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Understanding Conditionalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Christopher J. G. Meacham
Christopher J. G. Meacham*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA
*
Email: cmeacham@philos.umass.edu
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Abstract

At the heart of the Bayesianism is a rule, Conditionalization, which tells us how to update our beliefs. Typical formulations of this rule are underspecified. This paper considers how, exactly, this rule should be formulated. It focuses on three issues: when a subject’s evidence is received, whether the rule prescribes sequential or interval updates, and whether the rule is narrow or wide scope. After examining these issues, it argues that there are two distinct and equally viable versions of Conditionalization to choose from. And which version we choose has interesting ramifications, bearing on issues such as whether Conditionalization can handle continuous evidence, and whether Jeffrey Conditionalization is really a generalization of Conditionalization.

Keywords

ConditionalizationBayesianismbelief revisionbelief updatingformal epistemology

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time , December 2015 , pp. 767 - 797
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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