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The Pomp of Superfluous Causes: The Interpretation of Evolutionary Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

D. M. Walsh
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Abstract

There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in trait frequencies in a population can be attributed only to selection or drift against the background of a particular statistical description of the population. The traditionalist supposition that selection and drift are description-independent causes of population change leads the dynamical interpretation into a dilemma: it must face a contradiction or accept the loss of explanatory power.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 3 , July 2007 , pp. 281 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I wish to thank audiences at Stirling, Toronto, and CSHPS for helpful questions and comments. I have benefited greatly from discussion with Sorin Bangu, Anjan Chakravartty, Ronnie de Sousa, Ronpal Dosanjh, Margie Morrison, Elliott Sober, Kyle Stanford, Chris Stephens, and Michael Strevens. I am particularly indebted to my fellow ‘statisticalistas’ André Ariew and Mohan Matthen.

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