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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2025
Many legal rules and principles may govern constitutional amendment. Observance of these rules and principles is an elementary focus point for the study of constitutional change. But constitutions do not exist solely in a legal reality. They are a cornerstone of the body politic in which they are adopted. Studying constitutional amendments through the lens of their legitimacy requires more than merely assessing their legality. However, distinguishing legitimacy from legality raises the question of whether an illegal amendment can still be considered legitimate, and conversely, whether a legal amendment can still be deemed illegitimate. Through a case study of constitutional overhauls in Belgium in the post-war period, I explore how these two possibilities manifest in practice, demonstrating that at crucial occasions in a state's history, amendments deemed illegal may be legitimised, and technically legal amendments may face criticism regarding their legitimacy.
Councillor at the Council of State of Belgium; Associate Professor at ConstitUGent, the constitutional law research centre at Ghent University. I would like to thank Jaclyn L Neo, Kevin YL Tan, Richard Albert, and the participants of the 2021 symposium ‘When is a Constitutional Amendment Illegitimate?’ at the National University of Singapore for creating the occasion for this paper and for their feedback. My thanks also go to the organisers and participants of the 2023 European Constitutional Law Review symposium at the University of Amsterdam, and to the anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions. Some English translations from Belgian sources are my own. Nothing in this article reflects positions of the institutions of which I am a member.
1 For an introduction to different typologies, see, eg, Doyle, Oran, ‘Order From Chaos? Typologies and models of constitutional change’, in Contiades, Xenophon & Fotiadou, Alkmene (eds), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change (Routledge 2020)Google Scholar.
2 I understand legitimacy here in a non-normative sense. According to Fallon,
measured in sociological terms, a constitutional regime, governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in a strong sense insofar as the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.
Richard H Fallon Jr, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1787, 1795. More recently, see also Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendments. Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (Oxford University Press 2019) 270–271.
3 Alon Harel & Adam Shinar, ‘Two concepts of constitutional legitimacy’ (2022) 12 Global Constitutionalism 80, 80–87.
4 Officially known as the European Commission for Democracy through Law, an independent consultative body tasked with, inter alia, promoting the rule of law and democracy.
5 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Report 469/2008 on Constitutional Amendment’ (CDL-AD(2010)001, adopted 11–12 Dec 2009) 6.
6 Neither of these sources, it will be seen, refers to a specific conception of legitimacy. Some considerations lean more towards one than towards the other, although it would require an amount of interpretation and qualification to categorise them distinctly. As the focus of this paper is on the legality-legitimacy bifurcation, this ambiguity does not seem problematic and will not be further examined.
7 The lower chamber is the Chamber of Representatives, the upper chamber the Senate. The latter's political significance has considerably dwindled over the past decades, with the exception of, among a limited number of other issues, the constitutional amendment procedure. Whereas the Constitution still refers to the King on many occasions, and while the Head of State's signature is still formally required for a number of legal decisions, today this formula is for all practical purposes understood as the Federal Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet is politically responsible to the Chamber of Representatives. See Constitution of the Kingdom of Belgium (ratified 7 Feb 1831, last amended 2024), art 101.
8 For more background on the amendment procedure in English, see, eg, Behrendt, Christian, ‘The process of constitutional amendment in Belgium’, in Contiades, Xenophon (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change. A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and the USA (Routledge 2013)Google Scholar; Popelier, Patricia & Lemmens, Koen, The Constitution of Belgium: A Contextual Analysis (Bloomsbury 2015) 37–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 The vocabulary traditionally used here may give cause to some confusion. As it was created by the Constitution, the legislative branch is a constituted power that can only exercise derivative constituent (amendment) powers. In this context, it is not equated with the constituent power understood as the original creator of the Constitution. On the origins of these concepts, see, eg, Yaniv Roznai, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea’ (2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 657, 661–665.
10 The pre-constituent assembly can indicate its intention to introduce a new subject matter. In that case, the subject matter binds the constituent assembly (ChR 1964–65, n° 993/6, 4–5; see also ChR 1967–68, n° 561/4, 3–4). Note that there is no possibility for judicial review of constitutional amendments. Both the Constitutional Court (see, eg, CC 27 Apr 2017, n° 45/2017, B.9.1; CC 28 May 2015, n° 81/2015, B.12) and the Council of State in its advisory capacity (see, eg, CS 14 Nov 1979, n° 13.482/VR; more recently CS 2 May 2012, n° 51.214/AG-AV) lack this competence.
11 Changing the amendment procedure has repeatedly been discussed, so far without effect. See, eg, Francis Delpérée et al (eds), ‘La procédure de révision de la constitution’ (Bruylant 2003); Alexander De Becker & Emmanuel Vandenbossche (eds), Scharnier- of sleutelelementen in het grondwettelijk recht (Die Keure 2011); see also Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove, ‘De grondwetsherzieningsprocedure: naar een omzeiling of naar een herziening’ [2011] Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht 531; more recently, eg, Ronald Van Crombrugge, ‘Een democratisch grondwetgevingsproces in België? Voorbij artikel 195 GW’ [2019] Publiekrechtelijke Kronieken 269; Hugues Dumont, ‘Ouvrir à révision l'article 195 et réveiller le pouvoir constituant originaire : possibilité, risques et opportunités’ [2019] Publiekrechtelijke Kronieken 448.
12 Arguably, with the perceived socio-political need to change the institutional architecture, the so-called ‘amendment culture’ has shifted as well. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, ‘Does the constitutional amendment rule matter at all? Amendment cultures and the challenges of measuring amendment difficulty’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 686, 699–701.
13 There are different definitions of this concept. A common denominator is the proposition that linguistic, ethnic, religious, or other forms of diversity are not only present in society but are also politically salient. See, eg, Ian Lustick, ‘Stability in deeply divided societies: Consociationalism versus control’ (1979) 31 World Politics 325, 325; more recently Reilly, Benjamin, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge University Press 2001) 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Some also refer to ‘deeply’ divided societies when the division has led to (a risk of) violence; see Adrian Guelke, Politics in Deeply Divided Societies (Polity 2012) 9–10.
14 There have been other important divides, including religion and social class. These also affected aspects of the legal architecture, but not to the same extent. See Maurice Adams, ‘Disabling constitutionalism. Can the politics of the Belgian Constitution be explained?’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 279, 290–293; Dave Sinardet, ‘Le fédéralisme consociatif belge: vecteur d'instabilité?’ (2011) 136 Pouvoirs 21, 26. On Belgian consociationalism before the state reforms, see, eg, Kris Deschouwer, ‘From consociation to federation. How the Belgian parties won’, in Kurt Richard Luther & Kris Deschouwer (eds), Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in Consociational Democracy (Routledge 1999); earlier, Lijphart, Arend (ed), Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium. The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society (University of California Press 1981)Google Scholar.
15 Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (Yale University Press 1977) 1Google Scholar.
16 For a more elaborate overview, see John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary & Richard Simeon, ‘Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict regulation’, in Sujit Choudhry (ed), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford University Press 2008); Brendan O'Leary, ‘Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments’, in Sid Noel (ed), From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (McGill-Queen's University Press 2005) 3–12. For an electoral perspective, see Reilly (n 13) 1–26.
17 On these concepts, see McGarry, O'Leary & Simeon (n 16) 57–61.
18 The capital of Brussels is a bilingual area in terms of government. Originally Dutch-speaking, the city later became majority French-speaking. Given its international functions, today many more languages are spoken in Brussels.
19 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (n 15) 25–44. Compare with the ‘conflict-regulating practices’ identified by Nordlinger: stable coalitions, proportionality, mutual vetoes, purposive depoliticisation, compromise, and concessions. See Nordlinger, Eric A, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Harvard University Press 1972) 20–33Google Scholar.
20 On the intricacies of these institutional arrangements, see also, eg, Adams (n 14) 281–288.
21 For a detailed account of this evolution, see, eg, Witte, Els, ‘Increasing Tension Between the Communities and the Creation of a Federalised Belgium’, in Witte, Els, Craeybeckx, Jan & Meynen, Alain (eds), Political History of Belgium (Academic & Scientific Publishers 2009)Google Scholar.
22 Constitution of the Kingdom of Belgium, arts 1–4.
23 ibid arts 4, final section, and 43.
24 ibid art 54.
25 ibid art 99.
26 The government of the capital-region of Brussels reflects these balances on its own scale. There, the Dutch-speakers are the politically protected minority.
27 Today, there is only one (far-left) politically relevant national party. No politicians are elected nationwide.
28 In that sense, the amendments adopted on the occasion of state reforms (taken together) would certainly qualify as what Albert defines as a matter of constitutional ‘dismemberment’: a thorough transformation of the constitution ‘while seeking to retain legal continuity, whether by altering a fundamental right, a central structure, or a core feature of constitutional identity’. See Albert (n 2) 91.
29 Constitution of the Kingdom of Belgium, art 4, final section. ‘Special laws’ are of particular importance because, unlike constitutional revisions under Article 195 of the Constitution, they require a majority in each linguistic group in order to be adopted. See Moonen, Toon & Meeusen, Benjamin, ‘De functies van de bijzondere wet in het communautaire België’, in Moonen, Toon, Cannoot, Pieter & Riemslagh, Jonas (eds), 50 Jaar Bijzondere Wetten (Intersentia 2021)Google Scholar.
30 See also Popelier & Lemmens (n 8) 43–45.
31 Implicit constitutional amendments in this sense are not to be confused with instances of informal constitutional change, which may also occur without any change to the text. See, eg, several contributions in Contiades & Fotiadou (n 2).
32 For more details, see Jan Velaers, De Grondwet: Een artikelsgewijze commentaar (Part III) (Die Keure 2019) 692–695; Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove, ‘De herziening en de coördinatie van de Grondwet’, in Marc Van der Hulst & Ludo Veny (eds), Parlementair Recht: Commentaar en Teksten (Mys & Breesch 1998) 61–64; André Alen & Frank Meersschaut, ‘De “impliciete” herziening van de Grondwet’, in Walter Jean Ganshof van der Meersch (ed), Présence du droit public et des droits de l'homme: mélanges offerts à Jacques Velu (Bruylant 1992) 263–269.
33 Compare the text of Article 30 of the Constitution (‘The use of languages spoken in Belgium is optional; only the law can rule on this matter, and only for acts of the public authorities and for judicial affairs’) with the text of Article 129(1):
The Parliaments of the Flemish and French Communities, to the exclusion of the federal legislator, regulate by federate law, each one as far as it is concerned, the use of languages for: 1° administrative matters; 2° education in the establishments created, subsidised or recognised by the public authorities; 3° social relations between employers and their personnel, as well as company acts and documents required by the law and by regulations.
34 For an early account, see, eg, André Mast, ‘De recente grondwetsherziening en de door artikel 131 van de Grondwet opgelegde procedure’ (1972) 31 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1473, 1482–1484. Of course, whether or not an implicit amendment actually amounts to an illegal amendment may be open to debate, either on the basis of whether there is in fact an incompatibility between the provision read in isolation and the same provision read together with the provision by which it is allegedly amended, or on the basis of interpretations of the intentions of the pre-constituent assembly. See also Alen & Meersschaut (n 32) 270.
35 Compare the text of what was then Article 26, first sub-paragraph (now Article 36) of the Constitution (‘The legislative power is exercised jointly by the King, the House of Representatives and the Senate’) with the text introduced at that time as Article 59bis(2), first sub-paragraph (now Article 127(1), first sub-paragraph) of the Constitution: ‘The Councils of the communities, each one in so far as it is concerned, regulate by federate law …’.
36 ChR 1964–65, n° 993/6, 7–8; Sen 1964–65, n° 278, 9–10.
37 Sen 1969–70, n° 391, 14. See also the commentary by the competent minister's deputy chief of staff: Walter Van Assche, ‘De grondwetgever van 24 december 1970 en het dilemma preconstituante–volkswil’ (1971) 26 Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht 363, 378.
38 Sen 1969–70, n° 391, 32–35. In legal doctrine, some also confirmed that as far as the First State Reform was concerned, the majority's interpretation of Article 195 of the Constitution was not unreasonable, as ‘interference with Articles that were not open for amendment was hard to avoid’ (Karel Rimanque, ‘Kanttekeningen bij een herziene Grondwet’ [1971] Rechtskundig Weekblad 689, 696–697); approvingly, Jean-Claude Scholsem, ‘Advies over het voorstel tot herziening van artikel 151, § 5 van de Grondwet en van de overgangsbepalingen met betrekking tot zijn inwerkingtreding’ (Sen 1998–99, n° 1121/3) 34–36.
39 Compare the text of Article 39 of the Constitution,
The law assigns to the regional bodies that it creates and that are composed of elected representatives the power to manage the matters that it determines … within the scope and according to the manner laid down by a law. This law must be passed by a [supermajority] …,
with the text of Article 118(2), first sub-paragraph, first sentence of the Constitution:
A law adopted by a [supermajority] designates those matters relating to the election, composition and functioning of the [community and regional parliaments] which these Parliaments regulate, each for itself.
40 Sen 1991–92, n° 1449/2, 19; see also ChR 1991–92, n° 1791/3, 29–36.
41 CS 18 Dec 1992, n° 21.990/VR, 92 (advisory opinion).
42 ChR 1992–93, n° 725/6, 56; see also Johan Vande Lanotte et al, Belgisch Publiekrecht (Die Keure 2015) 81–82.
43 Note that more punctual constitutional reforms have also raised concerns about the implicit amendments they entailed, see, eg, a debate on the introduction of gender equality norms in the Constitution in Sen 2000–01, n° 465/4, 76–83 and 101–118.
44 ChR 1990–91, n° 10/60-1531/2, 5–6.
45 ChR 1989–90, n° 961/3, 20–28. See also Marc Van Der Hulst & Anne Vander Stichele, ‘Is de herzieningsbevoegdheid van de grondwetgever beperkt?’ (1991) 46 Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht 514, 521–523.
46 ChR 1997–98, n° 1591/2, 169–170.
47 CS 2 Apr 1998, n° 27.415/2, 32–33 (advisory opinion). The Constitutional Court declined to adjudicate the amendment process, including criticism of implicit amendments, see CC 9 Feb 1994, n° 16/94.
48 ChR 2002–03, n° 2389/3, 31. The Cabinet member later called them hypocritical (Senate, plenary session 6 May 2010, n° 122, 79).
49 ChR 2006–07, n° 3056/5, 10.
50 However, on certain specific issues, implicit amendments were not completely absent, see Sen 2013–14, n° 2232/5, 284.
51 In the Constitution itself, the temporary provision was wrongly identified as a ‘transitional’ provision.
52 The temporary provision added the following to the existing text:
The Houses, as they were constituted following their full renewal on 13 June 2010, may however, in common consent with the King, pronounce on the revision of the following provisions, articles and groups of articles, but only to the effect as indicated hereafter …
53 ChR 2011–12, n° 2064/1, 3. See also Sen 2011–12, n° 1532/3.
54 This implied that the constitutional provisions that had been opened for amendment prior to the 2010 elections in accordance with the normal procedure of Article 195 of the Constitution could also be amended during this term (eg, ChR 2011–12, n° 2064/1, 4).
55 Contrary to what is usually the case, the constituent assembly that would make use of these peculiar and temporary powers could only do so ‘to the effect as indicated’. In other words, the intentions expressed in the new provision were binding. In the normal setting of a declaration for revision, this is in principle not the case.
56 ChR 2011–12, n° 2064/3, 8.
57 ibid 14–15.
58 ibid 19.
59 ibid 19–21.
60 ibid 22.
61 ChR 2009–10, n° 2593/3, 7 et seq; see also Sen 2009–10, n° 1777/3.
62 The question of the applicability of a constitutional amendment ratione temporis had been a point of debate in earlier times (Sen 2002–03, n° 1549/3, 27–28 and 81–82). See also Jan Velaers, ‘Artikel 195, overgangsbepaling: een tijdelijke versoepeling van de procedure voor de herziening van de Grondwet’, in Jan Velaers et al (eds), De zesde staatshervorming: instellingen, bevoegdheden en middelen (Intersentia 2014) 12–13.
63 Some suggest that this was not the case, see, eg, Pierre Vandernoot, ‘La revision de l'article 195 de la Constitution du 29 mars 2012: “Ceci (n’)est (pas) une revision”’, in Joëlle Sautois & Marc Uyttendaele (eds), La sixième réforme de l'État (2012–2013) : Tournant historique ou soubresaut ordinaire? (Anthemis 2013) 32.
64 Notwithstanding earlier hints, see in particular the intervention of one Senator during the plenary session of 6 May 2010, n° 122, 20.
65 Marc Verdussen, ‘Réviser la Constitution à n'importe quel prix?’ (La Libre Belgique, 11 Feb 2012) 32.
66 Dave Sinardet, ‘De truc met artikel 195’ (De Morgen, 29 Feb 2012) 20.
67 Robert Senelle, quoted in Pierre Havaux, ‘La « vieille Dame » toute malmenée’ (Le Vif/L'Express, 9 Mar 2012) 18.
68 Vincent de Coorebyter, quoted in ibid.
69 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Zappen met een vodje papier’ (De Standaard, 10 Jan 2012) 23.
70 Hendrik Vuye, ‘De grondwetsfraude van de regering-Di Rupo’ (De Morgen, 14 Feb 2012) 20.
71 Carl Devos, ‘De truc met de grondwet’ (Het Nieuwsblad, 20 Feb 2012) 8.
72 Bart Maddens, ‘Hoe Di Rupo de N-VA achter slot en grendel zet’ (De Morgen, 27 Feb 2012) 16.
73 Marc Uyttendaele, quoted in Havaux, ‘La « vieille Dame » toute malmenée’ (n 67).
74 Christian Behrendt, quoted in Paul Piret, ‘Il faudra réviser la Constitution selon une procédure dérogatoire’ (La Libre Belgique, 5 Nov 2011) 4.
75 Francis Delpérée, ‘Je jure de l'observer et de la modifier si nécessaire’ (La Libre Belgique, 15 Mar 2012) 31.
76 Johan Vande Lanotte, quoted in Pierre Havaux, ‘Pour une fois, une réforme de l'Etat respecte la Constitution!’ (Le Vif/L'Express, 9 Mar 2012) 21; see also Vandernoot (n 63) 79.
77 André Alen, quoted in Ruth Boone, ‘Een handleiding voor het Belgische institutionele labyrint’ (De Juristenkrant, 8 Feb 2012) 7.
78 Belgian Government, ‘Memorandum for the Attention of the Venice Commission’ (CDL-REF(2012)019, 16 May 2012) 10–18.
79 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Opinion n° 679/2012 on the revision of the Constitution of Belgium’ (CDL-AD(2012)010, 20 Jun 2012) 7–14.
80 ibid 14. The Commission's opinion was subsequently criticised, see Patricia Popelier, ‘De truc met artikel 195: een lapje voor het bloeden met de zegen van Venetië’ [2012] Publiekrechtelijke Kronieken 421, 442. There is, in any case, tension with the Commission's position in its general report on constitutional amendment, in which it stresses, for example, that popular consent to amendments should not be used to circumvent existing amendment procedures; see European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Report n° 469/2008 on Constitutional Amendment’ (CDL-AD(2010)001, 11–12 Dec 2009) 35–38.
81 Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove, ‘De nieuwe “overgangsbepaling” bij artikel 195 van de Grondwet. Een herbruikbare tijdelijke afwijking van de herzieningsprocedure?’ [2012] Tijdschrift voor Wetgeving 156, 164; see also Bernard Bléro, ‘La refonte de l'article 195 de la Constitution: No future?’ [2012] Administration Publique 587, 594–595; Werner Vandenbruwaene, ‘Grondwetwijziging via overgangsbepaling’ [2012] Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht 409, 417–418; Patrick Peeters, ‘De “overgangsbepaling” van artikel 195 van de Grondwet: een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor de uitvoering van de zesde staatshervorming’ [2013] Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht 379; Vandernoot (n 63) 61.
82 Velaers, ‘Artikel 195, overgangsbepaling’ (n 62) 14.
83 Popelier (n 80) 430–431 and 434.
84 Velaers, De Grondwet (n 32) 694; Alen & Meersschaut (n 32) 271–273.
85 See, eg, André Alen & Koen Muylle, Handboek van het Belgisch Staatsrecht (Kluwer 2011) 228–229; Vande Lanotte et al (n 42) 81; Behrendt, Christian & Vrancken, Martin, Principes de Droit constitutionnel belge (Die Keure 2019) 371Google Scholar; Lejeune, Yves, Droit constitutionnel belge: fondements et institutions (Larcier 2017) 86Google Scholar. As one author remarked, during the final decades of the twentieth century, implicit amendments have been so present that they were eventually trivialised; see Van Nieuwenhove, ‘De herziening en de coördinatie van de Grondwet’ (n 32) 77–78.
86 Adams (n 14) 299–301.
87 Yaniv Roznai, ‘Clownstitutionalism: Making a Joke of the Constitution by Abuse of Constituent Power’ (2024) 8 Jurídica Ibero 51, 83.
88 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (n 15) 50.
89 ibid 55–61, 81–83, 99–103. Compare with the thesis that bipolar federal systems are more fragile (eg, Ronald L Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (3rd edn, McGill-Queen's University Press 2008) 71–72). Linked to this, it has been suggested that resilience is enhanced when constituent groups possess relatively equal size and socio-economic power, see Arend Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, in Joel Krieger (ed), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001).
90 For an overview of scholarship that both builds on and critiques Lijphart's approach, see, eg, Matthijs Bogaards, ‘Comparative Political Regimes: Consensus and Majoritarian Democracy’, in William R Thompson et al (eds), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford University Press 2014); also nuancing O'Leary, ‘Debating Consociational Politics’ (n 16) 19–36.
91 See, eg, Didier Caluwaerts & Min Reuchamps, ‘Combining Federalism with Consociationalism: Is Belgian Consociational Federalism Digging its Own Grave?’ (2015) 14 Ethnopolitics 277; also Patrick Peeters, ‘Reflections on the Belgian federal state’, in Michael Burgess & John Pinder (eds), Multinational Federations (Routledge 2007) 31, 37–38; cf, Kris Deschouwer, ‘And the Peace Goes On? Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First Century’ (2006) 29 West European Politics 895, 909, who hypothesises that the unattractiveness of federal gridlock diminishes as the federated entities become more powerful.
92 See, eg, Caluwaerts & Reuchamps (n 91); Sinardet, ‘Le fédéralisme consociatif belge’ (n 14); Caroline Van Wynsberghe, ‘The End of Belgium As We Know It: From Consociational Democracy to Partitocratic Deadlock?’, in Alberto López-Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San-Epifanio (eds), Claims for Secession and Federalism: A Comparative Study with a Special Focus on Spain (Springer 2019) 203–219.
93 See also Adams (n 14) 293–299.
94 There may also be pragmatic solutions. Some propose abandoning the need to list all articles that are considered for amendment in the declaration of the pre-constituent assembly, and limiting the declaration to indicating which titles of the Constitution are to be considered, or the general sense of a reform. See Van Assche (n 37) 379; more recently Velaers, De Grondwet (n 32) 695.
95 Van Nieuwenhove, ‘De nieuwe “overgangsbepaling”’ (n 81) 168–170; Peeters, ‘De “overgangsbepaling” van artikel 195’ (n 81) 387; Bléro (n 81) 598.
96 The Cabinet's coalition agreement of 30 Sep 2020 already mentioned this intention.
97 S 2023–24, n° 550/1, 5–6. As the Minister for Institutional Affairs confirmed, this addition stemmed from the comment made by the Venice Commission regarding transparency (ChR 2023–24, n° 4018/3, 10). Some academic reactions again characterised the 2012 episode as an ‘unprecedented trick’ (Niels Klein, ‘Artikel 195 Gw. voor herziening vatbaar verklaard: diepgaande evaluatie dringt zich op’ (De Juristenkrant, 29 May 2024) 10), others called for renewed efforts to fundamentally reform the amendment procedure (Jan-Baptist Lemaire, ‘De truc met artikel 195’ (De Tijd, 10 May 2024) 11).
98 See, eg, Christof Vanschoubroek, ‘Kan De Wever de grondwet passeren voor zijn staatshervorming?’ (De Standaard, 30 Jan 2023) 4.