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The No-Minimum argument and satisficing: a reply to Chris Dragos

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2013

JEFF JORDAN
JEFF JORDAN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, 19716, USA e-mail: jjjordan@udel.edu
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Abstract

Chris Dragos has recently presented two objections to criticisms I've published against Peter van Inwagen's No-Minimum argument. He also suggests that the best way to criticize the No-Minimum argument is via the concept of divine satisficing. In this article I argue that both of Dragos's objections fail, and I question whether satisficing is relevant to the viability of the No-Minimum argument.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 379 - 386
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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