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Locke-ing onto Content

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Frank Jackson
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Extract

Our reading is a passage from John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, § 2.

When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. … Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification.

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Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 49 , March 2001 , pp. 127 - 143
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2001

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