The Australian debate over Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) sharpened in 2023 because Australian mining billionaire Clive Palmer, having previously registered his mining company in Singapore, has claimed to be a Singaporean investor. He is using ISDS provisions in the 2012 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement and the amended 2017 Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement to sue the Australian government for a total of A$410 billion in three separate claims. This article uses Cox’s critical theory framework developed by Schneiderman to explain the historical development and power dynamics of ISDS, the contest between its business supporters and social movement critics, and the impact of this contest on governments. It then analyses the Palmer claims and explores the global debate about ISDS, including its increased use by fossil fuel companies against government regulation of carbon emissions, which has led to increased resistance from social movements and governments. ISDS is also being reviewed by the United Nations and World Bank institutions which provide arbitrators for its tribunals and by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The conclusion assesses the debate over whether ISDS can be reformed and its future viability.

In the recent years, there has been an upsurge in the number of countries that are mainstreaming gender equality concerns in their trade and investment agreements. These recent developments challenge the long-standing assumption that trade, investment, and gender equality are not related. They also show that gender mainstreaming in trade and investment agreements is here to stay. However, very few countries – mostly developed countries – have led this mainstreaming approach and have made efforts to incentivize other countries to negotiate gender-responsive trade and investment agreements. The majority of developing countries are yet to take their first steps in negotiating such policy instruments with a gender lens, and their hesitation can be grounded in various reasons including fears of protectionism, lack of data, paucity of understanding and expertise, and, more broadly, constraints relating to their negotiation capacity. Moreover, the inclusion of gender-related concerns in the negotiation of such agreements has deepened and widened the negotiation capacity gap between developed and developing countries. In this article, the authors attempt to assess this widening negotiation capacity gap with the help of empirical research, and how this capacity gap can lead to disproportionate and negative repercussions for developing countries more than developed countries.

The negotiation of the free trade agreement (FTA) between Australia and the United Kingdom promised to integrate trade and climate policies. As a leader of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference in Glasgow, the UK seemed well-placed to exert pressure on Australia, a country that was yet to embrace a target of net zero emissions by 2050. This article asks whether the FTA achieves this aim. It explains the link between trade liberalisation and climate change, referring to the scale and composition of economic activity and drawing upon examples from energy, agriculture, building and transportation sectors, as well as strategic factors. It provides an original analytical framework to assess the FTA's contributions to climate change goals, pointing to: (1) provisions to strengthen climate commitments, including net zero targets; (2) provisions to facilitate trade and investment in climate-related areas; and (3) provisions relating to enforcement and cooperation. It compares selected initiatives of other FTAs, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the European Union–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the UK–New Zealand FTA and the Singapore–Australia Green Economy Agreement. It reviews the FTA's negotiating process and its aftermath, including complaints about public participation. The article's conclusion that the FTA makes minimal contribution to climate change mitigation has implications for the broader quest for mutually supportive trade and climate policies, and, now that a net zero target has been legislated by the newly elected Australian Parliament, for the FTA's future implementation.

In the context of the working-class backlash against free trade represented by Brexit, the recent surge of right-wing political parties in Europe and the 2016 US presidential election, it is timely to take stock of the threats to jobs and wages posed by recent negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The European Commission selectively relied on econometric analyses, predicting a positive impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Its proposed legal text on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ fell short of the European Parliament’s negotiating guidelines, which themselves failed to ensure protection of labour standards. The activities of corporate lobbies threatened the effective protection of workers’ rights. Major risks to workers’ rights are posed by discrepancies between US and European Union labour and social law and labour standards. The most recent legal text lacks compliance monitoring provisions and sanction mechanisms against member states failing to ratify core labour conventions. The investment court system does not resolve the problems of the discredited investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for which it is the proposed replacement. The year 2016 has provided a foretaste of the dislocation likely from trade and investment regulation that sees social and environmental standards and labour rights simply as barriers to corporate profits.

This article examines the Japan–Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement, an agreement that has allowed Japan to supplement its local healthcare workforce while continuing to sidestep the thorny issue of labour and immigration policy reform and Indonesia to increase its skilled workers’ access to the Japanese labour market at a time when it was making a concerted effort to reorient migrant labour flows away from informal sector occupations. Despite the programme’s many problems, it has contributed to the use of trade agreements as a mechanism for regulating labour migration, and so to the normalisation of migrant labour as a tradable commodity rather than a discrete area of policy-making, with all the attendant risks that normalisation brings.

This paper reviews the trade agreement landscape and argues that the conventional understanding of trade agreements as encapsulated in the WTO Agreements is now outdated. This misperception about trade agreements is not just an institutional insufficiency. Concentration on those agreements has led many practitioners and commentators to underestimate the variable texture of the global trade agreement fabric. But these shortcomings have not inhibited states from concluding innovative alternatives to regulate and manage the cross-border movement of goods and services. As this paper shows, trade-related agreements that do not fit the perceived traditional mold have proliferated. Given these advances, more policy and scholarly attention is required. Accordingly, this paper serves as a roadmap for the accommodation of trade agreements within the WTO and as an agenda for additional research.

Some protrade business interests that are against hard enforcement of labor and environmental provisions in trade deals may end up eventually supporting it, while others stick to their initial opposition. Why? When will their positions change? The existing literature would expect protrade interests to be more or less in favor of non-trade issues in trade policies according to how dependent on the international economy they are. However, longitudinal variation in export- and import-dependence does not suffice to explain change of the sort I am interested in. I argue that the position of protrade business interests change as they accumulate experiences on the negotiation/ratification of trade deals. To probe that argument, I present two paired comparisons analyzing the position of protrade business interests as pertains to the use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by Canada and Australia, and by the United States (US) and European Union (EU) between 1993 and 2019. My analysis points to the overall plausibility of my hypothesis and to avenues for future research. The paper helps understand the political activity of business interests on trade and sustainable development and can shed new light on the politics behind the design of social and environmental provisions in PTAs.

Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) has considerably increased its competencies in European Union (EU) trade policy. At the same time, a ‘new generation’ of free trade agreements (FTAs), including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, and the agreement with Japan, have been negotiated by the European Commission. Although existing literature has tackled the process of the EP's institutional self-empowerment in this policy area, there is no systematic research investigating the lines of conflict within the EP over FTAs. Through a newly collected dataset of all EP plenary debates between 2009 and 2019 on six relevant FTAs, we extract EP Members’ (MEPs) preferences by means of a manual textual analysis. We then test the explanatory power of the two traditional lines of cleavages within the EP over MEPs stated preferences: position on the left-right axis and support for EU integration. We find that both these dimensions fundamentally shape the conflict in the EP over FTAs. The impact of these two ideological cleavages is magnified in the context of politicized FTAs, namely the TTIP and CETA. Through these findings, the paper significantly contributes to the research on competition in the EP and, more broadly, to the understanding of EU trade policy and its emerging politicization dynamics.

Chapter 23, exclusively dedicated to labor protection, has been widely described as one of the most distinctive features of the new US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). This paper challenges the current narrative surrounding the USMCA by critically analysing Chapter 23 of the agreement, looking at the legal innovative design of its substantive commitments of labour protection and their enforceability. In light of this objective, a comparative analysis will be conducted. The provisions of Chapter 23 USMCA will be compared with labour provisions in previous US Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), namely, the NAFTA side agreement on labour rights and the TPP. Second, a comparative analysis will be conducted comparing USMCA Chapter 23 with labour provisions in EU Trade Agreements negotiated with USMCA parties. The paper demonstrates that although the USMCA does not radically innovate from the level of substantive labour protection reached in recent US and EU PTAs, the enforcement mechanism in the USMCA is significantly strengthened, with controversial and innovative features.

The literature lacks consensus on the role of currency regimes in explaining external competitiveness. Countries not only differ in terms of currency regimes, but can also have different institutional arrangements, namely trade agreements and inflation targeting (IT) frameworks in addition to the overall quality of governance. Hence, using the real effective exchange rate and by covering 35 developing countries over the period 1975–2014, we investigate the role of currency regimes in explaining the degree of misalignment while considering institutional factors. First, we find that intermediate regimes limit the currency misalignment with greater financial openness (FO). Second, non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements improve price competitiveness, whereas free trade and reciprocal ones can only be beneficial with a higher degree of FO. Third, misalignments in fixed regimes decline in the presence of stronger institutions or in countries with an IT type of monetary policy framework. The above results remain robust to alternative specifications.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a ‘carrot-and-stick’ mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to ‘reward good behavior’ or ‘punish bad behavior’ on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.