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Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Marco Casari
Marco Casari
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy. marco.casari@unibo.ithttp://www2.dse.unibo.it/casari/
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Abstract

The claims about (1) the lack of empirical support for a model of strong reciprocation and (2) the irrelevant empirical role of costly punishment to support cooperation in the field need qualifications. The interpretation of field evidence is not straightforward, and other-regarding preferences are also likely to play a role in the field.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 21 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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