The confession, as its name suggests, presents the personal, and often private, experience of the author, as we see in Rousseau’s well-known confessions which intend to expose his private self to public scrutiny. Bell’s confessional writing, however, is employed as a rhetorical means to serve his public purpose of political theorizing, since what the author intends to emphasize is not his private world, or even his personal experience as “a minor bureaucrat,” but to explore “the inner workings of Chinese academia and to draw implications for China’s broader political system” (3). Instead of a chronological reckoning of the history of the author’s life as an academic leader, Dean from Shandong has singled out several interconnected topics as a series of recollection of events Bell experienced in his five-year deanship to illustrate what he perceived as the important aspects of the Chinese culture in general and academic life in particular. The first-person narration, with its self-mocking style, foreshadows his intention behind the narrative, namely, his way of doing political theorizing as a political scientist. According to Northrop Frye, the confession is “introverted” and “thematic.”Footnote 1 Bell’s confessions seem to be more thematic than introverted, “I invoke my personal experience only if it sheds light on social and political life in contemporary China, with its contradictions, diversity, and charm” (18).
On the one hand, Bell’s appointment as dean sounds very unusual given the current situation of political repression in mainland China. On the other, it fits the state policy of internationalization of higher education in the past decades for the sake of local and global rankings. For Bell, the new post at Shandong University was an exciting adventure which offered a rare opportunity for him to exercise his Confucian ideal of xianneng zhengzhi (political meritocracy): A virtuous Confucian bureaucrat in the contemporary world who can exert more influence in order to build a good society, and in this case, a good academic environment. There is no question that Bell was qualified for the position since what matters, according to the Confucian merit system, is character and caliber instead of lineage or patronage. Bell’s foreign/Western identity would not be a problem as long as he is perceived as a “cultural Chinese” (123). More importantly, Bell’s impeccable scholarship and longstanding commitment to Confucianism have strengthened his eligibility to be an academic leader in Shandong Province, a place of Confucius’s hometown as well as a symbolic site for the revival of the Confucian tradition in the past three decades.
Academic meritocracy in Confucianism can be traced back to the creation and development of imperial examinations, beginning with the Tang and Sui dynasties. Academic meritocracy is still an important factor in China despite political intervention from the state in some situations. Faith in meritocracy is deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture and well reflected in higher education, ranging from nation-wide college entrance examination to the selection and promotion of professors. Nevertheless, meritocracy and the related challenge of elitism have been debated in recent years to address the concern and the problem of rising inequality and social stratification. Academic meritocracy is also a perplexing issue in the West, as shown in the recent DEI controversy at US higher institutions, which raises issues concerning reverse-intellectual snobbery and the dumbing down effect, and in some cases the irrationality of the populist movements sweeping the West today. No doubt, meritocracy is at odds with liberal egalitarianism and the supremacy of the individual average person emphasized by modern democratic values. While Bell offers an account of the practice of academic meritocracy in his faculty, he challenges the premise that “academic ability and output are the only things that matter for universities” (137). He then argues that a positive social influence by “accumulating talent for the world” (a motto of Shandong University) should also be an important academic output. Here, the connection of education to a positive social influence can be understood as Confucianism or John Dewey’s pragmatism, though the latter speaks of education in view of democratic values and ideals.
Bell’s searching for possible alternatives to liberal democracy in light of the political progress in China enables him to see things from a different perspective. What makes Bell’s confessions unique is the way he presents the relation between academia and the political system within the Chinese context. Yet the current academic environment he describes is by no means Confucian or even Confucian-friendly. His confessions tell us that it is virtually impossible for him as a dean to “guide the young with virtue, regulate them with rituals”Footnote 2 as a good Confucian in the ancient time would do. Although Bell recognizes the problems of the heavy hand of state censorship and the authoritarian reflex that influences higher education in terms of academic freedom, he is optimistic about the possibility of a better future for both Chinese academia and Chinese society at large. When speaking of censorship, Bell not only criticizes Chinese academia but also offers examples of “informal” media censorship in the West (124). He seems to suggest that censorship or the political influence on the academic life is not a problem only for an authoritarian society since it can happen in a democratic society. Nonetheless, Bell quickly adds that he does not mean to equate China’s formal system of censorship with the informal system in the West (125–26).
Bell’s real intent in his detailed accounts of his personal academic life is to present his view about political meritocracy in China. For him the academic life is simply the microscopic world of society in terms of both virtue and vice. Bell is well aware of all the challenges he had to meet when his book The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy was published in 2015. Huang Yushun, one of his colleagues from Shandong University, points out that Bell’s assertiveness on political meritocracy “not only consists of an anti-democratic political program but also is full of logical contradictions” (6).Footnote 3 Bell tries to defend his position with an apologetic gesture, contending that the title of the book was given for the marketing reasons. He rejects being called “academic wumao” (though this pejorative term makes him laugh), repeatedly pointing out that China is a highly imperfect meritocracy, just as those who defend the liberal democratic system in the West also claim that their system is imperfect. Bell admits that by living in Chinese academia for years, he “has gone native” in the sense that his academic work has often been informed by his experience living and teaching in China, especially at Tsinghua University in Beijing (178). Those familiar with Tsinghua University would not be surprised by Bell’s view on political meritocracy since, as one of the top institutions in China, it is well-known for training many of China’s future leaders who are seen as the representatives of intellectual and moral excellence. In this regard, Bell maintains that meritocracy rather than the electoral system is a good thing, and a preferred method of selection for office. However, he may ignore the fact that Tsinghua University is by no means a “pure land”—ideological indoctrination by the CCP is a required component of its curriculum like all other institutions in China.
The “meritocratic solution” is rooted in the Chinese tradition, both intellectual and administrative. For many Chinese, meritocratic Confucianism presents itself as a legitimate model for China today. Would Confucian meritocracy really work in China, and to what degree can Confucianism(s) in China (whether hybrid in character or not) influence Chinese culture and Chinese politics in the present? Bell and kindred spirits might be too optimistic about the revival of Confucianism and the implementation of meritocratic rule in China. Although his observation of meritocracy in academia has valid points, whether the CCP’s authoritarianism favors meritocratic selection remains a question. For the party, personal loyalty very often seems to be more important than a person’s talent and integrity. This is one of the reasons why “reversed elimination” (nixiang taotai) has been a moral hazard in political elections in recent years.
Concerning the relationship between Confucianism and Marxism, Bell once mentioned that it might be a good idea to rename CCP as the “Chinese Confucian Party” as a diplomatic strategy when China deals with Westerners, considering the longstanding hostility toward “Communism” in the West (105). However, Bell undermines the internal conflict between Confucianism and Marxism when he thinks that they can coexist as a guide to China’s future. Confucian familism emphasizes the family as a more important community/unit of common good that provides a safe, stable, and harmonious society, whereas Communist statism tends to focus on the party-controlled state as a collective whole as well as the ideology of class struggle. Confucianism does not deny private ownership and property while Marxist communism does (as the Chinese name gongchan, literally meaning “common property,” for the “Communist Party” suggests). Of course, China is no longer Communist in reality after Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform allowed the existence of the private sector, multiple billionaires, and a stock market.
Nonetheless, Bell is right when he speaks of the recent comeback of Marxist ideology. It is deployed as a weapon to critique capitalism and the rising social inequality in a post-Reform era. Recently, a TV series was produced in China by Hunan Television titled “When Marx met Confucius” where we find dialogues between Confucius and Marx in a question-and-answer format. Obviously, the series is part of the government’s propaganda campaign. The purpose is to reconcile China’s official Marxist underpinnings with an appeal to Chinese cultural heritage. I was wondering if Bell would take such a TV program as a way toward “Confucian Communism.” He claims that “China’s political future is likely to be shaped by both Communism and Confucianism” (104). However, Bell’s confessions give us the impression that he prefers Confucianism to Marxism.
Bell uses confessions as a way of sustaining his political theorizing on the China model that needs to be articulated and made clear to his readers. The personal experience presented to us is a strategic way of expressing an internal appropriation of the external truth. It is a process of adding the experiential quality to his political claim. In this process, we do not find that Bell has undergone any significant conversion (either religious or political), as are often seen in confessional writings. His confessions are circular since he restates at the end what is all along implicit, i.e., his faith in meritocracy as the China model, and I think this was done on purpose. Yet with its humorous and playful style, Bell’s non-confessional confession is a delightful read.
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