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THE PROBLEM OF THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2015

Roger White
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Abstract

To solve the problem of induction we had first better know what it is. Some ways of formulating the worry about induction are underwhelming as they depend on assumptions that don't survive much scrutiny. Perhaps the most disturbing argument for inductive skepticism appeals to the claim that we could not possibly be justified in taking our inductive methods to be reliable independently of our use of those methods. And the use of inductive methods cannot give us justification to suppose that they are reliable. I argue for a new way to escape the first horn of this dilemma.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 275 - 290
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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