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Vice-Charging and Epistemic Vices of Consequence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2025

Gerry Dunne*
Affiliation:
Marino Institute of Education, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland.
*
*Corresponding author. Email: gedunne@tcd.ie
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Abstract

This article presents a short account of the practice of vice-charging within the domain of vice epistemology. It briefly examines two pervasive epistemic vices – closed-mindedness and insouciance – and then explores some of the issues surrounding when and how to go about charging others with an epistemic vice.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy.

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References

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