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Explanationism All the Way Down

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Ronald J. Allen
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Abstract

The probabilistic account of juridical proof meets insurmountable problems. A better explanation of juridical proof is that it is a form of inference to the best explanation that involves the comparative plausibility of the parties’ stories. In addition, discrete evidentiary matters such as relevance and probative value are also best understood as involving inference to the best explanation rather than being probabilistic.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , October 2008 , pp. 320 - 328
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

REFERENCES

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