China’s Anti-corruption Calls for Reform

Opposing electoral democracy in the Chinese context, Bell advocates a political model on which national leaders are selected by political elites rather than by voters. ¹ Even though deeply disappointed by the current national leadership in the past decade, Bell places his hopes on future generations of Chinese leaders (112). For him, the issue for the political system in China is improvement rather than fundamental reform. He remains hopeful that “China’s political future is likely to be shaped by both Communism and Confucianism” (104). In maintaining such a view, he overlooks a much deeper problem with the current political system in China.

Being a dean at the major Chinese university has given Bell a deep understanding of the bureaucratic system in China, where all major universities are part of the state apparatus. Bell tells us some of his stories in a positive light. At every level of Chinese governing institutions, from central government to village, and virtually all social organizations, there is a unit of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At universities, this includes every academic department and, in it, almost every formal unit of students, who are organized according to their academic majors and entering-year classes. Every unit has a party secretary (shuji). While the party secretary’s primary assignment is for “political thought work (zhengzhi sixiang gongzuo),” which Bell has no doubt “undermines academic freedom” (39), its role also includes maintaining harmonious workplace operations on a daily basis. For instance, when COVID-19 hit, party secretaries at the university led various efforts to protect students and faculty from the threat. They worked day and night to design and implement regulations fighting the disease. Most “of the shuji’s day-to-day work is not dirty. Quite the opposite: it involves, as Mao famously said, ‘serving the people’” (40). Bell’s depiction is charitable, showing the positive side of shujis’ everyday work. We also know, however, in enforcing top-down regulations, they can be repressive toward people in their unit, as we have seen in Shanghai and many other cities that were locked down in 2022 and paid a heavy price in economic loss and human suffering.

Bell also applauds the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign. He observes, regardless of the view that the whole thing is a means of going after political enemies, that the effect is clear. “The anti-corruption drive has worked. Anybody who has dealt with public officials has noticed the changes. Corrupt practices are now almost universally frowned on. The profits of companies are up because there’s no longer a need to pay extras to public officials” (67). The anti-corruption campaign has definitely shot down a large number of CCP officials, some of whom are high ranking. According to an official report by the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, during the decade from 2012 to 2022, 4,648,000 cases were investigated. These included 553 officials appointed by the central government at high levels and 207,000 cases of party secretaries at every level; 25,000 at the director level (ting-ju ji) and 182,000 at the county level (xian-chu ji) were given disciplinary punishment. ²

Lai Xiaomin, party secretary and chairman of the board of the state-owned China Huarong Asset Management, who had previously served as a high executive at the People’s Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), pled guilty to accepting 1.79 billion yuan (US$257.7 million) in bribes. According to a report in the China Economy Weekly, Lai acquired through illegal means more than 100 suites allocated to his ex-wife and allegedly over 100 mistresses. ³ He was executed on 29 January 2021, twenty-four days after his sentencing.

However, it may be too quick for Bell to conclude that “ordinary citizens perceive the system as less unfair because it’s now possible to access public services without paying bribes and gifts to bureaucrats” (67). After a decade of anti-corruption campaign, a large number of new corruption cases are being announced every month or week by the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as evidence of the effectiveness of the campaign. ⁴ This has become ironic: the more effective the anti-corruption campaign has become, the more corruption it reveals at every level of government. A campaign is meaningful if launched for a limited period. The CCP’s anti-corruption has been proclaimed as a never-ending process. If corrupt officials are continuously caught after years of a campaign, is the problem being resolved effectively by a campaign or is systematic reform needed? Without freedom of the press, for instance, can government operations be transparent? If not, can correction be controlled merely by the CCP policing itself?

Bell recognizes that harsh punishment alone does not stop corruption, as has been evidenced dynasty after dynasty in China’s history. He proposes a Confucian approach as a supplement: moral education in the Confucian classics can help to change mind-sets in the long term. However, for over 2,000 years of China’s history, most corrupt officials surely read their share of Confucian classics. That did not prevent them from engaging in corruption.

Interestingly, Bell realizes that he has been too naïve in thinking that China would move toward a more humane political system, informed first and foremost by Confucian values and with more tolerance for social and political dissent (14). Reading his book, one cannot help but question whether he is still too naïve. He calls for “a clearer separation of economic and political power” (72) but fails to understand that the CCP can maintain its political power precisely because it controls economic power. Bell holds that openness can only benefit China’s current political system (112). This implies that, once the CCP leaders realize it, they will adopt a policy of openness and benefit from it. Bell argues that the CCP organ Xuanchuanbu, which has been translated as “the Propaganda Department,” would be better translated as the department of “Communication” or “Public Engagement.” “I recognize that the Xuanchuanbu does some valuable work at home in communicating the government’s policies, such as how to combat pandemics in an effective way. In principle, there’s nothing wrong with promoting Chinese ideas abroad so that foreigners can better understand, if not appreciate, what’s going on” (4).

Bell’s well intended proposal reveals his misunderstanding of the CCP’s Xuanchuanbu. The purpose of that organization includes communication, but is far more than that. A primary charge of the Xuanchuanbu is to direct public opinions. The office has the power and responsibility to promote certain public opinions as well as censoring others. Such a function has led to the current situation in China that Bell deplores: more repression and less freedom of speech (111). Hence, making the office one of communication would fundamentally change its purpose. It won’t happen as long as the current political system continues. Moreover, the office is not about promoting Chinese ideas; it is first of all about promoting the ideas of the CCP. As far as Chinese ideas are concerned, the office is charged with promoting certain kinds of Chinese ideas endorsed by the CCP. It is a bit perplexing that a learned Confucian scholar as Bell can confuse these two things.

Bell, who lived in Singapore some thirty years ago, can testify that Singapore was once more repressive than China is today. Now, he observes, Singapore is more open and tolerant toward free speech (114). He however does not take into consideration a fundamental difference between Singapore’s political system and that of China. Even though Singapore’s ruling party from time to time uses its government power to its own advantage, arguably as do virtually all ruling parties in the world, Singapore’s citizens have a voting right in the general election. And their votes count. The ruling party must go through a hard test every five years or so in general election to vindicate its legitimacy. In recent general elections, the ruling party has tried very hard to maintain its popular vote above 60 percent. China does not have a political institution for citizens to vote in general election.

In the last chapter, Bell discusses the ideal of symbolic leadership, drawing on his experience as a foreign dean at a Chinese university where powerful officials are CCP members. Toward the end of his term as dean, Bell’s official functions were mostly symbolic. He hosted dinners for visitors, did his share of “propaganda” for his faculty, spoke with parents of first-year students to give them confidence in the university, and delivered congratulatory remarks at graduation ceremonies (153–54). He argues for the need for and desirability of political symbolic leadership at the national level.

Bell is acutely aware of the great danger of merging symbolic leadership and political power when a political leader “cultivates a cult of personality that celebrates his own thought” (155), recreating an image like Mao in the 1960s for people to worship. He proposes separating symbolic leadership from the role of political leadership as a solution to such problems. He cites the British monarchy as a good example of symbolic leadership as opposed to systems in China and the United States. In constitutional monarchies, the two roles are separate and, in Bell’s view, they are less likely to end up with Mao-style dictatorship. Bell realizes that, for China, making a monarch out of descendants of past emperors is no longer feasible. He partially endorses Jiang Qing’s model of having the direct heir of Confucius serve as symbolic monarch. Bell worries, however, that the direct descendant of Confucius may lack talent and virtue for such a role. He proposes instead that the symbolic monarch “be selected on merit from among the descendants of Confucius” (159).

I do not necessarily oppose constitutional monarchies provided that they embrace democracy. However, Bell’s view is problematic for two reasons. First, it is inappropriate to place China and the United States in one basket in this aspect. Regardless of its defects, the United States is a democracy, where voters choose their leaders. There is little chance for such a political system to generate the kind of personal cult as in China, perhaps with the exception of Germany in the 1930s. Second, Bell overlooks an important alternative to symbolic leadership. Many constitutional democracies separate the symbolic role of the president and the political role of the prime minister. In Singapore, for example, the role of the president is largely symbolic whereas the prime minister handles the nation’s political affairs. Yet both are elected. ⁵ If the president’s role is to represent the country and its people, citizens should have the right to elect their president in the twenty-first century, regardless of the heritage of the candidate.

Bell’s book presents a rare opportunity for people who have little exposure to or understanding of today’s China to get a glimpse from the inside. I look forward to his next book and hope that Bell will finally realize that the CCP’s model of political meritocracy is a dead end, and that, despite all its shortcomings, there is no viable alternative to democracy. ⁶