Are immigrants entitled to the right to vote in receiving societies? Or is voting the most effective path to fostering immigrants’ political agency, integration, and protection of their interests? This special issue explores these core questions through a range of contributions that offer nuanced and forward-thinking insights. In this introduction, we survey key literature at the intersection of democratic theory and migration justice, outlining major arguments and tensions in the field. By weaving together diverse perspectives, we propose a framework to navigate what may seem like deep divisions, ultimately clarifying the evolving role of political participation in immigrant inclusion and democratic legitimacy. While we recognize the differing positions among scholars, we emphasize points of convergence and the broader trajectory of the debate. This approach reflects our hope to promote constructive dialogue and highlight emerging consensus, particularly in light of the contentious nature of migration and its implications for democratic practice.

Recently, Will Kymlicka reconsidered his multicultural liberal nationalism in response to empirical findings on minority–majority relations in multicultural settings. The empirical findings are disheartening, demonstrating that majorities judge various minorities as less deserving of access to social rights and recognition as legitimate agents making political claims, leading to membership penalties. These results led Kymlicka to recalibrate his normative position into multicultural nationalism. In my response, I will assess Kymlicka's renewed normative position according to a moderate critique of methodological nationalism. I will argue that if multicultural nationalism aims to promote inclusive membership for immigrants by transforming the existing prominent and exclusive stories of peoplehood, then it should avoid relying on fixed, methodologically nationalist epistemic presuppositions.

In this article, I question whether the widely endorsed functional demos views—like the “all affected interests” and “all subjected” approaches—adequately measure legitimacy in democratic inclusion. I argue that these views fall short of this task and propose an alternative criterion for evaluating electoral rights allocation. The “permanent disenfranchisement condition” asserts that electoral regulations leading to involuntary, permanent disenfranchisement are undemocratic. This condition challenges traditional exclusions based on factors like denizenship or mental illness. Age-based or residency requirements, however, remain permissible, as they do not imply inherent unfitness for political participation. Additionally, I introduce the “democratic ethos proviso,” which is less stringent and failure to fulfill it is less consequential. It stipulates that electoral regulations should be justifiable with reference to the specificities of the relevant democratic ethos.

The article examines the meaning of migrants’ (dis)enfranchisement within democratic polities, focusing on ideas of political authority and agency derived from democratic theory. Building on the notion that democratic voting represents a mutual and second-personal exercise of authority, the article argues that the disenfranchisement of migrants signifies their exclusion from agential authoritative relationships in politics, and ultimately, from a quintessential democratic mode of political agency. We recall some of the principles for expanding voting rights and acknowledge that there may be reasons in favor of exclusion. However, we highlight how any such exclusion (re)shapes the political relationships instantiated in the practice of voting. While we rebut the challenge of “voting fetishism,” we conclude by discussing how alternative forms of political participation for migrants, though important, cannot compensate for the unique impoverishment of political authority and agency that disenfranchisement specifically incurs.

Immigrants without citizenship are usually excluded from democratic participation. It is often argued that this is a grave injustice that calls for redress; immigrants should be enfranchised whether they have citizenship or not. Most arguments for this claim hold that immigrant enfranchisement is justified by immigrants’ interest against being ruled by the receiving state. In this article, I argue that this view fails to explain why immigrants should be enfranchised. I offer an alternative view according to which immigrant enfranchisement is justified by a shared interest of immigrants and citizens in relating as mutually serving agents of justice by participating in the common undertaking of ruling the polity justly together.

José Medina and Claudia Gâlgău discuss the epistemology of protest, epistemic self-empowerment and hope in the midst of persistent forms of oppression. “Social change and liberation often take many generations, and we need to cultivate sustainable communities of resistance that will not give up hope and will help people achieve recognition and dignity, and even flourish, amid structural forms of oppression.”