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‘Stretched But Not Snapped’: A Response to Russell and Serban on Retiring the ‘Westminster Model’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2021

Matthew Flinders Open the ORCID record for Matthew Flinders [Opens in a new window] ,
David Judge ,
R.A.W. Rhodes Open the ORCID record for R.A.W. Rhodes [Opens in a new window]  and
Adrian Vatter Open the ORCID record for Adrian Vatter [Opens in a new window]
Matthew Flinders*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
David Judge
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
R.A.W. Rhodes
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
Adrian Vatter
Affiliation:
Institute of Political Science, Bern University of Applied Sciences, Bern, Switzerland
*
*Corresponding author. Email: m.flinders@sheffield.ac.uk
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Abstract

This article engages with Meg Russell and Ruxandra Serban's (2021) argument that the Westminster model is ‘a concept stretched beyond repair’ that deserves ‘to be retired’. We examine the logic, theory and methods that led to such a powerful, potent and provocative argument. We suggest their approach may have inadvertently ‘muddied’ an already muddled concept. We assess the implications of ‘muddying’ for their conclusion that the Westminster model is, in essence, a dead concept in need of a decent funeral. We suggest the concept is ‘stretched but not snapped’ by developing a simple four-perspective broadening of the analytical lens. This approach aids understanding about what the concept covers, how it is operationalized and why it remains useful in comparative research.

Keywords

Westminster modeldemocracycomparative politicsconceptsinterpretivisminstitutionalism
Type
Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , April 2022 , pp. 353 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited

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