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Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Lola L. Lopes
Lola L. Lopes
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 255 - 256
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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