It doesn’t seem all that long ago that security experts and policymakers were contemplating how advancements in military technology including long-range precision missiles, advanced sensors, global navigation systems, and command and control capabilities now seemingly determined the outcome of future conventional war. The first Gulf War, NATO operations in Kosovo, the rapid defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the United States–led invasion of Iraq in 2003 seemed to prove these technologies superior. This view, reinforced by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, culminated in the early 2000s with what the author and historian Alistair Horne described as ‘hubris’ on the part of military commanders and political elites.1 True to Horne’s analysis, the hard lessons learnt from the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2004 onward, ending with the total defeat of NATO in Afghanistan in 2021, proved the pundits wrong; the technological innovations of this most recent ‘revolution’ and Western military supremacy were no longer convincingly superior, as once thought. These counterpoints demonstrated that war remained a distinctly human activity in its very nature and that emerging military technology complemented mass and manoeuvre; it did not replace them.
It is in this environment that the Australian Army now finds itself as it prepares for the challenges of the twenty-first century. As the 2021 Chief of Army History Conference has illustrated, the Army has always been faced with the questions of what type of war it should mostly prepare for and in what context it should prepare. The notions of contingency and compromise therefore strongly resonate, especially when dealing with the matter of size and scale as it relates to the issue of how best to mobilise for conflict and war. The authors that have contributed to this compendium will be significant in terms of their insights and advice for future Army planners as well as for its force posture and preparedness. The varied content of this book underscores the complexity inherent in the issues of mobilisation and the national endeavour of national security.
That mobilisation and the challenges of preparing armies for war in times that are uncertain are extremely complex issues should not come as a surprise to the reader. Militaries are complex; an army in particular is something of a melting pot of history, culture, science, technology, art and the people themselves that serve. Military service, one of the oldest vocations, exists as part of a nation-state’s fundamental expression of sovereignty and will.
The contributors to this publication have demonstrated through their submissions that the Australian Army, and indeed any successful army, has never been static in size or shape. Rather, it has scaled its capabilities up and down, mobilising and demobilising forces, to adapt to the circumstances of the day. For the past two decades, the Australian Army has demonstrated its ability to scale to the demands of different operations, different theatres, different threats, different roles and different partnerships. As one example, between the 1999 start of operations in East Timor and the 2014 end of combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Slipper, the Army generated 690 discrete Army-led formed body overseas deployments, which roughly amounts to a new force element every eight days for 15 years. And while we haven’t crunched the numbers past that point, we only need to reflect on Operations Bushfire Assist 2019–20 and COVID-19 Assist; the assistance provided in our region and domestically in the wake of cyclones, floods and other extreme events; the recent evacuation operations from Kabul; and the counterterrorism training support to the Philippines in 2018 to realise that the tempo is not likely to let up anytime soon. Indeed, as the world moves into the middle parts of the 2020s, it is clear that the operating environment is becoming less certain, and the use of the Army in roles that are unanticipated, as well as anticipated, will become a feature of its contribution to Australia’s future national security.
This book is organised into six parts that are thematically linked. Part 1 covers the keynote.
Dr Jean Bou’s keynote chapter introduces the topic of mobilisation by drawing upon different examples from across the Army’s 120-year history. Bou reminds us that while the combination of challenges to force generation is ever changing, many of the core factors remain the same or have been encountered – if not overcome – in different combinations before. This is why almost every great practitioner urges the study of military history. Bou’s insights show that mobilisation in a time of conflict takes many forms and in the most demanding circumstances can lead to an almost unbounded activity that strains the fabric and resources of the society that undertakes it. Renewed consideration of the topic is timely and relevant, especially given the Army’s recent experiences in supporting the whole-of-government efforts in fighting the 2019–20 bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–2.
Part 2 focuses on the mobilisation of resources for war in the first half of the twentieth century, spanning the two world wars. It features chapters by Dr Meighen McCrae, Professor Douglas E. Delaney, Dr Andrew T. Ross and Dr Carol Fort.
Meighen McCrae explores how the British balanced the competing requirements for manpower between the army and the critical arms industries supporting it during the First World War. Key decision-makers – the Prime Minister, Minister for Munitions, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Force and Allied Generalissimo – all understood that resources, specifically manpower, should be balanced between industry and the military in the context of national power and ensuring that the means were large and sufficient to enable ways and ultimately achieve the strategic end. These crucial factors considered the role of new technology. Just as the British demanded more of industry to better arm, equip and support the British Army and its partners, they simultaneously needed to generate sufficient combat power to halt and turn back the German Army’s renewed offensives. At the same time, the British Government, the army and industry were trying to transition to new technologies – such as the tank – to offset a finite and later declining human resource.
Doug Delaney highlights the similar experiences of the Canadian and Australian armies when confronted with demobilisation and issues such as how to best balance the allocation of available resources between the full-time and the part-time components, as well as the common Canadian and Australian interwar problem of not having even a rudimentary sovereign defence industry. As Delaney illustrates, no one on the 1919 general staff of Canada or Australia wanted to lose the skill and hard-won professionalism that their army had acquired over four years of war. Senior officers in Canada initially proposed a permanent force of 20 000–30 000 troops and a compulsory service militia of 300 000 soldiers, while their counterparts in Australia wanted a permanent force of 3500 professionals to train a militia of 130 000, which could expand to 182 000 in wartime. By 1922, however, Canada had its militia capped at 50 000 and its permanent force cropped to fewer than 5000, and Australia had just 37 000 militiamen supported by a tiny permanent force of 1600.
Andrew T. Ross next argues that the industrialisation of Australia was far from inevitable. He suggests that Australia was a potential future battleground for competing major economic powers, including Britain, the United States, France, Germany and later Japan. Ross points out that by 1900, Australia was a key source of strategic materials like zinc and a valuable market for manufactured goods. Ross also highlights British reassurances claiming that industrial goods were more efficiently produced by global powers like Britain, and Australia should instead focus on its strengths, such as mining and agriculture. Ross argues that the government subsequently believed that maintaining control over the continent’s vast resources required a larger (white) population and therefore required more immigrants. Its massive expansion of this program, especially after the Second World War, and with it heavy industrialisation were critical to keeping the nation safe over the following decades.
Carol Fort examines tensions in Australia during the Second World War and how after a poor start in 1939 Australia had over-mobilised by 1943 to the extent that the Army had to merge or disestablish units. To add to the complexity of this issue, the Army also had to transition from an all-volunteer infantry force training for operations in Europe to an armoured and mechanised force for northern Africa, and then subsequently to a militia jungle warfighting Army that, at the same time, was becoming increasingly amphibious in its style of operation. The relationship between all-consuming armed forces and their commercial providers of war matériel has long been fraught, characterised by mistrust, competition, compromise, interdependence and regulatory backlash. The Second World War was an industrial watershed, a crisis of under-capacity and excess demand, of galloping consumption, during which all belligerent nations turned to commercial manufacturers to meet their war goals, each managing the complex business–state relationship through an array of structural and functional arrangements. This aspect of Australian wartime experience and the current challenges faced by the government and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as it increases its efforts in realising sovereign guided weapons manufacturing and strategic resilience is important if past mistakes are to be avoided.
Part 3 concerns the employment of women in the war effort at a time of rapid force expansion. Its chapters are by Clare Birgin and by Dr Karen D. Davis and Dr Philip McCristall.
The Army’s rapid mobilisation of signals intelligence in the Pacific War has distinct parallels with its efforts today to maximise its modernisation in signals intelligence and electronic warfare. Clare Birgin’s contribution to this volume demonstrates how attempts to generate this niche capability included drawing upon the talents of University of Sydney academics working in similar fields to support the Army’s cipher-breaking mission. The focus was on building a new capability, based on technical and language skills, with obvious parallels to the challenges represented by the cyber and space domains of today.
Karen Davis’ research, with that of her co-author Philip McCristall, examines the Canadian experience with gender integration and diversity. Both the Canadian Armed Forces and the ADF first comprehensively reviewed the question of the combat-related employment of women in the early 1990s, and Davis and McCristall identify how, from a similar start point, the Canadians reached some milestones earlier than the ADF and how the two forces are broadly following a similar path. Notably, women are now eligible to serve in almost all roles within both the ADF and the Canadian Armed Forces. Women’s contributions, both domestically and internationally, date back to the establishment of women’s services in the Second World War and earlier roles as nurses during the First World War, with continued service through the Korean and Vietnam wars. More recently, women have served on the front lines in various conflict zones, including Afghanistan. This chapter focuses specifically on the opportunities, challenges and operational roles available to women from 1990 onward. The analysis indicates that, while the historical paths of each nation differ, shared experiences have significantly shaped the roles of women in both military forces. Furthermore, recent initiatives, inspired by the United Nations’ women, peace and security agenda, aim to recognise and enhance the unique contributions of women to operational effectiveness. This point is crucial in understanding the modern challenges faced by the militaries of both nations, in terms of recruiting, retention and the ability to provide the right balance of skills necessary for the future operating environment.
Part 4 concerns alliance and concurrency pressures in the Cold War and post–Cold War years. It comprises chapters by Colonel Amanda Johnston, Associate Professor Sue Thompson, Professor John Blaxland and Professor Dan Marston.
Amanda Johnston’s chapter considers the complex task of balancing alliances and concurrent operational pressures, exploring how the Army is managing these present-day demands simultaneously. The end of 2021 saw the Australian Army remain committed to its mission of preparing land power for the joint force in both peace and wartime. This was achieved by carefully managing numerous competing priorities: operating effectively in a competitive environment, strengthening strategic relationships, preparing for response options across the conflict spectrum – including high-end warfighting – and modernising the land force, all at the same time.
Sue Thompson’s examination of how multilateral forces were mobilised through regional treaties is timely in terms of our understanding of the Indo-Pacific region’s history, culture and politics. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization provides a critical case study in regional cooperation that continues today. Regarding Australia’s experience, the formation of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, raised in Malaya in 1955, with its three infantry battalions from Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, gave military substance to the treaty as its immediate reaction force. For 19 years, the brigade was a form of coalition mobilisation, with the burden shared across more than one country such that the whole exceeded the sum of its parts. Moreover, its forward-deployed units were available to support operations in Malaysia, Singapore, Borneo and South Vietnam.
John Blaxland describes the operational tempo of the Army in 2006 as an area ripe for examination in terms of contingency management and dynamic operational force design. At that time, the Army faced competing pressures for deployments across the Middle East and the near region. The demand to support deployments from Solomon Islands to Lebanon (Cyprus) saw the Army draw upon different options to generate sufficient force. It called upon the reserve force in ways not seen since before the Vietnam War and which continue today in locations such as Rifle Company Butterworth. It also drew upon partners and allies – a reminder that almost all major operations are undertaken in some form of partnership. The concurrency pressures faced by the Army in the mid-2000s came as a result of several competing factors. Between 2003 and 2010, the Australian Army faced an unprecedented increase in operational tempo, driven by deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, redeployments to East Timor, evacuation operations from Lebanon, a crisis in Tonga, a tsunami in Papua New Guinea, domestic security obligations and sustained commitments in Solomon Islands. This high demand intersected with issues related to force posture, training pace, personnel limitations and organisational gaps, resulting in a shortage of deployable combat teams. In response, the Army advocated an Enhanced Land Force initiative to increase combat unit strength to levels unseen since the Vietnam War era – though still significantly below the massive mobilisations of the world wars. This expansion enabled the Army to sustain its operational presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, Blaxland questions whether this force structure will be adequate for the challenges anticipated in Australia’s regional future.
Dan Marston’s examination of the British Army’s experience as a senior coalition partner with the United States in Iraq provides a different, but relatable, perspective from the Australian experience of working in coalition with the United States, and a reminder of the limits of national influence, especially in Australia’s case, as a junior coalition partner. Marston’s chapter reminds us that even larger partners – such as the British Army – can still experience challenges when not a coalition lead. His review of the British Army’s experiences in Multi-National Division (South East) and Basra in the Iraq War over four operations (Telics 8–11) highlights the challenges for both the British and the US forces, who were hampered in achieving a realistic end state by a lack of clear and coherent strategy. The parallels to the Indo-Pacific region indicate that any future war will most likely be difficult and complex, especially given the consequences for Australia as they relate to its regional security and economic wellbeing.
Part 5 concerns utilisation of the reserve forces in crisis and war. It contains chapters by Dr James Morrison, James Kell and Colonel Renée Kidson.
James Morrison outlines the interwar Militia scheme before expanding on the early wartime arrangements of the late 1930s and early 1940s that resulted in an Army with two major components: one explicitly for expeditionary operations, known as the Second Australian Imperial Force; and one for home defence and defence of Australia-administered territories, which came to be known as the Citizen Military Forces. Morrison explains how national service was introduced for the Militia and explores a number of the challenges arising from having a bifurcated land force.
James Kell then examines the postwar national service schemes in Australia. Surprisingly from some, and despite being regarded as a vexed issue in Australian society, national service has often had high levels of support from Australians, including the soldiers called up for it. Moreover, successive governments have relied upon national service as a means of rapidly mobilising a small, professional standing Army for large-scale conflicts. National service in its various forms featured prominently in twentieth-century Australian society, with the two schemes that followed the Second World War mostly having broad approval from the public. The most recent scheme ended abruptly in 1972, and national service seemingly has not been seriously considered since. Kell asks why national service was introduced and what caused the scheme to be terminated. His examination focuses on two periods of mobilisation: the part-time Militia service from 1951 to 1959, and the full-time overseas deployments from 1965 to 1972. Analysing these two schemes brings a greater understanding of military national service as it sought to benefit the individuals participating and the country at large and can assist policymakers today. In our increasingly fragile geopolitical environment, a thorough historical understanding of Australia’s national service experience could prove invaluable to those considering potential military capabilities of the future.
Colonel Renée Kidson concludes Part 5 by focusing on the historic call out of the Army, most notably the Army Reserve, from 2019 onward in response to the national bushfire emergency, the COVID-19 pandemic and several other high-risk weather season events. The mobilisation of the Army in response to the bushfire and COVID-19 emergencies included extensive employment of the Reserve and provides a valuable opportunity to reflect on the contingencies and compromises in the part-time force. Historically, the Reserve has experienced perceptual tensions in purpose, availability and training focus which have inter alia influenced conceptions of its employment potential. Kidson explores how recent domestic operations experience can reconcile some of these contingencies and compromises. She argues that while the part-time force has a unique capability edge during domestic operations (based on geography, relationships and expertise), this does not preclude warfighting and warlike operations. Rather, the civil–military mindset and skill set blend of part-time members is both inseparable from and critical to delivering the highest value capability contributions for the ADF.
In Part 6, we consider deployment challenges in the 1990s and beyond. This part contains two important chapters by Professor Bob Breen and one by Dr Rhys Crawley.
Bob Breen takes us through the major defence exercises that prepared the Army in the decade leading up to the International Force East Timor deployment. Adapting to joint, let alone combined and interagency, operations added a layer of complexity, as did a tendency to over-plan exercises, which lessened their value and became nothing more than templated drills. Breen reminds us that armies fight as they train, and that saving resources in training increases risk in operations. The 1987 Defence White Paper recalibrated Australia’s strategic posture to self-reliant defence in depth.2 Breen describes and analyses, with emphasis on command and control, the Kangaroo series of exercises, conducted by the ADF in 1989, 1992 and 1995. Consistent with government policy, these rehearsals incorporated narrow elements of mobilisation and military force projection which measured Australia’s military proficiency to deploy and defend the northern approaches to the Australian continent. Breen suggests that the major challenges during the exercises were the coordination and integration of maritime, land and air power under a unified command and control arrangement. Specific force preparation and deployment functions were not rehearsed realistically, and sustainment arrangements were rehearsed ‘backward’.
In his second chapter, Breen analyses force projection functions across six selected ADF overseas operations between 1987 and 2003: the deployment to the waters off Fiji (1987), Somalia (1993), Bougainville (1994 and 1997–8), East Timor (1999–2000) and Solomon Islands (2003). Using a grading matrix, Breen generates an audit report for each operation and then compares these reports to identify systemic issues affecting operational performance and risk mitigation. The audit catalogues what occurred in these peace support operations and raises the question, ‘Does such an audit hold relevance for the mass mobilising of forces in defence of Australia?’
Dr Rhys Crawley looks at issues of mobilisation in the current century, examining three case studies from deployments to Afghanistan to analyse how the Army addressed manpower, supply and logistics, force preparation, force insertion, and policy development across Australia’s longest and most recent war. Crawley looks beyond the operational logs to critically examine the preparation of forces as well as the strategic and operational staff processes needed to support them in theatre. He asks how the Department of Defence dealt with resourcing, resupply, logistics, force design and policy development questions. Each case study begins with the government’s decision to deploy forces as a starting point and then goes on to look at all the preparation that occurred between that decision and the start of operations. The chapter concludes with general observations regarding the long-term impacts of these issues.
In the concluding chapter, Professor Blaxland provides some closing reflections on mobilisation in the past and pointers for the future. He considers the political challenges of mobilisation today, coupled with the competing demands for support to domestic crises ranging from floods and fires to pandemics. In light of the difficulties, he proposes an Australian universal scheme for national and community service to cover the Army and the other arms of the ADF, along with the state and federal police, rural fire services and state emergency services.
This compendium of essential works clarifies that the Australian Army’s force structure is organic and constantly changing. It provides a starting point for quickly acquiring new capabilities at short notice when required to meet emerging threats and challenges. Moving forward, this book can act as the Army’s ‘open-source software’, giving operational and force design planners the baseline from which to tailor the Army program to generate the required output.
Today, the Army’s response to realising government direction and investment in new capabilities is being examined via a series of options under the Army Objective Force.3 It involves a careful and deliberate program of analysis that will provide a framework to develop the Army of the future. The Army Objective Force is about implementing an in-barracks land force structure capable of effectively and efficiently enabling the joint force. The work is in two steps: first, identifying what the force structures look like to enable the joint force (to be ‘ready now’), and second, deciding how to evolve force structures to ensure the Army can generate forces efficiently and effectively to enable the future joint force (to be ‘future ready’). The title Army Objective Force reflects the fact that the Army is implementing its component of the joint objective force. Readers can be assured that the Australian Army’s future is informed through understanding of its past – understanding that is provided to the Army’s planners today through contributions such as this.
