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There is No Such Thing as a Purely Logical Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2025

Mette Leonard Høeg*
Affiliation:
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
*
*Corresponding author. Email: Mette.hoeg@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

Philosophical writing always already entails poetics and rhetoric, even if the convention has been to try to reduce these dimensions in the effort to enhance the logic and clarity of an argument. Humans rely on aesthetics and narrative, to make themselves understood and to persuade and influence. A heightened awareness and more extensive use of these dimensions in philosophical and scientific writing could help facilitate deeper and more experiential ways for readers to engage with theoretical ideas, including the reductive theory of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit (which may have little psychological traction when presented in conventional scientific and philosophical discourses, which strive to be purely rational), and help release their emancipatory and consolatory potential.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy.

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References

Anderson, Peter J. (2015) Seneca: Selected Dialogues and Consolations (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett).Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Wilkinson, Dominic (2023) ‘Grief and the Inconsolation of Philosophy’, Philosophy 98: .10.1017/S0031819123000049CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed