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Different structures for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: One Mama, more milk, and many mice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Paul Bloom
Paul Bloom
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 bloom@u.arizona.edu
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Abstract

Although our concepts of “Mama,” “milk,” and “mice” have much in common, the suggestion that they are identical in structure in the mind of the prelinguistic child is mistaken. Even infants think about objects as different from substances and appreciate the distinction between kinds (e.g., mice) and individuals (e.g., Mama). Such cognitive capacities exist in other animals as well, and have important adaptive consequences.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 66 - 67
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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