rights in this way, the law affirms and reinforces the importance of certain interests. As noted in Ch 13, Varuhas has observed that the interests protected by vindicatory awards are often associated with the torts actionable per se.

The victim of a tort can generally claim compensatory damages for any loss suffered as a result of the tort. The assessment of such damages and the attribution of responsibility for such loss are generally governed by the rules discussed in Chs 2 to 4 for civil wrongs in general. Specific rules for tort are discussed in this chapter: the assessment of damages and the attribution of responsibility. The assessment of compensatory damages for personal injury, which are usually claimed in tort, is discussed.

In this chapter, we consider exemplary damages and aggravated damages, remedies with a strong vindicatory flavour, as recognised by the High Court of Australia in Lewis v Australian Capital Territory.

Exemplary damages vindicate the plaintiff’s interests, but also explicitly punish the defendant for the wrong in question. Punishment is not commonly recognised as a central aim of private law. Some commentators have argued that it should not be part of private law. However, exemplary damages are said to validate the plaintiff’s feelings of hurt and anger arising from the contumelious nature of the defendant’s wrong. Such damages also perform a vindicatory function. The fact that the law punishes a defendant for the manner of his interference with the plaintiff’s interests signals the importance of those interests.

The responsibilitiesand liability of the persons and organisations involved in the development of AI systems are not clearly identified. The assignment of liability will need government to mo e from a risk-based to a responsibility-based system. One possible approach would be to establish a pan-EU compensation fund for damages caused by digital technologies and AI, financed by the industry and insurance companies.

This chapter deals with all manner of state-derived prohibitions. Ancient states prohibited a broad variety of behaviours, threatening punishment for those who would transgress boundaries. The logic of prohibition was wide-ranging: from the marking of spaces, objects and officials as somehow distinct from the rest of ‘society’, leading factions within ancient states sought to preserve and protect their individual prerogatives. They also sought to reinforce their claims to leadership by incentivizing subjects to settle their disputes in state-sanctioned venues. The evidence for such prohibitions is extensive, but did they add up to something that we might legitimately call ‘social control’? Did ancient states succeed at inducing subject populations to accept their claims to rule? If so, how? This chapter suggests that the logic of prohibition was a site of contestation for both statecraft and subject-craft.

Deep fakes are a special kind of counterfeit image that is difficult to distinguish from an authentic image. They may be used to represent a person doing any act and are generated using advanced machine learning techniques. Currently, such an appropriation of personality is only actionable if the circumstances disclose one of a number of largely unrelated causes of action. As these causes of action are inadequate to protect claimants from the appropriation of their personalities, there should be a new independent tort or statutory action for the appropriation of personalities which is grounded in the protection of a person’s dignitary interests.

AI will disrupt the existing tort settlement. Tort law should be tech-impartial – that is, it should not encourage or discourage the adoption of new technologies where they generate the same level of risk, and victim rights should not be eroded by the use of new technologies in place of existing systems of work. Existing tort law is poorly suited to address some AI challenges, and a liability gap will emerge as systems replace employees since AI does not have legal personality and cannot commit a tort. A form of AI statutory vicarious liability should apply in commercial settings to address the liability gap and as the tech-impartial solution.

In this chapter we discuss two doctrines that are interrelated in that they impose liability either because of the relationship between the defendant and the tortfeasor (D2–D1) (vicarious liability), or the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff (D2–P) (non-delegable duty of care).

We will start by examining vicarious liability, which is a form of strict liability. We will learn that the employer–employee relationship is the most common instance of vicarious liability. At common law, the employee who commits the tort is always liable, and so vicarious liability of the employer is in addition to the direct liability of the employee (tortfeasor). We will distinguish the employer–employee relationship from the relationship of principal–independent contractor, as the employer is not vicariously liable for the acts of independent contractors. Then, we will establish when the employee acts in the course of employment. We will also note the employer’s right of indemnity from an employee.

As we have already seen, there are three basic elements to a successful action in negligence:

1. (1) a duty to take reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff

2. (2) a breach of that duty of care by the defendant

3. (3) damage resulting to the plaintiff from that breach.

This chapter deals with the third element. This stage involves taking (yet again) three steps:

1. (1) Identify the damage having an adverse effect on the plaintiff to be recognised by law as damage for which compensation can be sought.

2. (2) Link the defendant’s conduct (act or omission) to the damage suffered by the plaintiff.

3. (3) Establish the scope of the defendant’s liability or, putting it differently, establish the extent to which the defendant should be found liable for the harm suffered by the plaintiff OR the type of harm suffered was within the scope of foreseeability.

Having discussed how the law of torts protects a person’s physical integrity and freedom of movement in the previous chapter, we will now consider how the law protects a person’s interests in property against certain types of interference, including trespass to land and trespass to personal property

In this chapter, we will explore the definitions and features of these trespass actions.

This chapter deals with defences to the trespass actions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. As a general rule, the defendant bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to constitute a defence. Where the defence is established, the defendant will be relieved of liability.

It should be noted that some statutory defences, which are similar to common law defences, are provided by the civil liability legislation and/or Criminal Code in most of the Australian states and territories. Therefore, when considering such defences, the relevant legislation in a particular jurisdiction must be consulted. This chapter will discuss some of the most important defences available for trespass to the person, trespass to land and trespass to personal property.

The defences fall within three roughly divided categories:

1. (1) Self-help based defences

2. (2) Justification-based defences

3. (3) Fault-based defences

   We also consider a number of factors that are not defences to trespass at the end of this chapter.

The common law principles of duty of care and negligence potentially apply to all actors, public and private, and earlier chapters have discussed their application to government actors. This chapter analyses two distinct forms of tortious action which are connected to the performance or non-performance of statutory duties and powers. The first, the action for breach of a statutory duty of care, exists where Parliament intends a legislative duty to be enforced by a private cause of action. This action in essence facilitates the enforcement of specific types of legislative duties which are aimed at the protection of certain interests. The second cause of the action, misfeasance in public office, exists as an action to prevent the bad faith use of statutory power by public officers performing public functions.

In a tort action, if the plaintiff’s claims are successful and no relevant defences are available to the defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to an order or award by the court for an appropriate remedy. Such judicial remedies include:

• damages

• injunctions

• declarations.

In addition, self-help remedies are available and include:

• eviction of trespassers and re-entry of land

• self-defence

• abatement

• apology.

  The focus of this chapter will be on judicial remedies, especially damages.

Tort law is a compelling and dynamic area of law, affecting many aspects of individuals’ lives. A strong understanding of tort principles is important for legal practice, as lawyers may be required to represent clients in a range of tort disputes, from a physical altercation in a bar, to a fall in a supermarket or possibly the lowering of a client’s reputation through defamatory material posted on the internet. At its core, a tort is a civil wrong. Deriving from the Latin word tortum (‘wrong’), a tort is an act or omission that infringes upon the rights of individuals in society, allowing the aggrieved individual to seek a legal remedy.

Nuisance is one of the oldest and most interesting in the law of torts. It developed early in the common law to protect a person’s interest in land. The emergence and rise of the modern tort of negligence has posed a challenge to the precise scope and relevance of the tort of nuisance. An action in nuisance covers conduct of the defendant that is excessive, substantial, and unreasonable, which interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her land. Nuisance covers both physical and non-physical damage.

There are two types of nuisance: private nuisance and public nuisance.

Since liability in nuisance is strict, the defendant must establish his or her defence, once a prima facie case has been established. A defendant is only liable for a harm that is foreseeable; thus, foreseeability is essential to establish the tort of nuisance. The tort of nuisance protects the pleasure, comfort and enjoyment derived by a plaintiff in the occupancy and use of both public and private rights in land. This chapter considers the elements of each tort.

The tort of defamation protects the reputation of individuals in society. A cause of action arises where one individual publishes a false matter about another that lowers the reputation of the latter in the eyes of ordinary and reasonable members of the society. While many of the torts covered in this book seek to protect the bodily integrity of individuals, the tort of defamation seeks to protect their reputation. Defamation laws are concerned with balancing freedom of speech with the protection of individuals’ reputation, character and standing in the community. The increased use of social media has a significant role to play in defamation, with the speed and ease of publication on the internet creating new sites for defamation action. Additionally, the emergence of novel technologies and methods of sharing defamatory posts online – such as hashtags, emojis and memes – have raised novel questions about application of traditional defamation principles to the modern technological landscape. This makes defamation a highly relevant tort in contemporary society.