Introduction
For over twenty years, the pretrial detention population has consistently exceeded the sentenced population in provincial and territorial jails across Canada (Statistics Canada 2024a). In 2023, 47 percent of Canada’s total custodial population was in remand. Compared with other comparable common-law countries, Canada (forty-two per 100,000) relies on remand quite heavily, exceeding the rates in England and Wales (twenty-nine), Ireland (thirty-six), Scotland (thirty-eight) and, until recently, Australia (sixty-five) and New Zealand (seventy-eight).Footnote 1 Despite what may be inferred from Canada’s heavy reliance on pretrial detention, release on bail pending the resolution of criminal charges is a fundamental legal right (Charter of Rights and Freedoms). This legal right, however, is more easily exercised by some than by others.
One way to assess the accused’s suitability for release on bail (judicial interim release) is to consider their ties to the community, their stakes in conformity and their social relationships. These criteria are understood as reducing the risk that the accused will fail to appear in court or fail to comply with the conditions of release. To secure release on bail, many accused people need to demonstrate that they have someone available in their life who can take on supervision as a surety. This person must agree to supervise the accused and enforce the conditions of release, including the possibility that the accused may be required to reside with them until the charges are resolved. The surety must affirm their higher allegiance to the court than to the person they are supervising, indicating their willingness to call the police and report any failures to comply, knowing this will result in the accused being rearrested and returned to detention. To demonstrate their commitment to their legal obligations, sureties must promise the court money that they risk forfeiting should they fail to supervise and report the accused for non-compliance.
In Ontario, Canada, recent reports indicate that, between 29 percent (Myers Reference Myers2024) and 41 percent (Schumann and Yule Reference Schumann and Yule2022) of releases require a surety. This practice, however, is jurisdiction-specific, with other provinces rarely using sureties. While modelled after English common law, sureties are used sparingly across England and Wales (Hucklesby 2011; Grech Reference Grech2017; Smith Reference Smith2020) and they are not expected to enforce the conditions of releaseFootnote 2 (Grech Reference Grech2017). Requiring a surety for pretrial release rests on the assumption that an accused has a close social support network that is able and willing to take on the responsibilities of supervision and enforce behaviour-modifying conditions of release (Pelvin Reference Pelvin2017, Reference Pelvin2019; Wyant Reference Wyant2016). Sureties are assessed for suitability, including their financial means, having an appropriate release plan, being of good character, demonstrating a close relationship with the accused and providing assurances that the accused will abide by their supervision (Trotter Reference Trotter2017; Wyant Reference Wyant2016). Individuals may be excluded from acting as a surety if they are the accused’s legal counsel, have a recent or serious criminal record, are a co-accused or victim, are a youth or are in custody (Trotter Reference Trotter2017). The assumption of an available, supportive and suitable support network disproportionately impacts certain populations.
By enlisting the accused’s social network in securing the accused’s liberty, the court relies on social bonds to exert control by pressuring people to behave accordingly. In assessing the suitability of potential sureties, the court emphasizes the importance of a close personal relationship between the accused and their prospective surety. The strength and closeness of their relationship are a proxy or assurance that the accused will listen to the surety and comply with supervision. Embedded in this practice are assumptions about the effectiveness of private citizens—particularly those with a close personal relationship with the accused person—as court-enlisted bail supervisors or “third-party police” (Myers Reference Myers2019). Determining release suitability based on an evaluation of an accused’s relationships provides the court with access to and the ability to utilize the accused’s social ties, thereby reframing the accused’s community support system as quasi-agents of the state. Consistently with Deckard’s (Reference Deckard2025) insights into commercial bail practices in the United States, through the threat of legal penalties, the state co-opts the accused’s social circle as a risk-management mechanism, exploiting the closeness of relationships and relieving the state of supervisory responsibilities.
To understand the impact that acting as a surety has on the relationship between a surety and the accused, we utilize a social-control framework. Reflecting on data from thirty-two in-depth interviews with individuals who have acted as sureties, this paper explores the complex, contradictory and damaging implications of exploiting personal relationships for the state’s surveillance and monitoring interests. Sureties struggle with a compulsion to protect the accused and an obligation to police the accused—a conflicting position that blurs the boundary between legal and personal commitments. Building on Deckard (Reference Deckard2025), Myers and McDermott Reference Myers and McDermott2023) and Schumann (Reference Schumann2018), we argue that, by placing sureties in such a role, the court causes relational harm, stressing the accused’s social relationships and transforming support networks into an apparatus of state control.
Legal context
With origins in English common law and pretrial release practices, initially, sureties were used to guarantee the return of an accused and relieve the sheriff of the financial burden and liability associated with an accused fleeing. The surety, generally a family member, was expected to act as a “jailer in the community,” returning the accused to court when necessary and facing financial consequences if they failed to do so (Qasem Reference Qasem1952; Schnacke et al. Reference Schnacke, Jones and Claire2010). Over time, the roles and responsibilities of sureties have evolved, with sureties doing more than guaranteeing the accused’s appearance. Detailed in s 515(1) of the Criminal Code, the ladder approach stipulates that the default form of release for (most) accused is a release order on their own recognizanceFootnote 3 without conditions and that the Crown prosecution must show cause for a more restrictive form of release or detention. There is, however, a small but growing list of circumstances in which the onus is reversed, meaning that release is not presumed and the accused must demonstrate why they ought to be released.Footnote 4 Recognizing the onerousness of surety supervision and the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)’s affirmation that surety supervision is not the starting position for release (it is the third release option in s 515(2)), s 515(2.03) explicitly legislates restraint in the imposition of surety supervision.
Sureties are legally obligated to monitor the accused’s behaviour and interactions, ensuring that the accused returns to court as required and enforcing the conditions of release (Trotter Reference Trotter2017). Canadian practices differ from those of other common-law nations, such as England and Wales where the surety’s primary responsibility is to ensure the accused appears in court, and Australia and New Zealand, which only require a surety to ensure the accused’s appearance (Contend Legal, 2025; Criminal Law Practice, 2022; OBS, 2025; Beehive, n.d.; Go to Court 2024). In addition to supervisory responsibilities, sureties must promise a sum of money that they may forfeit should the accused breach their bail order.Footnote 5 Sureties are also given extensive powers, with flexible, expansive and adaptive conditions of release. Once imposed, it is a criminal offence to fail to comply with any condition.
The SCC reaffirmed the original purposes of judicial interim release in R. v Antic (2017) when they issued a reminder that the bail decision must be made with restraint—not just the decision to release the accused, but also under what supervision and conditions. The court is clear that accused people have a right to reasonable bail, to be released as soon as practicable and with the fewest conditions appropriate for the circumstances, and that a ladder approach is to be used in determining the appropriate form of release (R. v Antic, 2017, at para 67(d)). Conditions, the court states, must be reasonable to comply with (at para 67(b)), directly related to the alleged offence and not be imposed as a form of punishment or a behaviour-modification tool (at para 67(j)). The SCC reminds court actors that surety supervision is only to be imposed after ruling out less onerous options (at para 67(g)).
In 2019, Bill C-75 legislated many provisions from Antic. The Act instructs court actors and police to give particular attention to (a) aboriginal accused and (b) accused belonging to an over-represented population that is disadvantaged in obtaining release (s 493.2). In R v Zora (2020), the SCC reinforced that conditions of release should not be used as a punitive tactic and should be tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused, reflecting the allegations before the court (at paras 46, 47). Obligating an accused to comply with onerous conditions of release, including the use of sureties, must be done with an explicit focus on the practical circumstances of the accused (at para 25). The court notes that charges of failing to comply are “very common, on the rise, and often involve questionable conditions imposed upon vulnerable and marginalized persons” (at para 5).
More recently, a series of tragic incidents allegedly committed by people on bail has renewed calls for restrictive bail reform. Parliament rapidly enacted Bill C-48 and, in 2024, the Act widened the types and number of violent and weapons-related offences triggering a reverse onus scenario. This Act was promoted as specifically targeting repeat violent offenders, but also introduced blanket-style amendments, such as requiring a justice to consider whether any accused has been convicted of a violent offence and to include in the record of proceedings a statement that the judicial officer considered the safety of any victims and the community in making an order.
Literature
Social bonds, normative assumptions and bail
Developing and maintaining strong social bonds, such as those through education, family and employment, increases one’s social stake in conformity, acting as a mechanism of social control by amplifying the negative consequences of delinquency (Hirschi Reference Hirschi, Williams and McShane1998). The presence of social bonds is critical for the success of many accused and may influence decisions at different stages of adjudication (Mowen and Visher Reference Mowen and Visher2015; Hepburn and Griffin Reference Hepburn and Griffin2004). Feeley (Reference Feeley1979) notes that the presence of friends and family members in the court (and the mention of employment or education) indicates “stabilizing forces” (164) and may influence a prosecutor’s decision when pursuing conviction or making sentencing recommendations. Quality rules over quantity in positive social bonds; a relationship may not increase social control, but a strong emotional tie with other individuals and shared goals will (Laub and Sampson Reference Laub and Sampson1993). Positive bonds develop gradually and may be fragile or easily stressed. Fostering positive social bonds is especially important for individuals recently released from custody, those facing issues with substance use and younger people (Gilmore et al. Reference Gilmore, Rodriguez and Webb2005; Laub and Sampson Reference Laub and Sampson1993; Mowen and Visher Reference Mowen and Visher2015). Conflicts with family and other community support after incarceration can impact an accused’s ability to complete their release plans (Gilmore et al. Reference Gilmore, Rodriguez and Webb2005; Mowen and Visher Reference Mowen and Visher2015).
Positive social bonds are seen by the court as measures of the accused’s stake in conformity and as necessary to facilitate compliance and resilience. Bonds such as employment, family connections and stable housing act as risk markers, signalling to the court that the accused has ties to the community and therefore something to lose by fleeing. Requiring sureties for release, however, makes normative assumptions about the accused’s kinship network (Pelvin Reference Pelvin2017, Reference Pelvin2019). Needing to demonstrate a close personal relationship, the court presupposes that the accused has such stable relationships in their life. Requiring someone deemed suitable to act as a surety, the courts guarantee the detention of certain individuals (Berger et al. Reference Berger, Myers and Deshman2024; Deshman and Myers Reference Deshman and Myers2014; Wyant Reference Wyant2016; Myers Reference Myers2019; Schumann Reference Schumann2020).
Inequitable impacts
The differential availability of and access to court-approved sureties is both gendered and racialized (Deckard Reference Deckard2025), meaning that certain groups are more likely to be detained in custody. The courts favour candidates of good character with the financial means to risk forfeiting a relatively substantial sum (Trotter Reference Trotter2017; Wyant Reference Wyant2016). The court emphasizes the necessity for a close personal relationship and questions sureties about the quality of their relationship with the accused (Pelvin Reference Pelvin2017, Reference Pelvin2019; Trotter Reference Trotter2017). The surety-approval process can be especially marginalizing. Some courts enforce rigid guidelines, including the requirement to attend court in person, provide extensive financial and or employment information and, in the case of a contested bail hearing, take the stand to demonstrate their suitability, the depth of their relationship and the veracity of their willingness to police the accused (Deshman and Myers Reference Deshman and Myers2014; Wyant Reference Wyant2016; Myers Reference Myers2019). The requirement to attend court in person is especially problematic for accused from rural and remote Indigenous communities, where it may be difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to travel to the court (Wyant Reference Wyant2016). This logistical issue intensifies the already disproportionate difficulties in securing release (Berger et al. Reference Berger, Myers and Deshman2024; Deshman and Myers Reference Deshman and Myers2014; Wyant Reference Wyant2016). Further aggravating decision-making disparities and contributing to mass incarceration, Indigenous accused are regularly assessed as being at higher risk for release and face difficulties in presenting an approved address, sufficient assets or a suitable person who can supervise them (Berger et al. Reference Berger, Myers and Deshman2024; Peterson-Badali, Reference Peterson-Badali2025).
Surety requirements lengthen the bail process, contributing to court delay and further time in detention as the accused and defence counsel formulate a release plan to secure the Crown’s consent for release (Berger et al. Reference Berger, Myers and Deshman2024; Wyant Reference Wyant2016; Myers Reference Myers2017, Reference Myers2019; Schumann Reference Schumann2020). An overreliance on sureties may be one reason why 46 percent (OCJ 2024) of individuals with cases disposed in Ontario do not apply for bail, remaining in detention without a bail decision until their case is resolved. The bail decision is critical, with substantial legal and social consequences. Individuals detained in Ontario (formally or informallyFootnote 6) are less likely to have their case stayed or withdrawn compared with those released (33% and 43% compared with 55%) and are much more likely to plead guilty (59% and 53% compared with 30%) (OCJ 2024). There is growing evidence of the adverse effects of pretrial detention on case resolution as well as the severity of sentence received. Most notably, people held in pretrial detention are more likely to plead guilty, will enter a guilty plea faster and are more likely to receive a custodial sentence compared with similarly situated individuals released on bail (Kellough and Wortley Reference Kellough and Wortley2002; Williams Reference Williams2003; Heaton et al. Reference Heaton, Mayson and Stevenson2017; Petersen Reference Petersen2020). Time in custody pretrial is generally credited toward any eventual sentence to account for conditions of confinement and the loss of earned remission, creating the appearance of more lenient sentences. Despite deplorable jail conditions and treatment, characterized by uncertainty, violence and deaths in custody, for some accused people, custody is preferable to life on the streets in the community, offering a space of temporary refuge (Bucerius et al. Reference Bucerius, Haggerty and Dunford2021).
Use of sureties
Despite the Supreme Court reinforcing the tenets of pretrial release, Ontario courts still routinely require a surety for release. While the use of sureties declined following R. v Antic (2017), a non-trivial proportion of releases still require a surety (Myers Reference Myers2024; Schumann and Yule Reference Schumann and Yule2022),Footnote 7 though there is variation across courts. The directions and explanations provided to sureties by the court emphasize their quasi-policing functions and explicitly focus on their behaviour-modifying powers in helping to craft the conditions of release (Schumann and Yule Reference Schumann and Yule2022). In Ontario, sureties pledge an average of $1,053 (Berger et al. Reference Berger, Myers and Deshman2024) and enforce on average 7.8 conditions, with many criminalizing the accused for behaviour that is legal outside of a court order (Webster et al. Reference Webster, Doob and Myers2009; Myers Reference Myers2017, Reference Myers2019; Myers and Leblond, Reference Myers and Leblond2024). Accused are routinely required to reside with their surety until their charges are resolved (Myers Reference Myers2017; 63% according to Myers Reference Myers2019). It is also common practice to require the accused to be amendable to the rules of the surety’s homeFootnote 8 (Myers Reference Myers2017, Reference Myers2019; Schumann Reference Schumann2020). A surety can impose any rule and, once imposed, it is a criminal offence to fail to comply. This power places the accused at increased risk of accumulating additional charges for behaviour that is legally outside of the bail order and, in this context, was not directly imposed by the court (Myers Reference Myers2017, Reference Myers2019; Schumann Reference Schumann2018; Schumann and Yule Reference Schumann and Yule2022).
Although community release pretrial is less restrictive than detention, it also allows new forms of surveillance and control prior to, and often in the absence of, a conviction. Myers (Reference Myers2009, Reference Myers2019) explains that relying on private citizens to act as community supervisors represents a culture of risk aversion by which the courts insulate themselves from blame by offloading the risk associated with community release to the friends and family of the accused. Sureties transform state supervision, extending the criminal justice system into otherwise inaccessible areas, redefining the relationship between the surety and the accused, and promoting a mechanism for monitoring and modifying behaviour in private spaces (Myers Reference Myers2009, Reference Myers2019; Schumann Reference Schumann2020). In forging this legal relationship, the court overlooks the impact on sureties, who may feel pressured by defence counsel or obligated to step up for their loved one (Schumann Reference Schumann2020). Once deemed suitable, the surety becomes a community jailer, responsible for enforcing strict conditions of release (Schumann Reference Schumann2018, Reference Schumann and Yule2022; Myers Reference Myers2019; Yule et al. Reference Yule, Schumann, MacDiarmid and Dunleavy2023). Assuming the role of the surety is challenging, as there is no guide dictating how individuals should enact their powers (Schumann Reference Schumann2020). Sureties also lament the lack of formal support in navigating their role, being forced to rely on their own best judgment and reacting to the fear of financial loss. Being a surety is a morally conflicting role characterized by significant financial, emotional and social hardships that disrupt and damage relationships (Myers and McDermott Reference Myers and McDermott2023; Schumann Reference Schumann2020).
Methods and analytical approach
Participants were recruited via postings in the vicinity of courthouses and police stations and on community notice boards. To be eligible, participants had to be currently acting as a surety or have acted as a surety in the past twelve months. Participants were asked to refer others who were interested in sharing their experiences with the researcher. Thirty-two semi-structured interviews, lasting for an average of fifty minutes, were completed. Each participant was assigned a unique numeric code during the interview and then a pseudonym. Interviewers utilized a semi-structured interview guide that covered broad subject areas, including experiences in court and their lived experiences as sureties, how they understand their role and the consequences of failing to meet their obligations to the court, motivations for supervision, the impact that being a surety has on their relationship with the accused and their reflections on the criminal justice system and the surety release process. Researchers were encouraged to ask follow-up questions for clarification and examples for further insights.
Interviews were transcribed verbatim by the researcher and uploaded to NVivo for analysis. We used a grounded approach to analyze the data (Charmaz Reference Charmaz2017), identifying broad thematic areas from the interview guide. The presence of these themes was evaluated during the first round of line-by-line coding and other emerging themes were identified and recorded. We employed an iterative approach, adjusting the second round of coding to include both original and emerging themes, identifying nodes within these thematic areas and highlighting differences and similarities in the experiences and perceptions of participants (Locke et al. Reference Locke, Feldman and Golden-Biddle2022; Neale Reference Neale2016). The third and final coding round transformed these broad thematic areas into more specific nodes, focusing the inquiry and providing greater nuance. The mapping function in NVivo was used to visualize the most prominent themes across the interviews, assisting in the creation of a conceptual map and making sense of the patterns and distinctions within the interview data.
Sample description
Table 1 details the diverse characteristics of the thirty-two participants. The mean age is fifty-three years (range twenty-one to eighty years) and the average bail amount promised is $3,305 (range: $500 to $30,000).
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
Findings
Exploiting social bonds
The court takes advantage of personal relationships when requiring sureties for release. As displayed in Table 1, 91 percent of participants were a family member or friend of the accused. When informed of the accused’s detention, half of the participants (n = 16) indicated that they felt they had to act as a surety, demonstrating their care for the accused. Depicting this perceived obligation to assist is Patricia, a fifty-three-year-old woman who supervised her brother for about four weeks:
Interviewer: Why did you decide to act as a surety? What motivated you?
Patricia: Because he’s my brother, that was just my duty.
Interviewer: Did you have any concerns about being a surety?
Patricia: I did at the time, but what could I do? He’s my brother, he came for help.
Patricia explains that, despite concerns, she felt she had to help her loved one. Betty, a fifty-nine-year-old woman who supervised her son for a year and a half, further explained what motivated her: “He’s my son. I didn’t want him in jail. He’s got a daughter; I’ve got a granddaughter.” Sureties feel a sense of urgency in assisting the accused; the idea of a loved one remaining in detention instigates a sense of familial obligation to get them out of jail.
Pressure from the state to step forward is reinforced by pressure from the accused and even other family members. Although participants may have reservations about acting as a surety, Cameron, a forty-four-year-old woman supervising a family member for one month, illustrates how familial ties foster a perceived obligation to step up: “Family, pressure, just felt I had to do it. I was the only person that had proof of money in the bank in the family at that time, so I just felt pressured to do it.” Cameron highlights how sureties may feel they are the only option for the accused to be released. The courts use the willingness and motivation of family and friends to come forward to gain some level of assurance of supervision.
The level of supervision provided by a surety may be more than necessary; however, when proffered, the risk-averse choice is to accept the available supervision. Valerie, a fifty-seven-year-old woman supervising her son for the past eleven months, reflects on her motivations for offering herself as a surety:
Well, I was picking him up the next day from the city to bail him out. I didn’t, and I just automatically assumed. I’m the parent; I’m going to do that. I didn’t know that he could have actually, I didn’t know until I heard other people that he could have actually just been released on his own recognizance.
Like Valerie, family and friends may pre-emptively offer to act as a surety when the accused could have been released without supervision. The court, however, assumes that the accused has someone who will step forward to strengthen the proposed release plan and that defence counsel is motivated to secure a consent release from the Crown. Banking on the existence of viable social networks highlights the court’s tendency for risk aversion, as legal practitioners wait to see whether a surety materializes before committing to an alternative form of community release. The court displaces both the responsibilities for social control and the risks associated with community supervision onto willing family and friends, preserving resources and shielding the legal system from public ridicule should the accused commit a serious offence. The court’s social-control objectives merge with their risk-adverse tendencies to amplify interventions while simultaneously offloading responsibility for enforcement onto the accused’s personal social relationships.
The court questions and assesses the surety’s volition as they seek to secure someone who will vouch for an accused and make lengthy personal concessions, such as emotional strain, financial sacrifices and alterations to social routines. Lucile, a seventy-five-year-old woman supervising her son-in-law for two and a half years, describes her outlook: “I come from a family background that if you make a promise to someone, then you keep it. If you’re supposed to be responsible for someone, then you be there.” Not only are sureties urged to assist the accused in being released, but their familial bond also ties them to the accused and makes them feel the need to stand by them. Surety requirements are contingent upon strong social bonds—bonds that are seen to facilitate community release while mitigating risk. The court, however, may not consider how this legal contract alters the relationship between the accused and their community, nor how such changes may isolate the accused from social support, making them more, rather than less, risky.
Rupturing familial and social networks
Most participants (n = 20) reported damage to their relationship with the accused, sharing that their relationship was fundamentally changed when their personal bond was transformed into a legal contract. This transition damages the relationship as the surety and accused navigate the contours of their legal obligations. For sureties, it may be challenging to accept their inability to effectively supervise or control another autonomous individual. The tensions generated by trying to maintain a policing role strains the ties between the surety and the accused, with consequences for their relationship. Kim, a sixty-year-old who supervised her friend’s son for six months, explains: “I don’t talk to him anymore. I have nothing to do with him, and I don’t have anything to do with that friend either.” Amid rising tensions, she not only pulled the accused’s bail (revocation), but also sought to sever the relationship entirely. The complexity of social networks means that the strain on the accused/surety relationship extends beyond them, impacting the accused’s wider social network and support system.
Supervising the accused has a substantial impact on the surety’s life. Barbera, a thirty-three-year-old who supervised her boyfriend on two occasions, explains the imposition on her work schedule:
Interviewer: How many times did you have to attend (the court)?
Barbera: I can’t even count that I was there. I almost lost my job. I almost lost my teaching job over it. I was there one day. Once, I was there for five, six days in a row.
The onerous expectations of supervision are an obstacle in the surety’s life. Expecting sureties to fulfil extensive and rigid obligations, such as attending court in person,Footnote 9 can hurt the sureties’ personal and professional lives, including missing work, which jeopardizes their employment. When asked about how their relationship changed, Barbera explained:
Yes, in a negative way. We broke up for a little while. That caused us to drift apart, I think, for a bit. It was really difficult implementing all the conditions and having to really be responsible for someone else as well as myself, especially when the person at the time was really struggling with drug addiction and alcoholism and having a hard time looking after themselves. A lot of the time, I had to really work hard to make sure that he followed through, and it was really difficult.
Sureties may not anticipate the depth of the accused’s issues when they agree to take on this legal responsibility, especially when the accused struggles with mental health and/or substance use. Sureties may be unprepared to manage the magnitude of their obligations and lack the necessary and comprehensive resources to assist the accused during their release. The consequence is that sureties may enter a legal contract without fully appreciating the consuming implications and extent of the challenges associated with this responsibility.
As the grinding, everyday reality of supervision settles in, sureties realize that the court’s imposition, regulation and demand for compliance extend beyond the accused. Thomas, a thirty-three-year-old man who supervised a friend for two and a half months, explains how he feels about the accused:
Thomas: I’m very frustrated and annoyed with him now because there’s such a strict bail, and I don’t think I would do it again. Without going into too much detail, I don’t trust him.
Interviewer: What impact has being a surety had on your everyday life?
Thomas: The stress of worrying about enforcing the bail and losing the money, that’s an additional stressor that gets added to your life when you decide to become a surety. I had to cancel social plans, re-arrange plans, stuff like that, re-arrange appointments. There’s a risk to the money. That means that I have to come up with the money if he breaches or if they try to get the money. I couldn’t have friends over because he was also at my place. I couldn’t host parties. I couldn’t just leave whenever I wanted to. I was also under a form of house arrest.
Thomas is both “frustrated and annoyed” with the accused. Being a surety is stressful, breeding resentment and eroding trust. Thomas’s experiences reflect the multitude of ways in which sureties contort themselves and their lives to meet the court’s requirements. Taking on supervision requires a reorientation and reorganization of the surety’s life and relationships. Sureties often feel that they are being punished by the bail order. Although sureties come forward to help the accused and, by extension, assist the court, they are subject to the constraints of a court order meant for the accused. Along with the frustrations of intense support under the threat of possible forfeiture, the loss of autonomy creates stress that strains the relationship between the surety and the accused. As the realities of surety supervision settle in, benevolent motivations metamorphose into a sense of obligation, diminishing personal relationships in the shadow of a legal contract.
Relational wear and tear
As sureties face the stress and strain of being legally responsible for the accused, their motivation to assist may decline. Nearly half (n = 14) of the participants expressed that their tolerance waivered over time as they came to resent their situation and the accused. Frustrating the onerous role is a perceived lack of appreciation from the accused for the hard work, compromises and inconveniences of surety supervision. Illustrating the tiring nature of this relationship, Jeff, a forty-one-year-old who supervised a friend for two and a half months, explains:
Constantly, it’s like you feel like you’re going home to an adolescent adult in your house, and it’s just tiring. I was like, “I don’t want to do that. After I work all day, come home and have to discipline you.” Nor does he want to be disciplined. It’s hard to discipline your friend.
Jeff highlights the difficulties of balancing personal responsibilities and the needs of the accused. Intensifying the stress-inducing role, the court routinely mandates that the accused must reside with their surety. This residential situation changes relationship dynamics and positions the accused as an imposition on the surety’s personal space.
Feeling unappreciated and stretched thin, the imperative to supervise may dissipate. Sureties find themselves maintaining their responsibilities because they feel obligated to do so. Peter (age missing), who has been supervising his uncle for the past two months, describes feeling “stuck” in the surety relationship—a feeling that is exacerbated by close family ties:
Very strained, yes. Well, now that being responsible for him, and we’re kind of keeping this between us because my mother is his sister. This would be like pretty much break her heart because she’s the oldest, and I have to make sure that he … even though he is older than me, he is pretty much a man-child. I have to ensure he keeps his court hearings concerning the issues. It’s just that because I’m dealing with my own thing, I’m dealing with him, too.
Despite discomfort in his role, Peter illustrates the sureties’ broader dilemma when contemplating how to balance their own needs with those of the accused. The strength of pre-existing relationships and shared kinship networks means that the surety contract may interfere with broader social and familial connections. Sureties bear the dual social costs of supporting someone’s release from custody and liberty in the community. The conditions that sureties agree to enforce may be overwhelming. The weight of their responsibilities can alienate some sureties, damaging far-reaching relationships as they navigate the competing needs and demands of the court, the accused and extended family or friend networks.
When the surety and the accused share a close bond, sureties may feel conflicted, unable to revoke the bail, knowing that this will result in the accused returning to detention and producing complicated consequences across social networks. Supervising a friend for the past three months, fifty-eight-year-old Kenneth describes the difficulties posed when the accused failed to meet their residential condition and he was supposed to wield the power of revocation:
In the end, I probably should do what I’m supposed to do, right? But then she’d go back to jail. The problem is she’d be there for a long time until the trial, or she’d have to plead guilty, and I told her, I said, “pleading guilty is not what you want to do. I know this from personal experience.”
Navigating and safeguarding relationships amplify the stress and exhaustion of being a community jailer. As described by Kenneth, his decision-making is guided by how the accused will be affected. The weight and responsibility for the accused’s liberty and well-being are oppressive, with the accused’s liberty contingent on their surety’s willingness to remain responsible for them.
Morally conflicted, sureties may find themselves constantly worried about the accused’s behaviour and how the accused’s performance could negatively impact the surety’s life. Reflecting on her experiences, Barbera explains the effect that acting as a surety had on her everyday life:
Like worrying at night, worrying during the day, wondering if I was going to have my job compromised, wondering if I had to miss work, having to go for court dates, things like that. I had to make sure he made it to court. When he didn’t get to court on time, I would hear from the court saying that they were sending an arrest warrant out for him. He would be late for court. He’d be late to meet his lawyer. It was just not good.
Exhausted from their vigilance, sureties define their experiences by heightened stress and serious disruption. Sureties feel that they shoulder a disproportionate burden of managing the accused’s pretrial release, perceiving the accused as disregarding or dismissing the severity of the circumstances. As stress and strain accumulate, altruistic intentions waiver and sureties come to see the role negatively. Jeff explains that supervising was “[a]bsolutely not rewarding whatsoever. It’s just stressful completely […]. You don’t get perks; you don’t get anything. You just get a bunch of added responsibilities, added pressure, and added conditions to normal life.”
Despite relieving the state of responsibility for the accused and being integral in securing the accused’s release from pretrial custody, participants discover that being a surety is a thankless role. Sureties concede aspects of their lives to fulfil their obligations to the court and the accused, but gain no perceived recognition, appreciation or compensation in return, leaving a wake of undue stress, resentment and damaged relationships.
Would never do it again
Citing the overwhelming responsibilities of the role and associated moral tensions, many sureties speak negatively about their supervisory experience and the legal process more broadly, with close to half (n = 15) indicating that they would never (or likely never) act as a surety again. Reflecting on his experience, Mark, a sixty-year-old man who supervised a friend for one month, expresses this sentiment, noting being a surety is too demanding and creates opportunities for conflict:
Mark: Made me never want to do it again. And I mean it, never again.
Interviewer: Why not?
Mark: Who needs it? It’s like being executor of an estate for a family. You don’t want to be the executor for your own family. It just causes too many, too much conflict.
Mark continues, explaining:
It’s not my responsibility to supervise another adult. This is up to the courts, the legal system, and the police. And the social system. I am none of those. So why is it my responsibility? If it was my son or my daughter or my wife, right, that’s different. But not a friend. I won’t go that, I won’t go that route again.
Mark concludes that supervising an accused involves too much responsibility and stress. When faced with the realities of the role, the negative emotional and social consequences outweigh wanting to assist the accused. Despite describing a terrible experience, Mark would still act as a surety for his family, feeling it is his responsibility to help. Although the court seeks a strong social connection, Mark explains that it is the very nature of personal relationships that makes the surety–accused dynamic so difficult. Sureties are expected to act in various capacities akin to a host of social service roles that exceed the boundaries of a personal relationship. The personal connection with the accused makes it impossible for sureties to provide unbiased supervision and support, and many sureties lack the professional training required to supply the accused with the necessary support (e.g., mental health, substance use, employment) that will assist them in complying with release conditions.
As the true nature of the role becomes apparent, sureties may feel that, by stepping in to protect and aid the accused, they inadvertently enable the accused to deflect responsibility. Discontent with supervising her son for the past eleven months, fifty-seven-year-old Valerie describes the lack of personal responsibility:
He wants this over with. He’s trying to make better decisions about things, but I don’t know if that’s always happening. I think I’m going to find out what would happen if I just chose not to do this again because I really don’t want to do it again. I don’t want to do it again. I think part of his responsibility in helping himself is finding out other, you know, things that he can do to, like, hopefully this will never, ever happen again.
Valerie shares her ambivalence about the situation, acknowledging that she is trying, but is curious about the consequences of not being her son’s surety again. Valerie sees herself as enabling her son and wants him to take responsibility for himself.
Valerie continues, explaining that release should be the accused person’s own responsibility, without surety supervision: “I think I would have preferred it, because I think it would have been a more, like, the self recognizance thing. I think that that would have been, make him entirely responsible, you know?”
The use of familial bonds for surety supervision may strain those connections, leaving accused people with less community support. In requiring a surety for release, the court may not consider how the imposition of a legal relationship can frustrate social bonds that were once supportive, making the accused more risky. For some sureties, a close personal relationship is not enough to convince them to take on this role again. Feeling that the dynamic does not place enough accountability on the accused, sureties may want to rid themselves of the responsibilities and see the accused work to secure and maintain their release in the community.
These negative experiences leave participants with little faith in using sureties for bail. Reflecting on his difficulties in supervising a friend for three months, fifty-four-year-old Joshua emphasizes the potential for damage to relationships and issues with relying on personal networks for supervision:
Not immediate family. They’ll do it but they tend not to respect it so much, I think it’s just, not a free pass but family’s not good. Family will always do it; we don’t need a third-party because an individual is not going to- doesn’t know the person. I say the second point there, because it’s tough for family and their loved ones they want to get them out, but they don’t tend to […] obey.
Participants feel that alternatives to sureties for pretrial release should be utilized. Joshua highlights a common sentiment—that family members will always try to help—but this does not mean the court should exploit these bonds to facilitate release. For some people, a habitual eagerness to care for and assist a loved one is in itself an indication that such a relationship is problematic; individuals may take on supervision regardless of any actual belief that the accused will abide by the conditions. Some accused take advantage of those close to them, manipulating the situation or being reckless with their compliance. The damage caused to close relationships means that nobody benefits from using personal networks as a supervision strategy. Friends and family cannot control the accused’s behaviour, and disrespecting the surety’s promise to the courts creates tension, moral quandaries and legal risk.
Discussion: manipulating and damaging personal relationships
Sureties are almost always related to the accused as a family member or friend. The inherent tendency for care embedded in kinship networks means that people are often eager to volunteer to assist someone to get out of custody. In practice, acting as a surety is morally conflicting and a significant impediment to the surety’s personal life. As a result of the extensive responsibilities, lack of support and moral tensions in the role, many sureties describe a strain on their relationship with the accused, causing both short-term and long-term damage that may extend to individuals beyond the surety and the accused. Due to a familial relationship, sureties may feel obliged to keep an accused out of custody, feeling stuck in the supervisory agreement, knowing that revocation will result in the accused returning to the harsh conditions of pretrial custody. Participants express growing resentment towards the demands and responsibilities of surety supervision and the bail process. Sureties commonly declare that they would never again act as a surety, citing the conflict and damage to their relationships. Attempting to avoid risk and extend pretrial social control, the court manipulates supportive personal relationships to manage the accused. By displacing the risk of community release to civilian volunteers, the courts transform personal bonds into legal contracts, straining and possibly permanently damaging relationships. In an effort to diversify social control, the court may inadvertently diminish the impact of these efforts. Personal relationships disintegrate in the shadow of a court order, diminishing the intended social control, while also isolating the accused from sources of support that have the potential to minimize risk.
The presence of positive social bonds, such as family attachment, has been of long-standing importance in understanding social conformity and deviancy (Hirschi Reference Hirschi1969, Reference Hirschi and Hirschi2002; Wiartrowski Reference Wiatrowski1978; Nye Reference Nye1958; Sykes and Matza Reference Sykes and Matza1957). More contemporary uses of the concept place less emphasis on the direct association between social bonds and conformity, instead highlighting the negative impact of family conflict (Mowen and Vishar Reference Mowen and Visher2015) and the positive impact of shared goals and emotional support (Laub and Sampson Reference Laub and Sampson1993). Research on the experiences of accused individuals released on bail supports this notion, with qualitative data highlighting family support as a mediating condition of release (Yule et al. Reference Yule, Schumann, MacDiarmid and Dunleavy2023). It is therefore problematic that surety supervision exploits the eagerness of those willing to help the accused; the downstream consequence is the possibility of draining the relationship between the surety and the accused of positive sentiment, rupturing the very support that facilitates social control and compliance, increasing the accused’s odds of returning to custody. The beneficial impact of positive support networks on the court’s assessment of an accused’s risk is contingent upon using these networks to facilitate community release. Altering the relationship between an accused and members of their support network puts these relationships at risk and may impact the accused’s legal outcome.
Reconfiguring an accused’s relationships into mechanisms of risk aversion may increase their time in custody. Although only a small percentage of accused people are formally denied bail, nearly half of all those with a case disposed in 2024 (OCJ 2024) had no formal bail decision made, remaining in custody until their matter was resolved. One reason why individuals may never formally apply for bail is the absence of a viable surety. Exacerbating this situation are any previous experiences with surety release that have damaged relationships, resulting in a social network that cannot be relied upon. The lack of a prospective surety further entrenches the accused in the criminal legal system. Exploiting the accused’s relationships may set the accused up for a more challenging future, preventing them from fostering and leaning on familial assistance as the court transforms this support into surveillance mechanisms.
Directions for reform
Support over surveillance
Despite some recent reductions, sureties are still frequently imposed in Ontario, but are not used to the same degree across the rest of Canada. While adopted from the United Kingdom, sureties are used sparingly across England and Wales (Hucklesby 2011; Grech Reference Grech2017; Smith Reference Smith2020). Sureties in England and Wales, Australia and New Zealand are also only expected to ensure the accused’s return to custody and do not police compliance with other release conditions. Moreover, in England and Wales, New Zealand and some Australian jurisdictions, it is not a criminal offence to breach a condition of release; it is only an offence to fail to appear in court. Canada may benefit from similarly restricting the use of sureties and limiting surety responsibilities to ensuring appearance in court. Reducing the expectations and requirements of sureties, including removing the notion of a “community jailer,” may help shift the relationship to one that is supportive rather than punitive. Decriminalizing failure to comply with release conditions may have a substantial impact on the backlog in criminal courts and help correct the over-criminalization of marginalized populations (Berger et al. Reference Berger, Myers and Deshman2024; Deshman and Myers Reference Deshman and Myers2014; Myers Reference Myers2024).
Despite the possible negative consequences associated with sureties and the imperative to limit their use and scope of responsibilities, this form of release facilitates the liberation of some individuals who would have otherwise been detained. Previous research highlights sureties as tending toward a caring rather than policing role (Myers and McDermott Reference Myers and McDermott2023). However, this dynamic is complicated by the weight of responsibility placed on sureties and the threat of recourse from the court (Myers and McDermott Reference Myers and McDermott2023; Schumann and Yule Reference Schumann and Yule2023). Shifting the expectations of sureties and adopting a more supportive orientation, in line with the use of a “responsible person” in the Youth Criminal Justice Act, may be a meaningful avenue for reform.Footnote 10 Although similar to a surety, the responsible person does not have the same level of responsibility and a financial promise is not involved. The responsible-person model allows the court to release the accused under the supervision of someone who cares for them but does not include the same rigid suitability guidelines or degree of liability, so it helps to circumvent some of the relationship strain while maintaining a position of support and supervision for the accused.
Bail supervision programmes
There are alternatives to surety supervision that can facilitate release without exploiting the accused’s support network. Bail supervision programmes, operated by the government or third-party organizations, can supervise individuals who do not have a surety (JHSO 2023). Bail supervisors verify information and compliance by contacting third parties (e.g., family, employers, landlords, other service providers); accused individuals are then required to report to the programme and attend any programme referrals. Programme participants benefit from being released from detention and the supportive services provided by bail programmes (Leblond Reference Leblond2025; Yule et al. Reference Yule, Schumann, MacDiarmid and Dunleavy2023). Bail programmes, however, have been criticized as net-widening, intensifying liberty restrictions and social-control efforts on the most marginalized accused (Leblond Reference Leblond2025; Peterson et al. Reference Peterson-Badali2025). Worryingly, third-party bail supervision programmes often control the vetting process, determining whom to supervise, without providing this service in a standardized or transparent manner (Leblond Reference Leblond2025; Wyant Reference Wyant2016). People supervised by the programme report resenting constant check-ins and numerous referrals to other programmes. These routinized meetings place intensive demands on accused, who risk being removed from the programme and returned to custody for missing an appointment (Leblond Reference Leblond2025). Another bail supervision programme model, administered by the government, involves reporting to a probation officer. While this model affords some standardization and oversight, using probation officers to supervise individuals prior to conviction obfuscates the distinction between those who are legally innocent and those have been convicted and sentenced, as the accused are monitored by a state institution intended for corrections. While surety and bail programme supervisions are distinct supervisory models, some of the challenges associated with surety supervision, including intensive conditioning and monitoring, are replicated, diversified and intensified in bail supervision programmes (Yule and MacDiarmid Reference Yule and MacDiarmid2024; Leblond Reference Leblond2025).
Another aveue for reform includes developing automated reminder systems to reduce the failure-to-appear rates (Ferri Reference Ferri2022; Lowenkamp et al. Reference Lowenkamp, Holsinger and Dierks2018). Many people fail to appear in court, not because they are purposely evading the court, but because they simply forgot. Improving appearance reminders would decrease the incidents of failing to appear. Another area for improvement is the provision of safe, stable housing—a fundamental need that is often required for successful release. To help provide a fixed address and supportive housing, bail bed programmes are a promising option that helps with residential needs for those who are unhoused (Government of Ontario 2017; Nee-Chee Friendship Centre, 2025).
Conclusion
Reliance on sureties for release is a well-documented concern (Myers Reference Myers2009, Reference Myers2017, Reference Myers2019; Deshman and Myers Reference Deshman and Myers2014; Wyant Reference Wyant2016; Schumann Reference Schumann2018; Schumann and Yule Reference Schumann and Yule2022). Through an intensifying culture of risk aversion, provincial courts assume that a surety is necessary for many conditional releases (Deshman and Myers Reference Deshman and Myers2014; Wyant Reference Wyant2016; Schumann and Yule Reference Schumann and Yule2022). Consistently with Deckard’s (Reference Deckard2025) analysis, the state exploits social relationships for its own benefit. Akin to liability systems in other sectors (Gilboy Reference Gilboy1998),Footnote 11 through the threat of financial loss, the courts persuade private citizens to assume the responsibility and risk associated with community supervision. In so doing, the courts insulate themselves from blame for an accused’s failure to appear before the court or for alleged offending while on bail (Myers Reference Myers2009, Reference Myers2017, Reference Myers2019; Myers and Leblond, Reference Myers and Leblond2024). Requiring a surety to secure release grants the state considerable power to define and manipulate the accused’s relationships. Utilizing the closeness of an accused’s relationships to measure eligibility, the court ensures the ongoing detention of certain populations while crafting new levels and forms of access to the accused in the community. Flowing from this risk-averse nature, the court enlists the accused’s social support network as agents of the state, thus infiltrating otherwise inaccessible private spaces. Through expansive release conditions, sureties are responsible for policing their kin (or close social network member) in exchange for securing their release from custody.
Sureties occupy a conflicting role and are often overwhelmed with trying to balance their responsibilities to the accused with their obligations to the court. A perceived lack of appreciation from both the courts and the accused challenges this tenuous and fragile balance. Policing and reporting the conduct of a loved one strain the very connections and support that are more likely to facilitate the accused’s compliance. The resulting relational harm ought not be viewed as a by-product or secondary feature; rather, these harms flow directly from the state’s exploitation of relationships in its quest for increased social control. Motivated by risk aversion, social-control efforts are the manifestation of fear, uncertainty and a desire to do something. Despite these challenges, there is a place for surety supervision in the system. What is needed is a shift—a narrowing of who needs this level of supervision in order to be released from custody. Decision-making about surety supervision ought to balance this perceived necessity with the costs of damaging the relationships that support the accused and reduce their risk. Rather than exploiting and weakening relationships by hinging the accused’s release from custody on the durability of their social bonds, these bonds can be used to support the accused through a difficult, stressful and potentially risky time.
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