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Two Dogmas of Methodology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Larry Laudan
Larry Laudan*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , December 1976 , pp. 585 - 597
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to my colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and especially to Adolf Grünbaum whose criticisms saved me from some egregious errors.

References

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