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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 July 2025
The dynamics surrounding the legislative process of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana, KUHAP) from 1979 to 1981 were shaped by a clash between two opposing ideologies. On one side stood proponents of a rights-based approach, advocating for legal protections for the accused; on the other, supporters of an authoritarian approach emphasised the primacy of state authority in maintaining security and public order. In the end, Indonesian lawmakers were able to strike a balance by establishing several procedural safeguards that purported to protect the rights of the accused. This article offers a detailed account and analysis of this debate, illuminating how resistance and compromise emerged from the struggle. Drawing on these historical insights, the article explores the potential for reform in the contemporary Indonesian legal and political landscape, highlighting current challenges. The main dataset for this article was collected from official records of the meetings that took place during the legislative process of the KUHAP, as well as public opinion at the time. Although this debate took place more than four decades ago, revisiting the historical context of the KUHAP remains crucial to understanding its ongoing relevance and potential future for reform.
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia, Depok, West Java, Indonesia; Director, Legal Consultation and Aid Institute, Dispute Resolution Options of the University of Indonesia, Depok, West Java, Indonesia; Partner, Asshiddiqie, Pangaribuan & Partners, Jakarta, Indonesia. The author gratefully acknowledges Elsaad Wirasah for his valuable assistance in collecting the data used in this article.
1 Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) 5 <https://web.archive.org/web/20240810014156/https://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200831-085127-9600.pdf> archived from the original 10 Aug 2024, accessed 14 Apr 2025.
2 ibid 98.
3 In the Italian and Latin American inquisitorial models, for instance, case files produced at the pre-trial stage play a central role, as the trial phase is seen as a confirmation of the investigation’s findings. As a result, the principle of orality in trial (as practised in the adversarial model) is of little utility. See Elisabetta Grande, ‘Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance’ (2000) 48 The American Journal of Comparative Law 227; Leonard L Cavise, ‘The Transition from the Inquisitorial to the Accusatorial System of Trial Procedure: Why Some Latin American Lawyers Hesitate Essay’ (2007) 53 Wayne Law Review 785, 793.
4 Most of the documents can be accessed at the Online Library of the Indonesian Parliament <https://www.dpr.go.id/arsip/indexlg/id/10> accessed 18 Oct 2023. However, records from the final session of the KUHAP deliberations (23 Sep 1981) are not available online, but the author obtained a copy from the parliamentary library.
5 Zain Badjeber & Imron Rosjadi, RUU Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana [The Draft of Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code] (Bumi Restu 1979). This book compiles public opinion on the legislative process of KUHAP. Some parts of the minutes of the meetings are also documented in this book.
6 Conducting interviews was not feasible, as the event took place over four decades ago and most of the individuals involved have since passed away. The author made efforts to establish contact but found no surviving sources available.
7 Criminal justice reforms in Indonesia have failed since 2013 because criminal justice actors cannot agree on who should have more power at the pre-trial level. This is because the reforms are trying to change how the system works to make it more adversarial. This article shows how the logic of the current system has been built. For a discussion of the process of the reform and how it has failed, see Robert R Strang, ‘“More Adversarial, but Not Completely Adversarial”: Reformasi of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code’ (2008) 32 Fordham International Law Journal 188; Jayson Lamchek, ‘Arresting a Due Process Revolution The Reform of Indonesia’s Code of Criminal Procedure and the Persistence of History’, in Pablo Ciocchini & George Radics (eds), Criminal Legalities in the Global South (Routledge 2019); Aristo Marisi Adiputra Pangaribuan, ‘Cooperation and Non-Cooperation in Indonesian Criminal Case Processing: Ego Sektoral in Action’ (PhD thesis, University of Washington 2022) <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/49391> accessed 16 Mar 2023.
8 Herbert L Packer, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’ (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1.
9 John Griffiths, ‘A Third “Model” of the Criminal Process’ (1970) 79 The Yale Law Journal 59.
10 Mirjan R Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (Yale University Press 1991). State ideology shapes Damaska’s model of criminal procedure. He contrasts two models: the interventionist ‘activist state’ with its tight control of citizens, and the ‘reactive state’ that minimises interference.
11 Griffiths and Roach offer an alternative model to Packer’s. Meanwhile, Damaska examines the linkage between the criminal justice and state political systems. From this he devises a co-ordinated model and a hierarchical model. See Kent Roach, ‘Four Models of the Criminal Process’ (1999) 89 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671.
12 Michael McConville, Criminal Justice in China: An Empirical Inquiry (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011). Expanding beyond the mechanics of procedure, McConville situates his analysis of criminal justice within the broader political landscape. He then employs this lens to illuminate the contrasting ideological underpinnings of the Chinese and Western systems.
13 Sida Liu & Terence C Halliday, ‘Political Liberalism and Political Embeddedness: Understanding Politics in the Work of Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers: Politics of Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers’ (2011) 45 Law & Society Review 831; Hualing Fu, ‘Book Review: Sida Liu and Terence C. Halliday, Defense Lawyers in China: Criminal Defense in China: The Politics of Lawyers at Work (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016) pp 220. Hardcover: $99.99ʹ (2017) 4 Asian Journal of Law and Society 277.
14 Le Lan Chi, Nguyen Thi Lan & Nguyen Hoang Ngan, ‘The Presence of the Defense Lawyer in Vietnam’s Criminal Justice System: Substantive or Cosmetic?’ (2023) 9 Hasanuddin Law Review 20.
15 Ho Hock Lai, ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ (2010) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87.
16 Tet Yung Chin, ‘Remaking the Evidence Code: Search for Values’ (2009) 21 Singapore Academy Law Journal 52.
17 Daniel Fitzpatrick, ‘Indonesian Criminal Procedure’ (Criminal Lawyers’ Association of the Northern Territory Conference, Jul 1993) <https://clant.org.au/wp-content/uploads/the-bali-conference/1993/Fitzpatrick-Daniel-Indonesian-Criminal-Procedure.pdf> accessed 16 Mar 2024; Daniel Fitzpatrick, ‘Culture, Ideology and Human Rights: The Case of Indonesia’s Code of Criminal Procedure’, in Timothy Lindsey (ed), Indonesia, Law and Society (Federation Press 2008). Fitzpatrick’s initial observations, dating back to his 1993 publication, focus on the KUHAP. He essentially argues that the weak emphasis on individual rights within Indonesian culture shapes the enforcement power wielded by the state.
18 Strang (n 7) 197. Strang was a representative of the American government-based Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT), an organisation that assisted the team in drafting the KUHAP reform. He was the team’s main external advisor.
19 Lamchek (n 7).
20 Simon Butt, ‘Indonesia’s Criminal Justice System on Trial’ (2021) 24 New Criminal Law Review 3.
21 Fachrizal Afandi & Adriaan Bedner, ‘Between Upholding the Rule of Law and Maintaining Security: Criminal Justice Actors in Indonesia’s Constitution’, in Melissa Crouch (ed), Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2022).
22 The ICCPR and the UDHR were frequently mentioned in official statements by the lawmakers. Literature and public opinion at the time also pressed the government to recognise the human rights principle introduced by these two conventions. Prior to the establishment of KUHAP, Indonesia also recognised human rights and fair trial principles under the 1970 judicial authority law (Law No 14/1970).
23 The minister responsible for drafting the KUHAP was the then-Minister of Justice, Oemar Seno Adji, who was replaced by Mudjono in 1973. Oemar Seno Adji went on to become Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court. See Oemar Seno Adji, Hukum (Atjara) Pidana Dalam Prospeksi [Criminal Procedure Code in Prospective] (Erlangga 1973) 239–278.
24 See KUHAP, first draft, art 14. The file of this draft is with the author. It is not available online, but it can be consulted in Badjeber & Rosjadi (n 5).
25 ibid arts 17–24.
26 However, art 30(2) states that the police need a court warrant to seize written evidence. Only in an ‘emergency’ could they seize written evidence. Needless to say, the term ‘emergency’ is left to the police’s own discretion, granting them significant leeway in practice.
27 In response to the pressures of the reformasi (reform) movement in 1998, the Indonesian police force was formally separated from the military in 1999.
28 KUHAP, first draft, art 102 only states that during the trial, the judge must ask the accused whether they wish to be represented by a defence lawyer or not.
29 Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 7, after the minister’s general statement. This argument is repeated over and over to justify the authoritarian approach of the code.
30 For a more detailed discussion of Pancasila democracy, see Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford University Press 2005); David Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia the Ideology of the Family State (Routledge 2016).
31 See Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 81. This document shows that the government was in a rush to pass the law. This is why the PDI faction filed an objection to the meeting; their faction had only received the draft a day prior. The PDI also reiterated its objection to the process at the final meeting on 23 September 1981. Its spokesperson, Gde Jaksa, criticised the speaker of the parliament for seeking to pass the law without proper deliberation – describing the process as a process van hamerslagen, or ketuk palu saja (passing laws with the strike of a gavel). See Minutes, Final Joint Meeting (23 Sep 1981) 94. These minutes are not publicly available online; however, the author obtained a copy from the parliamentary library and has made it accessible at <https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aaid:sc:AP:fcc4679e-7f8a-467b-8d25-2d57bcb871ba> accessed 5 May 2025.
32 See Presidential Decree No 103/M (19 Sep 1977) on the Inauguration of Members of the DPR/MPR Elected in the 1977 General Election.
33 See Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 15–41. In the final meeting in 1981, however, Golkar toned down its objections. By this time, Hasibuan was no longer Golkar’s spokesperson.
34 In his exact words, ‘the draft does not provide enough protection (jaminan hukum yang mencukupi) for the accused … It is still too easy for the government to arrest and detain individuals because everything is based on the discretion of the authorities (penilaian subyektip) as regulated by Article 16ʹ. See Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 27–30. At that time, Indonesia had yet to ratify the ICCPR, which it would only do in 2005. Albert Hasibuan (1939–2022) was also a defence lawyer. His profession may have influenced his (and Golkar’s) views on the passive role of the defence lawyer. In the final meeting, Hasibuan was replaced as spokesperson, though the reasons for this change remain unclear. This article briefly discusses his replacement later on.
35 See Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 29.
36 In his statement, Albert Hasibuan cited the then-recent case of Yan Bodong, an individual charged with theft who had spent a year in pre-trial detention, during which he was reportedly tortured by the police. Hasibuan also referred to another incident highlighting the abuse of power resulting from the unchecked authority of law enforcement. Additionally, he raised concern over the deaths of six juveniles who were found in a detention cell at a Jakarta police station.
37 See Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 31.
38 See ibid 30–31. In his exact words, ‘with the restriction of communication, it appears that the government was not fully committed (tidak sepenuhnya) to upholding the rights of the accused’.
39 This means that ABRI held the enforcement power in the criminal justice system. As noted in fn 27, the police force was officially separated from ABRI in 2002 in response to pressure from the reformasi movement.
40 See Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 7.
41 For a more detailed discussion of Pancasila democracy, see fn 30. Moreover, Soeharto himself stated in his official autobiography that there was no room in Indonesia for Western-style democracy, and that Indonesian values are different from Western values. See Soeharto, G Dwipayana & Ramadhan KH, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds: An Autobiography (Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada 1991); Aspinall (n 30); Bourchier (n 30).
42 See Minutes, First Joint Meeting (8 Nov 1979) (n 1) 11. At this meeting, ABRI argued that the KUHAP was a step ahead of the colonial code. Under the colonial code, an accused could be detained indefinitely.
43 See ibid 11–14.
44 See ibid 61. In its official statement, the PPP claimed that the fundamental principle of the 1945 Constitution is a harmonious balance between individual rights and the power of the state (asas berpadunya secara seimbang antara kepentingan, hak dan wewenang pemerintah serta hak-hak asasi manusiawi rakyat), and that this balance must serve as the basis for the KUHAP.
45 See ibid 50–52. In his statement, Usman said that the Islamic doctrine of Imam Al-Syatibi in Al-Muwafaqat also mandates the need to safeguard human rights. According to this doctrine, there are five principles of human protection: religious protection, protection of life, intellectual protection, property rights, and ancestry/familial protection.
46 See ibid 68–69.
47 See ibid 65.
48 See ibid 80.
49 See ibid 85–86. Da Costa said that ‘both laws [referring to the colonial code and the KUHAP] are no different [in terms of the logic:] … First arrest, then detain, then look for evidence’ (emphasis in the original).
50 See ibid 85.
51 See ibid 89.
52 See ibid 86.
53 See ibid 88–89. To illustrate his argument, da Costa quoted the Dutch version of a well-known allegory: ‘De bergen baren, een belachelijk muisje wordt geboren’. This proverb, often rendered in English as ‘The mountain laboured and brought forth a mouse’, originates from one of Aesop’s fables and conveys the idea that something anticipated to be grand and consequential turns out to be small and insignificant.
54 See ibid 90.
55 Minutes, General Meeting (18 Nov 1979) <https://web.archive.org/web/20240809104621/https://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200831-085243-5509.pdf> archived from the original 9 Aug 2024, accessed 14 Apr 2025.
56 See ibid 6–7. This may be attributed to the fact that Mudjono himself had a military background, having served in the naval military police.
57 See KUHAP, first draft, arts 86–88.
58 Minutes, General Meeting (18 Nov 1979) (n 55) 10.
59 Soerjadi, who served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1966 to 1968, published an opinion piece in the Sinar Harapan newspaper on 19 November 1979. His views were later documented in Badjeber & Rosjadi (n 5) 309–311.
60 Specifically, he cited articles 8, 10, and 11 of UDHR.
61 Opinion from Mohammad Roem, a member of the NGO Lembaga Keadilan Hukum, originally published in the Harian Pelita newspaper on 10 November 1979. Cited from Badjeber & Rosjadi (n 5) 303–306.
62 Opinion from legal aid institutions from various backgrounds: LBH DKI, University of Indonesia (UI), Christian University of Indonesia (UKI), Pusbadhi, Posbakum, LPPH, and LKH. Cited from ibid 320–321.
63 See Minutes, Final Joint Meeting (23 Sep 1981) (n 31) 8–10.
64 ibid.
65 See ibid 101. In this meeting, the PDI, through its spokesperson Gde Jaksa, stated ‘that with this procedure, any action that can drastically undermine human rights is subject to strict supervision’.
66 Afandi & Bedner (n 21) 77–79. The authors highlight the limitations of the pre-trial mechanism as an effective safeguard for defendants, illustrating their argument with real-life case examples.
67 See KUHAP, art 82. However, this article was revoked in by the Constitutional Court in 2015.
68 In March 2021, the author conducted an interview with a senior judge in Jakarta as part of a broader research project. Parts of the interview data have been repurposed for this article. Reflecting on his role in the pre-trial procedure, the judge remarked that ‘it is like a gun without a bullet’, a metaphor that highlights the lack of real power in the process. This observation aligns with Lev’s (1999) argument that, in practice, judges often hesitate to hold their colleagues in the state apparatus accountable because of the inherent power disparity between the state and individuals. During the New Order era, judges were classified as civil servants, effectively subordinate to the executive. As part of institutional developments in the wake of reformasi, however, judges have, since 2004, operated under a framework that at least formally guarantees judicial independence from executive influence. See Daniel S Lev, ‘The Criminal Regime: Criminal Process in Indonesia’, in Rafael Vicente (ed), Figures Of Criminality In Indonesia, The Philippines, And Colonial Vietnam (Cornell University Press 1999); Sebastiaan Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse (SEAP Publications 2005); Dian Rositawati, ‘Judicial Governance in Indonesia’ (PhD thesis, Tilburg University 2019).
69 Pangaribuan (n 7); Afandi & Bedner (n 21).
70 See Minutes, Final Joint Meeting (23 Sep 1981) (n 31). The agreement of Golkar is on pp 35–47. The agreement of ABRI is on pp 57–77. The agreement of PPP on pp 83–91. Lastly, the agreement of PDI is on pp 98–106.
71 In 2015, the Constitutional Court regulated the threshold for preliminary evidence: two pieces of evidence and the testimony of a potential suspect.
72 See Minutes, Final Joint Meeting (23 Sep 1981) (n 31) 36–99.
73 See KUHAP, elucidation of art 115.
74 Minutes, Final Joint Meeting (23 Sep 1981) (n 31) 100.
75 Aspinall (n 30) 21; R William Liddle, ‘Indonesia in 1987: The New Order at the Height of Its Power’ (1988) 28 Asian Survey 180. In his book, Aspinall argues that the Soeharto regime was very good at suppressing dissent, in part by strategically permitting limited opposition to maintain a façade of democracy. He draws on Liddle’s analysis (1988), which introduced the concept of ‘limited pluralism’ to describe this strongly controlled form of political diversity.
76 It is interesting to note that before the final meetings of the KUHAP drafting committee, the spokespersons of two factions that had been critical of the government were changed. Albert Hasibuan, who had represented Golkar, was replaced by Taufik Hidayat, and Vincentius Bata da Costa was replaced by Gde Jaksa. It is unclear whether this change affected the stance of these factions on the KUHAP.
77 In today’s literature, this strategy is closely associated with so-called ‘autocratic legalism’. In this method of authoritarianism, maintaining a façade of democracy is an important factor.
78 T Mulya Lubis, In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order, 1966–1990 (PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama/SPES Foundation 1993) 111.
79 See Golkar’s opinion in the Final Joint Meeting (23 Sep 1981) (n 31) 47. Hidayat remarked that ‘[the establishment of KUHAP] marked a milestone in the history of mankind and strengthened Indonesian democracy’.
80 ibid 73.
81 ibid 81.
82 ibid 106.
83 Daniel Bell, ‘A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism: The Case of Singapore’ (1997) 25 Political Theory 6.
84 While the term ‘Asian values’ may be seen as encompassing a broad and multi-dimensional spectrum, certain values, such as the prioritisation of social harmony over individual freedoms, can potentially clash with democratic processes. This tension may, in turn, influence how a society structures its criminal justice system. See Daniel Ho, ‘Asian vs. Liberal Democracy: Identifying the Locus of Conflict in the Asian Values Debate’ (2023) 75 Political Science 165.
85 Lawrence Sáez & Julia Gallagher, ‘Authoritarianism and Development in the Third World’ (2009) 15 Brown Journal of World Affairs 87; Bourchier (n 30) 240. Bourchier observes that Indonesia’s authoritarian architecture, often described through the concept of ‘organicism’, served as an inspiration for other Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore and Malaysia.
86 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 The University of Chicago Law Review 545.
87 John H Langbein, ‘Torture and Plea Bargaining’ (1978) 46 The University of Chicago Law Review 3; Stephanos Bibas, ‘Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 2463; Cynthia Alkon, ‘The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye’ (2014) 41 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 561.
88 Afandi & Bedner (n 21).
89 Jacqui Baker, ‘The Rhizome State: Democratizing Indonesia’s Off-Budget Economy’ (2015) 47 Critical Asian Studies 309. The term ‘rhizome’ is borrowed from botany and refers to a type of underground stem that grows horizontally and produces shoots in multiple directions.
90 Fachrizal Afandi, ‘Maintaining Order: Public Prosecutors in Post-Authoritarian Countries, the Case of Indonesia’ (PhD thesis, Leiden University 2021).
91 It is important to note that during the New Order regime, the Supreme Court was part of the executive government, under the control of the Minister of Justice. In the wake of reformasi, the Supreme Court was separated from the executive government in 2004. See Pompe (n 68); Rositawati (n 68).
92 See, for instance, the chapter examining the role of defence lawyers in Indonesia in Binziad Kadafi et al, Advokat Indonesia Mencari Legitimasi: Studi Tentang Tanggung Jawab Profesi Hukum Di Indonesia [Indonesian Advocates Searching for Legitimacy] (Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia 2001); Santy Kouwagam, ‘How Lawyers Win Land Conflicts for Corporations: Legal Strategy and its influence on the Rule of Law in Indonesia’ (PhD thesis, Leiden University 2020); Pangaribuan (n 7); Institute for Criminal Justice Reform, ‘Menerapkan Standarisasi, Memperkuat Akuntabilitas dan Nilai-Nilai Ideal Profesi Advokat: Studi Kelembagaan Organisasi Advokat di Indonesia [Implementing Standardisation, Strengthening Accountability and Ideal Values of the Legal Profession: An Institutional Study of Advocate Organisations in Indonesia]’ (Jul 2023) <https://icjr.or.id/menerapkan-standardisasi-memperkuat-akuntabilitas-dan-nilai-nilai-ideal-profesi-advokat-studi-kelembagaan-organisasi-advokat-di-indonesia/> accessed 24 Apr 2025.
93 Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir & Rafiqa Qurrata A’yun, ‘Doing Business under the Framework of Disorder: Illiberal Legalism in Indonesia’ (2021) 42 Third World Quarterly 2651. The article highlights how the erosion of pivotal institutions – such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Constitutional Court – has profoundly impacted the evolution of Indonesia’s criminal justice system.
94 Stephen Thaman, The Two Faces of Justice in the Post-Soviet Legal Sphere: Adversarial Procedure, Jury Trial, Plea-Bargaining and the Inquisitorial Legacy (Hart Publishing 2008) 100–103.
95 Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies (Routledge 2015).
96 Sida Liu & Terence C Halliday, Criminal Defense in China: The Politics of Lawyers at Work (Cambridge University Press 2016).
97 Choky R Ramadhan, ‘Plead Guilty, Without Bargaining’ (2014) 32 Pacific Basin Law Journal 29; Lamchek (n 7).
98 Luhut MP Pangaribuan, ‘Lay judges dan hakim ad hoc: suatu studi teoritis mengenai sistem peradilan pidana Indonesia [Lay Judges and Ad Hoc Judges: A Theoretical Study On the Indonesian Criminal Justice System]’ (PhD thesis, University of Indonesia 2009).
99 The response from the police can be seen in RM Panggabean, ‘Rancangan Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana Dari Perspektif Polri Sebagai Penyidik [The Draft of Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code Reform From the Police’s Perspective as an Investigator]’ (2010) 39 Masalah-Masalah Hukum Jurnal 12.
100 See Constitutional Court Decision No 3/PUU-XI/2013 <https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_1630_3%20PUU%202013-telahucap-30Jan2014.pdf> accessed 6 May 2025.
101 See Constitutional Court Decision No 21/PUU-XII/2014 <https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/21_PUU-XII_2014.pdf> accessed 6 May 2025. Previously, to designate an individual as a suspect, the KUHAP only required authorities to possess ‘sufficient preliminary evidence’ (bukti permulaan yang cukup; bukti yang cukup). However, the KUHAP did not provide any sanction for defining such a term. The term ‘preliminary sufficient evidence’ is referenced in KUHAP, art 1 paras 14, 17, and 21.
102 In its consideration in Decision No 21/2014 (n 101), the Court mentioned the case of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund. In this case, the inconsistency of witness testimony ultimately led to the dismissal of the case (pp 102–103).
103 See Constitutional Court Decision No 130/PUU-XIII/2015 <https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/130_PUU-XIII_2015.pdf> accessed 6 May 2025.
104 Ady Thea DA, ‘Pembahasan RUU KUHAP Dimulai dari Nol [Discussion of the Draft Criminal Procedure Code (RKUHAP) to Restart from Scratch]’ (hukumonline.com, 23 Jan 2025) <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/pembahasan-ruu-kuhap-dimulai-dari-nol-lt6791d2f618bd4/> accessed 6 May 2025.
105 Eve Warburton, ‘Jokowi and the New Developmentalism’ (2016) 52 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 297; Sarah Nuraini Siregar, Riaty Raffiudin & Firman Noor, ‘Democratic Regression in Indonesia: Police and Low-Capacity Democracy in Jokowi’s Administration (2014–2020)’ (2022) 26 Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik 197.
106 Herlambang P Wiratraman, ‘Constitutional Struggles and the Court in Indonesia’s Turn to Authoritarian Politics’ (2022) 50 Federal Law Review 314.
107 Mudhoffir & A’yun (n 93); Petra Mahy, ‘Indonesia’s Omnibus Law on Job Creation: Legal Hierarchy and Responses to Judicial Review in the Labour Cluster of Amendments’ (2022) 17 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 51.
108 Simon Butt, ‘Indonesia’s New Criminal Code: Indigenising and Democratising Indonesian Criminal Law?’ (2023) 32 Griffith Law Review 190.
109 In Indonesian criminal justice literature, the tendency to maintain the status quo is known as ‘ego sektoral’, literally translated to ‘sectoral ego’ or ‘institutional ego’. For more in-depth discussion of ego sektoral, see Pangaribuan (n 7).
110 Lamchek (n 7) 171–173.
111 Andri Faruqi, ‘Peneliti Kritik Putusan MK Soal Praperadilan [Academics Criticise Constitutional Court’s Decision]’ (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia/TEMPO, 5 Jun 2015) <https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=10833&menu=2> accessed 15 Mar 2024.
112 After the Cold War, donor institutions (mainly funded by the United States) began to sponsor law reform, including criminal justice reform, in many foreign countries. See Allegra M McLeod, ‘Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice’ (2010) 29 Yale Law & Policy Review 83.
113 Le, Nguyen & Nguyen (n 14).
114 Paul J De Muniz, ‘Judicial Reform in Russia: Russia Looks to the Past to Create a New Adversarial System of Criminal Justice’ (2004) 11 Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 81; Thaman (n 94); Ekaterina Moiseeva, ‘Plea Bargaining in Russia: The Role of Defence Attorneys and the Problem of Asymmetry’ (2017) 41 International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 163.
115 Liu & Halliday, ‘Political Liberalism and Political Embeddedness’ (n 13); Liu & Halliday, Criminal Defense in China (n 96); James WC Lee, ‘Anti-Corruption in a Party-State: Constitutional Implications of China’s Supervisory Reform’ (2023) 18 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 389.
116 Cavise (n 3); Máximo Langer, ‘Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery’ (2007) 55 The American Journal of Comparative Law 617.