This symposium probes contemporary classifications of the “far-right”, “populist radical right” and “radical right” variety. It also considers whether there is a need to look beyond socio-economic factors to explain the upward trajectory such parties experienced in recent years. The symposium thus connects to ongoing debates regarding the nature of this party family (or families) and to previous accounts of their successes across Western Europe.

In this article, we investigate the ideology of the populist radical right (PRR) and the extent to which its political message has changed over time. In doing so, we also judge the usefulness of the PRR-tag. Like seminal scholarship on these parties, we contend that both economic and social positions are relevant for contemporary radical right parties. Further, we argue that contemporary parties’ stances are indicative of a nationalist ideology. Using the Manifesto Project Dataset, we investigate radical right policy preferences between 1970 and 2015. Results indicate that right-wing economic stances are more prevalent prior to the twenty-first century and that radical right parties increasingly make economically leftist claims. Results also demonstrate that radical right parties are not always the farthest to right in national political spaces. Further, we show that contemporary parties make nationalist claims. Indeed, nationalism not only increasingly characterizes these parties but also increasingly distinguishes them from other major party families, whose average positions over time are globalist. We argue that contemporary radical right parties are better conceptualized and described as neo-nationalist, a label consistent with both their social and economic positions.

The appeal of far-right parties’ ideologies is one of the key drivers of such parties’ electoral wins in Europe. Most studies, however, have focused on the far right’s anti-immigrant or anti-minority discourse as the defining feature of this party family. In this article, we examine: (1) The conditions under which far-right parties benefit electorally from their Eurosceptic discourses, and (2) How center-right parties’ responses to the far right affect the latter’s electoral outcomes. The results of multilevel regression models show that when the distance between far-right and center-right parties’ positions toward European integration narrows, the vote share of far-right parties increases—but only up to a point. When the distance continues to narrow, without reaching zero, the far right’s vote share decreases. Our empirical analysis relies on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey series dataset and examines 75 cases of far-right parties in 22 European countries between 1999 and 2014. The findings suggest that center-right parties face a difficult strategic dilemma as they compete for votes with the far right: moving incrementally closer to the far right’s position can benefit the far right by intensifying competition over the issue of European integration. An almost full cooperation of the far right’s agenda, however, dampens the success of the far right. The center right must strike a balance that allows it to be responsive to Eurosceptic voters while retaining a centrist identity.

What is the impact of unemployment on far-right party support? This article develops a framework that links unemployment to far-right party support, while taking into account both the heterogeneity of the workforce and the role of labour market policies. More specifically, we focus on unemployment as a driver of economic insecurity and examine its effect on outsider and insider labour market groups. We identify the extent to which two labour market policies—unemployment benefits and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)—mediate the effect of unemployment on economic insecurity, thus limiting the impact of unemployment on far-right party support. We carry out a large N analysis on a sample of 14 Western and 10 Eastern European countries between 1991 and 2013. We find that unemployment only leads to higher far-right support when unemployment benefits replacement rates are low. The results with regard to the mediating effect of EPL are more complex as EPL only mediates the impact of unemployment when we take into account the share of foreign-born population in the country.

Fifteen years ago, Rydgren (Scand Polit Stud 25(1):27–56, 2002) asked why no electorally successful radical right-wing party had yet emerged in Sweden. In this respect, Sweden was a negative case. Rydgren posited four main explanations: (1) social class mattered more in Sweden than elsewhere. Working-class voters identified strongly with their social class and with the Social Democratic party, making them largely unavailable to radical right-wing mobilization; (2) socioeconomic issues still structured most politics in Sweden, and issues belonging to the sociocultural dimension—most importantly immigration—were of low salience for voters; (3) voters still perceived clear policy alternatives across the left-right divide; and (4) the leading radical right-wing alternative, the Sweden Democrats, was perceived as being too extreme. Since 2010, however, Sweden can no longer be considered a negative case, and in this article, we argue that in order to understand the rise and growth of the Sweden Democrats, we should focus on changes in the factors enumerated above.

This article aims to provide an overview of the general development of Chinese political science and a critical analysis of the problems and challenges faced by Chinese scholars. The development of Chinese political science is characterised by institutionalisation, professionalisation, and internationalisation on the one hand, and tensions between Westernisation and indigenisation, scientification and methodological pluralism, and the “ivory tower” and political relevance, on the other. The debate centres on contending beliefs on the nature of political knowledge and ways to convert understanding of Chinese politics into knowledge and shows a serious tension and conflict between scientific, universalistic, and positivist traditions on the one hand and particularistic, historical, and contextual traditions on the other hand. We argue that a “glocalisation” approach might be adopted to integrate “globalisation” and “localisation” of Chinese political studies by exploring the reciprocal influences of the two aspects, being methodologically both “scientific” and “pluralistic”, and balancing between scholarship and public relevance. We hope to help Western academics learn about achievements and struggles in the study of political science in China, and also to push Chinese political science to engage more with the rest of the world.

Protests on the street may last weeks or even months. Why do some people join protests against government wrongdoing on day one while others wait weeks to do so? This article suggests that delay discounting—an important personal trait that decides how much people discount the future pay-off—determines when an individual joins a protest. An analysis of the 2007 Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey reveals that Ukrainians who discounted the future less were much more likely to join the Orange Revolution right after the electoral irregularities of the 2004 run-off election. Weeks passed as they waited in the snow for the Supreme Court required rerun. In contrast, impatient citizens joined the protest several days after the scandal broke. Additional evidence based on a cross-country survey shows that lower levels of delay discounting help explain the consolidation of democracy over time. This evidence linking delay discounting and political participation supports the concept of self-enforcing democracy and helps us understand the conditions under which a democracy may be in peril.

This research aims to develop a deeper insight into the development of political science from the bibliometric perspective by analysing peer-reviewed journal articles (n = 1117) indexed in the Scopus database and published by authors from fifteen Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the period 1996–2013. Results indicate that the majority of articles (84%) by CEE authors have been published in international journals and in the English language. The visibility of these articles in international journals, measured by the mean number of citations, is 5.2 per paper, while the same indicator for CEE journal articles amounts to 0.2. Authorship analysis indicates a gradual but continuous increase in co-authorships. Additionally, there are significant differences in citations between single-authored and co-authored articles, both in international and CEE journals. Co-authorship among CEE authors is present in only 1% of the analysed articles, confirming weak collaboration between political scientists in CEE countries.

Existing datasets provided by statistical agencies (e.g. Eurostat) show that the economic and financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 significantly impacted the lives and livelihoods of young people across Europe. Taking these official statistics as a starting point, the collaborative research project “Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship in Europe” (CUPESSE) generated new survey data on the economic and social situation of young Europeans (18–35 years). The CUPESSE dataset allows for country-comparative assessments of young people’s perceptions about their socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the dataset includes a variety of indicators examining the socio-economic situation of both young adults and their parents. In this data article, we introduce the CUPESSE dataset to political and social scientists in an attempt to spark a debate on the measurements, patterns and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of economic self-sufficiency as well as its political implications.

In January 2018, two different large-scale simulation games on the European Union’s decision-making process took place in Brussels. This study aims to bring systematic empirical evidence from both EuroSim and SUNY Model EU, two active learning experiences that gather around 300 international participants. The intention is to scrutinize whether specific student attributes generate differential effects on the learning outcomes. These involve cognitive outcomes and affective outcomes. The first type refers to participant’s level of knowledge and understanding about the EU policy-making dynamics. The second type reflects on participants’ overall interest and motivation upon the EU. The data were obtained through a post-game survey method based on stratified sampling. The results point at affective outcomes as the most salient learning outcomes of the simulations. In relation to participants’ features, the data reveal country of origin and gender as good performance-enhancers for students of non-EU origin and for the female cohort. All in all, in order to increase the usefulness of large-scale simulations, more attention needs to be given to participant selection and role attribution, as well as post-simulation debriefing or focus groups.

This article presents an interactive theatre tool that aims to facilitate a nuanced, holistic exploration of different topics in political science. Its approach builds on insights drawn from the work of four playwrights who provide fascinating, in-depth examinations of social and political topics: Henrik Ibsen, George Bernard Shaw, Bertolt Brecht, and Augusto Boal. Two features that distinguish the method I present here from other techniques are student ownership and interaction with the audience. At a time when political science is increasingly criticised for becoming overspecialised, irrelevant, and unstimulating, this paper offers a promising and flexible tool that can help synthesise ideas from thriving but often ingrown areas of political science research, contextualise them, and examine their practical relevance.