In our scientific era, there has been widespread talk about the demise of conventional notions about our agency. In this book, Jason Runyan examines our conventional thought and talk about our agency and the basis for thinking that it is inconsistent with scientific findings. Using clear language and concrete examples, he brings philosophy and science to bear on fundamental questions: What is true about us? Do we accomplish what we think we do in everyday life? And should our scientific discoveries upend the way we think about our agency? In the process, Runyan shows how analytic and empirical approaches should inform one another-how, together, they enable a more precise and expansive view, save us from the pitfalls of overreaching, and yield insights to live by.

‘A unique contribution to the literature on action and free will. Runyan deftly bridges the gap between contemporary, empirically informed discussions of neuroscience and free will, and a tradition in linguistic philosophy with roots in Wittgenstein and Vendler. Tightly focused and accessibly written, this book should be of interest to both scholars and students in the philosophy of mind and action.'

Jonathan Payton - Bilkent University