Chapter 3 - Perception as a Source of Information

Summary

An immediacy condition is elaborated. It is argued that a Kantian intuition is immediate both in the sense that it is direct in its way of representing and in the sense that it is presentational in acquainting the perceiver with its object. It can thus be said to be both of and as of, in present-day terminology. It is representation of, or referential, by virtue of its “intuitive marks,” which are singular, and it is representation as of, or attributive, by virtue of its “predicates of intuition,” which are general. This has been overlooked by most Kant commentators. It may also have contributed to the epistemic downgrading of perceptions that has been ascribed to Kant. It is argued that an empirical intuition hooks on to tropes in the perceived scene by way of the intuitive marks, and that there is also perceptual attribution of proper and common sensibles to the concrete particulars by means of it. Finally, it is discussed how information that is carried by intuitions can be “unpacked” and thought through concepts in cognition of objects “in the proper sense.”