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Inductive reasoning: Competence or skill?

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Commentary On Cohen L. Jonathan (1981) Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?. BBS 4:317–370.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Christopher Jepson ,
David H. Krantz  and
Richard E. Nisbett
Christopher Jepson
Affiliation:
a Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106
David H. Krantz
Affiliation:
b Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, N.J. 07974
Richard E. Nisbett
Affiliation:
a Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106
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Open Peer Commentary
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 494 - 501
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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