Introduced in 2009, the debt brake instantly became a defining element of the German Fundamental Law. During the Eurozone fiscal crisis, it grew into the main constitutional export of the Merkel/Schäuble government, an executive remembered by its imposing austerity policies to ‘save’ the Eurozone. In what comes close to a U turn, Friedrich Merz, the German Chancellor in pectore, promoted in the early days of March 2025 an amendment to the Fundamental Law which, in less than a month, resulted in a radical recalibration of the debt brake. This editorial considers the very idiosyncratic procedure of reform followed in Germany, including the rather exceptional rulings produced by the German Federal Constitutional Court. I conclude by considering whether, politically and morally, it is wise for Germany to partially dismantle the break without some serious reconsideration of the effects that the previous “Germanisation” of the Eurozone had, and without some form of consultation with its European peers. Before that, I reconstruct how Germany shifted from debt brake enthusiasm to debt brake disenchantment.

European Central Bank (ECB) staff have repeatedly justified the carbon bias of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) in terms of “market neutrality”. Yet this term is not included in the Treaties so its meaning and legal nature are unclear. To clarify the meaning of market neutrality in the euro area’s monetary policy we develop a summative content analysis of the textual data contained in relevant legal and policy documents that are publicly available. We conclude that, in the context of monetary policy, the ECB and its staff have used the term market neutrality with two meanings: (i) the minimisation of any impact on the operation of markets and, in particular, on the operation of the price discovery mechanism; and (ii) the mirroring of the composition of a particular market to guide asset purchases. We then examine the legal nature of market neutrality in each of these two meanings. In its first meaning, we argue that market neutrality is the ECB’s definition of the so-called ‘principle of an open market economy’ (‘OME principle’) and it is therefore primary law. In its second meaning, we argue that market neutrality operationalises the OME principle and is therefore secondary law. Our conclusions differ from those reached by the first academic enquiries into the legal nature of market neutrality and open an academic debate on the matter. A clear understanding of the legal nature of market neutrality is also essential to assess the validity of the ECB’s climate change action plan.

The European Legal order, created by the European Court of Justice [ECJ], is an astonishingly effective treaty enforcement system. Previous explanations of its ‘transnational’ or ‘constitutional’ development have focused on the politics of judicial networks, and the wider political and economic context of postwar European democracy. Judicial biography has been almost entirely overlooked, even in the case of Robert Lecourt, widely acknowledged as the leading judge in the Court’s revolutionary period. Unknown to research on the ECJ, however, Lecourt had already spearheaded the adoption of the famous Article 49-3 of France’s 1958 Constitution. This paper demonstrates that the constitutional doctrines of European law and Article 49-3 were in fact premised on a similar ideology, that the pursuit of ‘effectiveness’ may require unprecedented restrictions on the traditional law-making role of national parliaments. Those were the constitutional values of the judge that, more than any other, built the foundations of the European legal order.

Beyond their differences, the various currents of neoliberalism share a common legal agenda: economic constitutionalism. From ordoliberal Ordnungspolitik to new classical macroeconomics and public choice, from Hayek’s ‘constitution of liberty’ to Vanberg’s ‘constitutional political economy’, an institutional agenda has emerged around a number of key tenets: enhancing the competition between jurisdictions through (state and international) federalism; safeguarding the competitive functioning of the market through supra-legislative rules; limiting fiscal policies and disciplining public spending through balanced budget rules; neutralising monetary policy through independent and price stability-oriented central banks. These key tenets of neoliberal constitutionalism infuse the three layers of the European economic constitution: the fundamental freedoms of movement pave the way to normative competition between national legislations (microeconomic constitution); competition law guarantees the competitive structure of the market (mesoeconomic constitution); European Economic and Monetary Union implements the rules of budgetary discipline and monetary stability (macroeconomic constitution). This does not imply that the European Union is solely a neoliberal project or that the European Union’s current neoliberal path is irreversible. But it does at least raise questions about the actual room for manoeuvre left by this rigid ‘economic constitution’ to public institutions in dealing with the various current crises.

How does EU free movement alter the role of the sovereign state? While this question may not sound new, this Article addresses it from a novel angle. If from the perspective of host Member States free movement upgrades a class of migrants to the status of ‘migrant citizens’, from the perspective of home Member States free movement instead splits the class of the citizens into citizen–settlers and citizen–migrants. The Article explores how the social contract between the state and the citizen is rewritten in the wake of this latter transformation. It articulates the duty of the states as agents for the citizen–migrants. It flashes out the implications for the relation between citizen–migrants and citizen–settlers. And it points to the partly reflexive nature of duties of states and citizens towards non-citizen migrants. It thus ultimately sheds light on how free movement prompts the sovereign state to embrace cosmopolitan obligations towards others ‘from within’, as an indirect effect of advancing the transnational interests of the citizen–migrants. The findings ultimately add to the cosmopolitan statist vision of European integration, while also rephrasing some of the questions of solidarity, non-discrimination and participation that remain unanswered in the literature on Union citizenship and free movement.

European cities struggle to regulate platform-mediated short-term rental services in response to local concerns over uncontrolled tourism and affordable housing. In their efforts to tame online platforms and local hosts, cities have consistently pointed to EU law as an obstacle to effective regulation and enforcement and called for solutions at EU level. To date, research has paid limited attention to the precise role of EU law in the regulatory responses to the growth of short-term renting. This article therefore offers an explanation of how EU internal market law structures the multi-level dynamics behind short-rental regulation. Methodologically, the article relies on a contextual analysis of the EU’s legal framework for (electronic) services and an in-depth, longitudinal case study of the City of Amsterdam’s efforts to regulate its Airbnb-driven short-term rental market (2013–2023). Comprehensive empirical evidence indicates that European e-commerce law can deter governments from enforcing platform cooperation in the upstream market and, instead, prompt them to shift the burden of regulation and compliance to the ‘actual’ service providers (the hosts) in the downstream market. These upstream/downstream dynamics also help to explain the successful adoption and normative content of the recent Short-Term Rental Regulation. With its focus on the power struggle between cities and platform actors in the EU internal market, the article also offers a unique, empirically grounded account of how EU law structures urban conflicts over housing and tourism in the context of platformisation and how platformisation might affect the dynamics of European market integration more generally.

The past decade has seen the rise of the semi-authoritarian regimes within the European Union. EU law scholars are rightfully concerned that, in the absence of a meaningful response, this leads to an existential crisis for the Union, as these regimes threaten respect for the Union’s foundational values. The Union did respond to what it has framed as a rule of law crisis by means of a constitutional transformation, asserting Union power to protect judicial independence within the Member States even in areas previously thought beyond the reach of Union law. This paper contends that the Union’s response to the authoritarian threat is flawed for its legalist faith in law and courts. In institutional terms, it was the Court of Justice of the European Union, rather than the Union’s political branches, that took the lead in this transformation. In substantive terms, the Union has transformed its constitutional framework to protect the organisational infrastructure of the judiciary, but it failed to do the same in response to various other strategies in the authoritarian playbook. By framing the authoritarian threat as, above all else, a threat to the judiciary, the Union’s response contributes to the reification of political debate at Union level and risks the alienation of the European polity.

Recent changes to EU fiscal policy, such as the landmark economic governance reform package passed in early 2024, have established a dense ‘coordination space’ that steers crucial social and economic choices at the EU and national levels. This coordination space, however, departs significantly from its historical predecessors. It largely operates within a hard law framework using finance rather than either rules or soft persuasion and peer review as its main tool of influence. In this coordination space, EU law is less a system of uniform rules underlain with sanctions than a negotiation framework where discretion abounds, and rules are never broken but rather ‘adjusted’. As this paper argues, the significance of the coordination space lies not only in its unique governance model and unclear boundaries but rather its increasing centrality to the governance of the EU. As the paper will explore using the rule of law example, even areas of EU law commonly conceived as necessarily insulated from political bargaining are increasingly drawn into the negotiation logic and instruments of coordination, rendering even more crucial a clear understanding of the trade-offs policy coordination implies. By unpacking 8 core features of policy coordination in the 2020s, the paper is therefore devoted to illuminating an expanding battleground within which EU law is being re-defined.

In this Article, I show how Danish reception of EC/EU law has been shaped by Nordic law and the connections between Danish and other Nordic jurists in a triangular system of social arenas. The purpose is to show in a concrete case that understanding the history of EU law in Member States requires us to engage increasingly with its connections to transnational legal orders and social structures that are older and different to the EU. In this, I aim to contribute to a history and sociology of EU law that puts its contingency at the forefront and removes EU from the main stage. The Article is based on the archives of the Nordic Jurist Meetings, a triennial conference of Nordic jurists dating back 150 years. I contextualise the debates with contemporary developments in the reception of EC/EU law within Denmark. I argue that Nordic law has played a special role in the history of EC/EU law in Denmark, as a source of reciprocal legitimation between the legal elites of the five Nordic countries. Whereas the Danish legal elite first believed in synergy between Nordic and EC law, the increased use of EU law to challenge this very elite during the 1990s onwards made them see Nordic law as in a principled, values-based opposition to European law. I argue that engagement in Nordic law has shaped Danish jurists’ perception of EU law, just as it has been mobilised in a defence of the Danish legal order against EU law.

No cooperative scheme in EU law has displayed bigger tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection than the EAW system. Despite the requirement developed by the CJEU for national courts to trust each other and recognise each other’s arrest warrants, the reality on the ground has shown high levels of distrust between national courts regarding Member States’ alignment with core EU values. In this contribution, we analyze how the CJEU has managed such tensions in the EAW system. To that effect, we first put the Court’s EAW case law into context by examining the broader language of mutual trust used by the Court in other fields of EU law. In doing so, we point out how the Court has espoused different levels of lawful distrust to be exercised in different circumstances under the scope of application of mutual trust. Given that broader context, it is contradictory for the Court to mainly view mutual trust as a requirement rather than a reality in need of permanent and continuing justification between national authorities. The latter conception of mutual trust is more apt to be the basis of EU horizontal cooperation, which must be value-based and sincere according to the Treaties. Therefore, we propose a bidimensional account of mutual trust as a legal principle, one that accommodates both trust and distrust as tools for managing the uncertainty and dynamic nature of trust-based cooperation. Finally, we explore how such account of mutual (dis)trust can be concretised by the Court and other political institutions.

Interactions of global change science, business and policymakers play a crucial role in shaping today’s regulatory frameworks for corporate sustainability. Our research question is why sustainability might actually be undermined by the ways that some prominent interfaces are informing corporate sustainability. Concentrating on ‘science-based’ initiatives that prescribe quantitative target-setting, business-driven task forces that define frameworks for businesses to assess and disclose information on strategies and targets, and the European Union (EU) as a supranational policymaking power, we scrutinise concepts, debates and developments involving these three globally influential non-state actors.

Although the conceptualisation of sustainability as a safe and just space is well established in academic and policy contexts, key premises are being lost in translation at science–business–policy interfaces, delaying or actually deflecting regulation of business. We call for science–business–policy interfaces to conceptualise corporate sustainability as business contributing to mitigating planetary biophysical pressures and securing social foundations worldwide. In this context, we argue that the research basis for ‘safe and just’ cannot be reduced to simplistic and separate quantifications. Treating global sustainability goals as an itemised checklist for business action, and using scientifically narrow and overly reductive approaches to quantification and target-setting, fall short of this systemic understanding of corporate sustainability.

The recognition of risks of unsustainability and the desire for sustainable value creation can act as drivers for change. Paradoxically, today’s business concept of ‘sustainable value’ actually undermines the potential for transformations to sustainability, and the dominant finance-driven treatment of ‘sustainability risks’ fall far short of capturing the hazards of continued unsustainabilities. In examining what the EU is actually doing, we find that the EU’s unprecedented attempts at regulating business for sustainability are being thwarted through powerful lobby interests, the outcomes of the science–business–policy interface, and the EU’s own fixation on economic growth and finance.

Sustainability involves dealing justly with today’s unsafe conditions, and dealing safely with unjust conditions. This requires radically more innovative responses from business, truly sustainability-oriented adaptive leadership from policymakers, and critically reflexive transdisciplinary engagement by a much wider range of sustainability scholars.

This article applies the lessons from the prior theory of responsive regulation in criminology to EU competition law and extends these lessons to argue in favour of an enhanced form of responsive competition law. First, it finds that EU competition law enforcement is already responsive in the traditional sense as it takes the reactions of undertakings into account when deciding which instrument to apply, in accordance with the enforcement pyramid developed by Braithwaite. An enforcement pyramid for EU competition law is presented. The objectives of competition law are found to be broad, and its key norms are open, facilitating responsiveness. This also allows competition law to develop to meet new societal demands, such as the need to control market power in the digital realm and to combat climate change. Next, the article examines the role of responsive and accountable behaviour by undertakings in competition law. First, it is found that in line with new forms of regulation concerning non-financial reporting, greenwashing, data protection, digital markets and services, and artificial intelligence, the special responsibility of dominant undertakings in competition law increasingly demands a pro-active approach to compliance. This also involves considering the interests of third parties and framing private governance in accordance with fundamental rights and legal principles. An enhanced degree of responsiveness of dominant undertakings results. Second, additional space is being created within competition law to accommodate undertakings that behave in a socially responsible manner, notably regarding sustainability. This is examined in relation to the issue of a fair share for consumers, and private enforcement by means of compliance agreements. After discussing potential objections to responsiveness in terms of democratic legitimacy, legal certainty, and redistribution of wealth, the article concludes that the developments sketched above indeed point towards the reinforcement of the responsive nature of competition law.

Belarus willingly uses migrants as a tool for political pressure, sending them into forests bordering the EU. This prompted Poland to secure its territory with additional troops and, first, to build a razor wire fence, and, second, to build an entire wall made of steel and concrete. The humanitarian situation of migrants stuck in the Białowieża forest has been dire. An underexposed theme is how not only people were hurt by the border policies, but non-human animals were also affected. As the effects of fencing ‘fortress Europe’ on wildlife are widespread (spatial behaviour, movements and gene flow), this paper uses the Polish–Belarusian border as a case study of a conflict between human border policies and non-human interests. We argue that the plans for the Polish wall are illegal, politically unjust and unethical, also from a more-than-human perspective. The wall is illegal because requirements under EU environmental law, in particular Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, were not met. The wall is unjust because it painfully demonstrates how animals’ communal or even liminal status is far from being recognised. Finally, the wall is unethical because it fails to account for the vulnerability of both humans and non-humans.

Consumers have in law been defined as the weaker parties in a transaction. Contract laws have integrated consumer protection with a view to balancing the interests of the parties, ensuring equal bargaining power and to some extent substantive fairness in contractual relations. Rules of consumer protection have therefore, from a contract lawyer’s perspective, been construed as expressions of a general principle of equality. The principle of equality, conceived in this way, complements the general principle of autonomy underlying contract law, which embodies the idea that parties should have the capacity for self-realisation. Does this construction of consumer contract law still hold in EU consumer markets transformed by the rise of online platforms and the overall move towards an economy based on services and experiences rather than the sale of physical goods? Or do we need to redefine the ways in which the principle of equality is expressed in European contract law in order to correct for new inequalities arising between consumers and businesses? This article aims to answer that question against the backdrop of established insights of the ways in which the rationality of European contract law differs from that of national, doctrinal private law systems. It concludes that the rules laid down in instruments such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) can protect consumers against exploitative practices. However, problems arise in cases where the interest at stake go beyond economic interests and concern also non-economic interests, such as data protection or freedom of expression, or do not have a market exchange value. Solutions can be pursued, it is submitted, by the European legislator and the European Court of Justice, potentially using the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a catalyst for reform.

The use of religious symbols has sparked heated debate and numerous judicial cases across Europe. Early case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been criticised for allegedly employing biased discourses. However, it remains unclear whether such biased discourses are present in recent ECtHR rulings or in comparable decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This article applies Critical Discourse Analysis, a linguistic and social science approach, to examine the narratives used by the ECtHR and ECJ in cases involving religious symbols. It argues that religious and gender biases are pervasive in ECtHR judgements. While the ECJ generally employs neutral language, biased discourses occasionally emerge in the ‘subtext’ of its decisions. These biases are not incidental but serve as strategic tools within judicial narratives, reinforcing the argumentative legitimacy of rulings for audiences influenced by societal prejudices.

Proactive transparency in the form of electronic provision of documents is required by law in the EU. It has long been acknowledged in law and technology studies that digital technology can have legal consequences when implemented to perform a legal function. Consequently, the technological design of document registers has the ability to limit as well as enhance access to documents. When technology can have such regulatory powers, incorporating it into a legal function requires closer attention as to how or why it is so. This article will provide a close analysis of the European Commission’s main Register of Documents (RegDoc) to study the implications of technological design for access to documents. Transparency is approached through a procedural view, highlighting its mechanisms. The article uses a HCI based walkthrough method for the case-study artefact critique of the RegDoc. The main findings suggest that there are two specific affordances of the RegDoc that limit access, especially for users who do not have pre-existing knowledge of the documents they are searching for. These affordances are, first, the scope of the dataset and, second, searchability. Overall, designing technology for legally relevant functions should take into account the wider legal framework that the technology aims to cater for. Attention should be paid to the affordances that can make a legal difference in a technology created to perform a legally relevant task.

This article examines how European Union (EU) arms control measures are tailored to its constitutional foundations. EU Member States subject shipments of arms and components to controls so as to screen them for risks and potentially block them. In this context different Member States may make different geopolitical and humanitarian risk assessments. Existing EU measures have achieved only limited security screening harmonisation, and have left room for Member States to shirk their obligations under international humanitarian law. But in case of joint arms production, which the EU subsidises to become more autonomous, one Member State’s arms controls may block another State’s exports and thereby jeopardise cooperation. This article posits that any reform of EU arms controls should start by re-evaluating their present legal basis. A constitutional competence analysis shows that controls on arms shipments to non-EU states should be regulated in part through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and not just through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This would be consistent with other EU regulatory regimes for trade security. While a joint CFSP-CCP approach cannot fully prevent conflict, since this would require further foreign policy harmonisation, it could help foster security convergence and strengthen humanitarian due diligence mechanisms.