Element contents
Series: Elements in Political Philosophy
Wrongful Discrimination
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2025
Summary
In a generic sense, to discriminate is to differentiate. Generic discrimination is not wrongful. But many instances of a more specific form of discrimination – differentiating between people because they are members of different socially salient groups (henceforth: group discrimination) – are wrongful. This means that people subjected to group discrimination are often wronged, and this bears importantly on whether such acts are morally impermissible. The three main accounts of what makes group discrimination wrongful appeal to considerations of harm, disrespect, and social relations of inequality, respectively. While each of them can explain the wrongfulness of some paradigmatic instances of wrongful direct discrimination, they explain the wrongfulness of a set of three important non-paradigmatic forms of discrimination – indirect discrimination, implicit bias, and algorithmic discrimination – less well. Overall, the prospects of a monistic account of the wrongfulness of discrimination are bleak.
Keywords
Information
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in Political PhilosophyOnline ISBN: 9781009596749Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 22 January 2026
References
Alexander, L., “What makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Biases, preferences, stereotypes, and proxies,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141 (1992), 149‒219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Altman, A., “Discrimination,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/discrimination.Google Scholar
Anderson, E., “Epistemic justice as a virtue of social institutions,” Social Epistemology 26 (2010), 163–173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., and Kirchner, L., “Machine Bias,” Pro Publica (2016, 23 May). www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.Google Scholar
Arneson, R. “Egalitarianism and responsibility”, Journal of Ethics 3 (1999), 225–247.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arneson, R., “Discrimination and harm.” In Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, London, Routledge, 2017, 151–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Basu, R., “What we epistemically owe to each other,” Philosophical Studies 176 (2019a), 915‒931.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Basu, R., “The wrongs of racist beliefs,” Philosophical Studies 176 (2019b), 2497‒2515.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Basu, R., “Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs,” Philosophical Issues 29 (2019c), 9‒23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Basu, R., “Morality of belief I,” Philosophy Compass 18(7) (2023a), 1–10. https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phc3.12934.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Basu, R., “Morality of belief II,” Philosophy Compass 18(7) (2023b), 1–9. https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12935.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Basu, R., and Schroeder, M., “Doxastic wronging.” In Kim, B. and McGrath, M. (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, New York, Routledge, 2018, 158–178.Google Scholar
Beeghly, E., “Discrimination and disrespect.” In Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, London, Routledge, 2017, 83‒96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beeghly, E., “Discrimination and the value of lived experience in Sophia Moreau’s Faces of Inequality,” University of Toronto Law Journal 73 (2023), 112–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beigang, F., “Reconciling algorithmic fairness criteria,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 51 (2023), 166–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bengtson, A., and Munch, L., “Consensual discrimination,” Philosophical Quarterly (2024). https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae039.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berndt Rasmussen, K., “Harm and discrimination,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2019), 837–891.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berndt Rasmussen, K., “Implicit bias and discrimination,” Theoria 86 (2020), 727–748.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brownstein, M., “Implicit bias.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias.Google Scholar
Brownstein, M., and Madva, A., “Ethical automaticity,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (2012a), 67–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brownstein, M., and Madva, A., “The normativity of automaticity,” Mind and Language 27 (2012b), 410–434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brownstein, M., and Saul, J., Implicit Bias & Philosophy, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.Google Scholar
Campbell, C., and Smith, D., “Distinguishing between direct and indirect discrimination,” Modern Law Review 86 (2023), 307–330.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chouldechova, A., “Fair prediction with disparate impact: A study of bias in recidivism prediction instruments,” Big Data 5 (2017), 153–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, G. A., On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2011.Google Scholar
Cornell, N., “Wrongs, rights, and third parties,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015), 109–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cosette-Lefebvre, H., “Direct and indirect discrimination: A defense of the disparate impact model,” Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (2020), 340–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cossette-Lefebvre, H., and Lippert-Rasmussen, K., Neither direct, nor indirect: Understanding proxy-based algorithmic discrimination. Journal of Ethics (2025), 1–27.Google Scholar
Crenshaw, K., “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex,” University of Chicago Legal Forum Iss. 1 (1989), 139–167.Google Scholar
Eidelson, B., Discrimination and Disrespect, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, J., “How outlandish can imaginary cases be?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2011), 241–258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor, New York, St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar
Fabre, C., “Doxastic wrongs, non-spurious generalizations and particularized beliefs,” Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 122 (2022), 47‒69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fiss, O. M., “Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 5 (1976), 107–177.Google Scholar
Frankfurt, H., The Importance of What We Care About, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987.Google Scholar
Fredman, S., “Direct and indirect discrimination: Is there still a divide?” In Collins, H. and Khaitan, T. (eds.), Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law, Oxford, Hart, 2018, 31–56.Google Scholar
Gardner, J., “Discrimination as injustice,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 16 (1996), 353–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gendler, T., “Alief in action (and reaction),” Mind and Language 23 (2008), 552–585.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenwald, A., and Banaji, M., “Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes,” Psychological Review 102 (1995), 4–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenwald, A., McGhee, D., and Schwartz, J., “Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1998), 1464–1480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haslanger, S., “Distinguished lecture: Social structure, narrative and explanation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2015), 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hellman, D., When Is Discrimination Wrong? Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2008.Google Scholar
Hellman, D., “Indirect discrimination and the duty to avoid compounding injustice.” In Collins, H. and Khaitan, T. (eds.), Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law, Oxford, Hart, 2018, 105–122.Google Scholar
Hellman, D., “Measuring algorithmic fairness,” Virginia Law Review 106 (2020), 811–866.Google Scholar
Hellman, D., and Moreau, S. (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holroyd, J., Scaife, R., and Stafford, T., “Responsibility for implicit bias,” Philosophy Compass 12 (2017), 1–13.Google Scholar
Holroyd, J., and Sweetman, J., “The heterogeneity of implicit bias.” In Brownstein, M. and Saul, J. (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, vol. 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 80–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holtug, N., Persons, Interests, and Justice. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hosein, A., “Racial profiling and a reasonable sense of inferior political status,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2018), 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ishida, S., “What makes discrimination morally wrong? A harm-based view reconsidered,” Theoria 87 (2021), 483‒499.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jönsson, M., and Sjödahl, J., “Increasing the veracity of implicitly biased rankings,” Episteme 14 (2017), 499–517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khaitan, T., A Theory of Discrimination Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khaitan, T., “Indirect discrimination.” In Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, New York, Routledge, 2018, 30–41.Google Scholar
Laborde, C., “Structural inequality and the protectorate of discrimination law,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics (2024), 1–24.Google Scholar
Levy, N., “Implicit bias and moral responsibility,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2017), 3–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “‘We are all different’: Statistical discrimination and the right to be treated as an individual.” Journal of Ethics 15 (2011), 47–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “Indirect Discrimination Is Not Necessarily Unjust,” Journal of Practical Ethics 2 (2015), 33–57.Google Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., Relational Egalitarianism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “Moreau on discrimination”, Jurisprudence 12 (2021), 579–590.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “Why ‘indirect discrimination’ is a useful legal but not a useful moral concept,” Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 15 (2022), 83–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “Wrongful discrimination without equal, basic moral status,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 26 (2023a), 19‒36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “Should people who are moral equals relate as social equals? Should people who are not moral equals relate as social equals?” In Floris, G. and Kirby, N. (eds.) How Can We Be Equals? Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024a, 81–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “Gated communities and discrimination against the poor.” In Holmen, S., Ryberg, J., and Petersen, T. Søbirk, Crime Prevention by Exclusion: Ethical Considerations, New York, Routledge, 2024b, 142–162.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “Algorithmic and non-algorithmic fairness,” Law and Philosophy (2024c), 1–25.Google Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., and Vallentyne, P., “Discrimination, Intrinsic Wrongness, and Mental States”, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (forthcoming), 1–18.Google Scholar
Long, R., “Fairness in machine learning: Against false positive rate equality as a measure of fairness,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (2021), 49–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liu, X., and Liang, Y., “What it means to respect individuality,” Philosophical Studies 179 (2020), 2579–2598.Google Scholar
Madva, A., and Brownstein, M., “Stereotypes, prejudice, and the taxonomy of the implicit social mind,” Noûs, 53 (2018), 611–644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Midtgaard, S. F. and Pedersen, V., “Paternalistic discrimination,” Law and Philosophy 4 (2024), 235–259.Google Scholar
Miller, D., Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001.Google Scholar
Nosek, B., Greenwald, A., and Banaji, M., “The Implicit Association Test at age 7: A methodological and conceptual review.” In Bargh, J. A. (ed.), Automatic Processes in Social Thinking and Behavior, Philadelphia, PA, Psychology Press, 2007.Google Scholar
Onwuachi-Willig, A. “Reconceptualizing the harms of discrimination: How Brown v. Board of Education helped to further white supremacy,” Virginia Law Review 105 (2019), 343–369.Google Scholar
Parfit, D., “Equality and priority.” In Mason, A. (ed.), Ideals of Equality, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1998, 1–20.Google Scholar
Schemmel, C., Justice and Egalitarian Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Segall, S., “What’s so bad about discrimination?” Utilitas 24.1 (2012), 82–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shelby, T. “Justice, deviance, and the dark ghette,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 (2007), 126–160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sher, G., Who Hnew? Responsibility without Awareness. New York, Oxford University Press, 2009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Singh, K., and Wodak, D., “Does race best explain racial discrimination?” Philosophers’ Imprint 23 (2023), 1–22.Google Scholar
Slavny, A., and Parr, T., “Harmless discrimination,” Legal Theory, 21 (2015), 100‒114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Starr, S., “Evidence-based sentencing and the scientific rationalization of deiscrimination,” Stanford Law Review 66 (2014), 803–872.Google Scholar
Steuwer, B., and Lippert-Rasmussen, K., “The poverty discrimination puzzle,” Political Philosophy 1 (2024), 293–320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomas, L., “Statistical badness,” Journal of Social Philosophy 23 (1992), 30–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomsen, F. K., “But some groups are more equal than others,” Social Theory and Practice 39 (2013), 120–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomsen, F. K., “No disrespect: But that account does not explain what is morally wrong about discrimination,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 23 (2023), 420‒447.Google Scholar
Vredenburgh, K., “Fairness.” In Bullock, J. B. (ed.), Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022. https://doi-org.ez.statsbiblioteket.dk/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.8.Google Scholar
Wilkes, K. V. Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Accessibility standard: WCAG 2.1 AA
Why this information is here
This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.Accessibility Information
The PDF of this Element
complies with version 2.1 of the
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines
(WCAG), covering newer accessibility requirements and improved
user experiences and achieves the intermediate
(AA)
level of WCAG compliance, covering a wider range of accessibility requirements.
Content Navigation
Table of contents navigation
Allows you to navigate directly to chapters, sections, or non‐text items through a linked table of contents, reducing the need for extensive scrolling.
Allows you to navigate directly to chapters, sections, or non‐text items through a linked table of contents, reducing the need for extensive scrolling.
Reading Order & Textual Equivalents
Single logical reading order
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
Visual Accessibility
Use of colour is not sole means of conveying information
You will still understand key ideas or prompts without relying solely on colour, which is especially helpful if you have colour vision deficiencies.
You will still understand key ideas or prompts without relying solely on colour, which is especially helpful if you have colour vision deficiencies.
Structural and Technical Features
ARIA roles provided
You gain clarity from ARIA (Accessible Rich Internet Applications) roles and attributes, as they help assistive technologies interpret how each part of the content functions.
You gain clarity from ARIA (Accessible Rich Internet Applications) roles and attributes, as they help assistive technologies interpret how each part of the content functions.