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Against Consequentialist Interpretations of Deontological Principles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 September 2025

Amir Saemi
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Abstract

The distinction between doing and allowing (DDA); intentional and non-intentional agency (DDE); and agent-relative versus agent-neutral values have been invoked to support the deontological nature of moral thought. Consequentialists claim that, since these distinctions can be incorporated into value theory, all plausible deontological theories ultimately reduce to consequentialism. I argue: first, that while the DDA and DDE can be framed in agent-neutral terms, they must be interpreted in agent-relative terms; second, that even when interpreted in agent-relative terms, the DDA and DDE compel non-consequentialist understandings; and third, that these three distinctions function as non-consequentialist constraints on deliberation about action, thus resisting attempts to ‘consequentialize’ them. The conclusion is that, far from being a mere variant of consequentialism, deontology is a distinct moral theory—one that offers a principled rejection of the consequentialist ‘compelling idea’ that it is always permissible to bring about the outcome with the best possible consequences.

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Type
Research Article
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Philosophy , Volume 100 , Issue 2 , April 2025 , pp. 179 - 202
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy

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