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Laws and Initial Conditions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Mathias Frisch
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Abstract

I discuss two case studies from classical electrodynamics challenging the distinction between laws that delineate physically possible words and initial conditions. First, for many reasonable initial conditions there exist no global solutions to the Maxwell-Lorentz equations for continuous charge distributions. Second, in deriving an equation of motion for a charged point particle one needs to invoke an asymptotic condition that seems to express a physically contingent fact even though it is mathematically necessary for the derivation.

Information

Type
Laws, Possibility, and the New Instrumentalism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 696 - 706
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Frisch, Mathias (2005), Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-locality: Philosophical Issues in Classical Electrodynamics. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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