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RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2018

Mark Schroeder
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Abstract

In this paper I will be concerned with the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and the rational instability of belief. I will be concerned to make five points: first, that some defenders of pragmatic encroachment are indeed committed to predictable rational instability of belief; second, that rational instability is indeed troublesome – particularly when it is predictable; third, that the bare thesis of pragmatic encroachment is not committed to rational instability of belief at all; fourth, that the view that Jake Ross and I have called the ‘reasoning disposition’ account of belief has the right structure to predict limited and stable pragmatic encroachment on the rationality of belief; and fifth and finally, that the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment are rationally stable in the right ways.

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Episteme , Volume 15 , Special Issue 3: 2017 Episteme Conference , September 2018 , pp. 297 - 312
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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