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Innateness and Canalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

André Ariew
André Ariew*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
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Abstract

Cognitive scientists often employ the notion of innateness without defining it. The issue is, how is innateness defined in biology? Some critics contend that innateness is not a legitimate concept in biology. In this paper I will argue that it is. However, neither the concept of high heritability nor the concept of flat norm of reaction (two popular accounts in the biology literature) define innateness. An adequate account is found in developmental biology. I propose that innateness is best defined in terms of C. H. Waddington's concept of canalization.

Type
Philosophy of Biology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S19 - S27
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Alan Belasco, Paul Bloom, Denise Cummins, Richard Lewontin, Elliott Sober, and Denis Walsh for comments on earlier drafts.

‡

Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ 85721.

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