The Contrast with Concepts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 November 2025
It is claimed that the form of perceiving is mirroring and also map-like. Historically, mirroring is here considered to be akin to mirroring in Leibniz, by whom Kant was influenced. Mirroring can also be taken to be indirect, by way of a representative, as in Locke, according to the standard interpretations. However, it follows from the immediacy condition on perceptions that the mirroring has to be direct in Kant. He also explicitly attacks picture theories of perception. Perceptions are not of an intermediary to be perceived. Rather, they are themselves space-like in their mereological organization, and they represent by way of a structural similarity with the layout of spatial scenes. On this point, it is claimed that Kant’s version of non-conceptualism has similarities with positions in current debates on perception, like those of Fodor and Peacocke. Indeed, perceptions also map the territory, as in Burge, and that goes a bit beyond mirroring. Thus, some features of cartographic representation carry over to intuitions in Kant. Finally, the relation between the saturation of intuitions and the fact that they mirror and map what they represent is discussed.
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