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The presumption of consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2014

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdom. jevans@plymouth.ac.ukhttp://www.plymouth.ac.uk/pages/dynamic.asp?page=staffdetails&id=jevans&size=l
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Abstract

Throughout this article the authors presume – without justification – that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 26 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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