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Comparison of Groundwater Ownership Regimes in Ten Jurisdictions Across Five Continents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2026

Gabriel Eckstein*
Affiliation:
School of Law, Texas A&M University , Fort Worth, TX (United States (US)); International Association for Water Law (AIDA)
Theo Buchler
Affiliation:
Buchler-Stein Consultants, Johannesburg (South Africa); AIDA
Caleb Cook
Affiliation:
Duane Morris LLP, Dallas, TX (US); AIDA
Heping Dang
Affiliation:
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen (China); AIDA
Robyn Stein
Affiliation:
Buchler-Stein Consultants, Johannesburg (South Africa); AIDA
Stefano Burchi
Affiliation:
AIDA
Gabriela Cuadrado Quesada
Affiliation:
IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, Delft (The Netherlands); AIDA
Juan Pablo Galeano
Affiliation:
Estudio Galeano & Asoc., Misiones (Argentina); AIDA
Eric Garner
Affiliation:
Best Best & Krieger LLP, Riverside, CA (US); AIDA
Amy Hardberger
Affiliation:
Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX (US); AIDA
Imad Antoine Ibrahim
Affiliation:
Universiteit Twente, Twente (The Netherlands); AIDA
Oudi Kgomongwe
Affiliation:
South Africa Department of Water and Sanitation, Pretoria (South Africa); AIDA
*
Corresponding author: Gabriel Eckstein, email: gabrieleckstein@law.tamu.edu
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Abstract

The regulation of groundwater remains underdeveloped globally and often lags behind the domestic governance of surface water. As a result, groundwater is often subject to unfettered extraction, uses, and contamination. A clear understanding of ownership is central to the success of domestic regulations. However, the types of ownership regime in place in nations around the world are poorly documented in the academic literature. This study addresses that gap through a comparative analysis of domestic groundwater ownership regimes across ten jurisdictions in nine countries spanning five continents. It identifies three dominant models of groundwater ownership: private ownership, public ownership, and non-ownership with public oversight. It then examines how these ownership doctrines impact key dimensions of groundwater governance, including the nature and transferability of the ownership right, the level of government at which regulation takes place, implications for rights of use, and interactions with customary and Indigenous rights. Doing so offers unique insight into how nations with different legal traditions, governance structures, and customary practices address the ownership of groundwater resources. It also suggests that different ownership (and non-ownership) models can have distinct implications for other aspects of groundwater governance.

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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained prior to any commercial use.
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

1. Introduction

Groundwater is the most extracted natural resource on Earth with more than 1,200 cubic kilometres (km3) extracted worldwide in 2021 to meet agricultural, industrial, drinking, sanitation, and hygienic needs.Footnote 1 That is nearly 300 times the global volume of oil extracted annually in the same year.Footnote 2 Around 40% of the world’s production of irrigated crops is dependent on groundwater, while 69% of withdrawn groundwater is applied to agriculture;Footnote 3 31% of groundwater withdrawals are used in the combined municipal, industrial, and commercial sectors;Footnote 4 45% of humanity’s freshwater needs for everyday domestic uses, such as cooking and hygiene, come from groundwater;Footnote 5 and more than half of all drinking water originates from freshwater aquifers.Footnote 6

Groundwater resources worldwide are facing significant threats. Studies suggest that global storage capacity of groundwater is declining at a rate of approximately 17 km3 annually as a result of over-exploitation and subsidence.Footnote 7 Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and other ‘forever’ chemicals are now found in a significant number of aquifers worldwide at levels that exceed safe levels of many nations’ health and environmental agencies.Footnote 8 Moreover, climate change and resulting desertification are placing increased stress on groundwater resources,Footnote 9 in both developed and emerging economies, many of which are already heavily dependent on groundwater abstraction to meet daily water needs.Footnote 10

Despite these significant dependencies and threats, groundwater regulation at the national level in the majority of nations is not well developed and lags far behind the governance of surface water resources. This can be attributed to the invisible character of groundwater, as well as a misunderstanding of the science of groundwater resources.Footnote 11 Even in countries where subsurface water has been regulated, the results have been limited and lacking, often without any effect on unfettered extraction, uses, and contamination.Footnote 12

To date, only a few studies involving a handful of nations or a region have explored national groundwater governance comparatively.Footnote 13 None, however, have approached these issues systematically or directly placed multiple systems from multiple regions of the world in a comparative context. As a result, nations have had few opportunities to explore and learn from the successes and failures of other countries. In order to develop a more robust comparative assessment, enhance understanding of this nascent area of law, and offer nations greater opportunities to explore the groundwater governance experiences of other countries, information needs to be compiled and assessed for specific groundwater regulatory mechanisms and approaches implemented by governments around the world.

This article is a first step towards that objective. It presents the results of a pilot project designed to compare one important aspect of domestic groundwater governance: the ownership regime. The project is part of a larger effort to explore groundwater regulations in various countries, compare specific components and factors of different regulatory approaches addressing distinct groundwater-related issues and challenges, identify commonalities and differences in those regulatory approaches, and enhance knowledge about groundwater governance that could be informative for other researchers, as well as nations around the world.

To this end, Section 2 of the article describes the methodology of the study, which may be best portrayed as a desk study. Section 3 provides a definition and interpretation of the concept of ownership, which underpins the analysis of this study. Thereafter, Section 4 examines the survey results in relation to the questions posed in the surveys. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.

2. Methodology

The initiative as the basis of this article was launched as a pilot project both to test the proposed methodology and to assess whether the results could be informative to the broader community, to include policymakers, water managers, and academics. The project was initiated under the auspices of the International Association for Water Law (AIDA), a non-governmental, professional membership association working at the intersection of water law, governance, and policy. AIDA was selected based on its considerable network of legal and related professionals specializing in water law and regulation. Its members come from nearly 40 countries on all six inhabited continents and serve in governmental, non-governmental, academic, and private sector professional roles.

While diversity in the geographic distribution and legal approaches to groundwater resources was a priority for the selection of countries to include in the pilot project, participants in the project were all AIDA members who volunteered to contribute to the effort. Moreover, each contributor was asked to conduct research only on domestic groundwater law and regulation in jurisdictions with which they were familiar. As a result, the volunteer participants’ distinct backgrounds and experiences dictated the countries and subnational jurisdictions that were included in this pilot project: Argentina, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Italy, Kenya, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United States (US) states of California and Texas.Footnote 14 Despite the limited sample size, the jurisdictions included in this study employ a variety of civil law, common law, and mixed legal traditions, are found on five continents, and include two with a federal political system. While the study is not intended to represent the full range of groundwater ownership approaches globally, the authors believe that the sample is adequately representative of such regimes.

For this pilot study, only one specific aspect of groundwater governance was selected for review in order to ensure that the research and its scope, as well as the mechanisms for conducting the research and comparing the results, could be managed adequately. The single issue reviewed in this project, which was collectively selected by the pilot project participants, was the domestic ownership regime for groundwater.

An eight-question survey template was prepared to guide each participant’s research. The questionnaire is available in the online supplementary materials to this article. Each author then completed an initial draft of their survey by responding to the questions, after which the drafts were reviewed under a modified single-blind review process. Next, a research assistant who did not work on any of the surveys randomly assigned three surveys to each survey author for their review, making sure that authors were not assigned their own surveys for review. This process ensured that every survey was reviewed by three or four pilot project participants. Reviewers were asked to focus on whether the surveys adequately and thoroughly answered the survey questions, and to ensure internal consistency within each survey. Given their respective backgrounds, reviewers were not asked to evaluate the substantive accuracy of the surveys. Thereafter, the surveys were returned to the research assistant who anonymized the feedback and returned it to the survey authors. Authors then revised their surveys and submitted their final drafts. The finalized surveys were used as the foundation for this article, which was drafted by a subgroup of the pilot project participants. Given their structure and nuances, as well as the need for explanation and qualifications, the surveys are not summarized in this article; rather, the results of the surveys have been incorporated into the ‘Discussion’ section of this article (Section 5). The completed surveys are available as online supplementary materials to this article.

3. Defining ‘Ownership’

In developing a comparative perspective on the ownership of groundwater, it is useful to understand what ownership means. This is challenging as concepts of ownership, especially of a transitory natural resource like groundwater, can vary widely across jurisdictions. Generally, ownership can be defined as the exclusive right to possess, use, and dispose of property. It encompasses the rights to control and manage the property, benefit from its use, and transfer it to others through sale, gift, or inheritance.Footnote 15 Building on this understanding, ‘property’ is generally understood to refer to the thing that is subject to ownership.Footnote 16 In other words, ownership is applied to things that constitute property. These understandings of ownership and property, however, are intentionally generic and find considerable distinctions and nuances in various legal traditions. Moreover, various legal traditions differentiate between full or absolute ownership, and ownership of or entitlement to a right of use.

In the American Common Law tradition, property is described in terms of a bundle of rights or entitlements that are malleable, the content of which depends on the character or quality of the thing that is being subjected to ownership.Footnote 17 While the right to exclude is especially important in common law conceptions of ownership,Footnote 18 the bundle also includes entitlements, inter alia, to possess, use, enjoy without interference, derive income from, transfer, and even destroy property.Footnote 19 At least in theory, each of these rights and entitlements can be disconnected from the whole and enjoyed and conveyed independently.

The Civil Law tradition views property more monolithically, with ownership as the foundation of the entire property law system with exclusion at its core.Footnote 20 This perspective allows owners substantial freedom to use their property free from interference by the government and non-owners.Footnote 21 Civil law draws heavily from Roman conceptions of ownership premised on a ‘triptych’ of three fundamental attributes: usus, ‘the right to use a thing’; fructus, ‘the right to have a thing produce whatever it produces or to administer it’; and abusus, ‘the right to dispose of a thing’.Footnote 22 This full collection of ownership attributes can be ‘dismembered’ into lesser property interests, which grant limited property rights,Footnote 23 though the numerus clausus principle limits the number of accessory rights that can be created.Footnote 24 These ‘accessory rights’ are different from ownership, which is unitary, and ‘have as their object the value of the asset’.Footnote 25 The limited property rights created in this fashion ‘burden the exercise of the power of ownership, but the right of ownership itself remains whole’.Footnote 26

While things like homes, automobiles, and even forests have been relatively easily incorporated into such ownership and property regimes, many jurisdictions have struggled to ascertain the legal character of fleeting natural resources like groundwater. Under Roman law, this stemmed, in part, from a belief that some resources had to be accessible to all. Thus, flowing water was generally treated as res communes, a resource that was incapable of ownership but was available for all to use. According to The Institutes of Justinian, ‘[b]y natural law, these things are the common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it the shores of the sea’.Footnote 27 It is unclear whether groundwater was treated as res communes under Roman law. However, some early Roman texts suggest that groundwater was either considered as part of the overlying land or subject to ownership by capture.Footnote 28

The challenges in ascertaining the legal character of groundwater, however, arise also from a lack of understanding of the nature of groundwater. For example, notwithstanding the public and interconnected nature of all freshwater resources, Roman law regarded groundwater underlying land subject to ius civile (civil law, or the law that applies to relationships between private citizens) as a part of the tract,Footnote 29 but also bound every landowner to a correlative right to that groundwater. This governance approach effectively set the stage for well interference without providing an equitable solution. In the absence of understanding of how groundwater flows and functions, the Digest of Justinian records Marcus Claudius Marcellus asserting that ‘no action, not even the action for fraud, can be brought against a person who, while digging on his own land, diverts his neighbour’s water supply’.Footnote 30

Not only was this neglect and misunderstanding of groundwater evident in Roman times, but it also appeared in more contemporary eras, resulting in a significant number of national legal systems failing to subject groundwater to any sensible ownership or property rules. For example, an English appellate court in the 1843 case of Acton v. Blundell concluded that ‘it would be unreasonable’ to grant rights to use subsurface water because its use may be hidden, leaving other interested parties ‘ignorant of its … adopted use’.Footnote 31 Courts in the US went further. In the 1911 case of New York Continental Jewel Filtration v. Jones, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia asserted that:

[p]ercolating subterranean water is a wandering thing, which, like the air, is not subject to any fixed rules of law. The existence, origin, course, and movement of such waters, and the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so involved in mystery, secrecy, and uncertainty as to render any attempt to establish or administer any set of legal rules with respect to them practically impossible.

Owing to its geographic and climatic origins, Islamic law developed a more substantial water law regime, including for groundwater resources. The term ‘Sharia’, which refers to the Islamic legal system, is actually rooted in freshwater resources and means ‘the path to water’.Footnote 32 With regard to groundwater, Islamic legal tradition generally prohibits ownership of freshwater resources, including the buying and selling of water. Traditionally, this public water could be used by anyone for any purpose as long as it would not lead to undue waste of or damage to the resource.Footnote 33 However, under Sunni doctrine, anyone digging a well, whether on private or unoccupied land, gains an ownership interest in the water contained in the well.Footnote 34 This legal system also affords well owners a buffer zone or harim around the well in which the well owner can prevent the installation of new wells that might have a negative impact on their well.Footnote 35 Notwithstanding this attention to groundwater, even Islam-based laws for administering groundwater resources have been limited and only minimally address contemporary challenges such as depletion, climatic changes, contamination, and aquifer-dependent ecosystems.

Groundwater regulations, however, can also be found in other legal traditions. For example, while the early Chinese legal system primarily addressed surface water, its principles, such as equitable water distribution, remain highly relevant to managing groundwater resources.Footnote 36 During the Ottoman era, the Ottoman Empire incorporated the majority of Islamic water principles into its legal regime, including those related to groundwater resources, much of which still influence the development of contemporary legal frameworks in many Arab states.Footnote 37

Nevertheless, groundwater today remains a secondary (and often a tertiary) priority in most countries’ legal regimes governing freshwater resources. This is especially evident in jurisdictions where groundwater is treated as a part of the land. For example, the US state of Texas regards groundwater as part of the land and owned by the landowner, although it does recognize the possibility of severing ownership of the groundwater from that of the land.Footnote 38 In such jurisdictions, comprehensive groundwater management plans are often thwarted by a lack of legal authority, leaving contemporary concerns – such as climate change, groundwater pollution, aquifer depletion, and impact on interrelated surface water resources – poorly addressed. Moreover, efforts in some countries that have sought to connect surface water and groundwater management through legal means have been stymied by ingrained traditional land-use practices.Footnote 39

Previous scholarly work has identified certain archetypal forms of water ownership. These are not always neat, well-defined categories, and multiple forms of ownership may occur within a single jurisdiction.Footnote 40 Nevertheless, they provide a useful organizing framework for categories of ownership. Firstly, under a private ownership system, all rights and obligations associated with ownership reside with individuals or private entities, enforceable against other individuals, entities, and the state alike.Footnote 41 In most cases, the private owners’ rights over the system are not absolute – they have an obligation to use the water they own in a socially responsible manner, as determined by the government of their jurisdiction.Footnote 42 Yet, a few jurisdictions, including one reviewed in this study, assign near-absolute rights to private owners. Secondly, and conversely, groundwater may be owned outright by the nation stateFootnote 43 under a public ownership system.Footnote 44 The nation-state’s ownership may be vested in the local, regional, state, provincial, or national government, or jointly managed by some combination thereof.Footnote 45 The relevant governing authority, as owner or public trustee, generally establishes a concession, permit or licensing system under which private owners acquire use rights in the water, and creates rules to control the use of the resource.Footnote 46 Thirdly, under a common ownership or res communis system, a group may own a water resource collectively with equal rights to access and use it, while excluding non-owners from use of the resource.Footnote 47 Between these second and third forms of ownership are various government trustee relationships, under which water is owned by the people of a nation and managed in trust on their behalf by the government.Footnote 48 Fourthly, under a modern res nullius theory of ownership, water belongs to no one and is available for everyone’s use.Footnote 49 Unlike the traditional Roman conception of the doctrine, however, modern forms of res nullius generally do not allow ownership of the resource to become privatized through occupation of the land overlying the groundwater.Footnote 50

For purposes of the current study, the following offers a basic framework for ownership and property as applied to groundwater resources under domestic law. It is presented based on a review of the literature and the surveys included in this present project, but without offering an opinion as to the appropriateness of specific components of the framework. While the framework may be somewhat generic, it provides a foundation against which variations, deviations, and exceptions can be considered. It also offers a starting point from which to begin assessing the practicability, suitability, and scientific bases of the law.

The findings highlight how in some jurisdictions (The Netherlands and South Africa), groundwater is considered incapable of being property in any context, albeit subject to the management of public authorities; such management may be in the form of a public trust or other obligation required of national authorities. In other jurisdictions (Argentina, California, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Italy, Kenya, and Texas), groundwater is regarded as property capable of ownership and available for private and/or public purposes.

Where ownership in groundwater is recognized, ownership of the resource refers to the exclusive right to possess, control, use, manage, transfer, and dispose of the resource. In some jurisdictions (California and Texas), these components of ownership may be disassembled and held independently, while in others they remain firmly bundled (Argentina and China). Ownership of the resource can be held privately (Texas) or publicly (China, Costa Rica, and Kenya). Where the resource is held privately, ownership of groundwater may be granted in relation to land ownership or independent from land, and may be conferred while it is in the ground or upon capture. If held publicly, the resource is legally owned by the public or the state (Chile, China, Costa Rica, and Kenya), or by a subnational authority (provinces in Argentina and states in the US), or by a local community (Italy) with benefits and responsibilities defined by domestic legislation, governance structures, legal traditions, and customary practices.

It is noteworthy that this last category, in which the resource is held publicly, is quite broad and diverse. Variations can be found in the language used to legally assign ownership of the resource, including, for example: ‘owned by’, ‘held by’, ‘belongs to’, ‘vested in’, or ‘under the dominion of’. Differences can also be found in the designation of the recipient, such as ‘the state’, ‘the public’, and ‘the nation’. Additionally, the translation of some of these concepts and terms from their original language into English adds another layer of complexity. Whether there are meaningful differences in these terms and phrases is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, and without venturing into degrees of democracy and representational governance, these differences may be tautological or relevant in specific jurisdictions, depending on the domestic governance structures, legal traditions and customary practices, and should not be discounted without scrutiny.

4. Review of Survey Results

Scholars in both civil and common law traditions have conceptualized property ownership as inherently relational.Footnote 51 Under the classical common law view (though, acknowledging that common law traditions can differ among nations), ‘rights in rem … should be regarded not as rights in a thing, but as relations between individuals, with each of them having an obligation not to interfere with the thing over which the other person has a property right’.Footnote 52 However, ownership of natural resources necessitates a different conceptual paradigm. It is a foundational principle of international law that nation-states have permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and, consequently, may set rules regarding their use and control.Footnote 53 With regard to natural resources, then, the relevant ownership relation occurs primarily between the nation state (or a subnational unit) and the users of its resources. The contours of that relationship are established by the specific requirements of the nation-state’s laws governing natural resources. Only where the nation-state recognizes privatization of the resource will the ownership regime follow the more traditional individual–individual paradigm.

In this study, we examine various facets of ownership regimes that have been applied to groundwater resources in ten jurisdictions in nine countries on five continents around the world. We begin by comparing ownership systems, the foundation of the ownership relationship. The relationship is fundamentally different when ownership vests in the nation state (or a subnational unit) as compared to when it is allowed to vest in individuals. We then focus on two classical elements of the ownership relationship: the right to use, and the right to alienate.Footnote 54 When the nation state owns groundwater, the right to use typically includes the exact parameters under which groundwater abstractions are permitted – for example, who may abstract water, in what quantities, under what conditions, and abiding by what rules. Similarly, the right to alienate becomes a question of whether that resulting usufructuary right (the right to use the resource) can be transferred, and under what circumstances.

After establishing the basic parameters of the ownership relation between state and user, we examine two aspects of how the nation-state (or a subnational unit) ensures that users abide by the terms of that relationship. This includes a discussion of the level of governance at which groundwater is managed or regulated, and the specific institutional arrangements relating to groundwater ownership. A substantial body of existing research focuses on the correlation between natural resource management and the devolution of ownership rights from the national government to more local levels.Footnote 55 In some instances, the delegation of administrative or ownership rights to a subsidiary level of governance can add an additional actor to the nation-state/user ownership relation with the ability to alter the contours of the ownership right.

Finally, we look at two specific aspects of ownership emanating from international law: the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty and practices, and the human right to water. Indigenous peoples have a special connection with their traditional lands and the resources therein, which frequently forms the core of their cultural and spiritual identity.Footnote 56 As part of this special relationship, aspirational principles of international law state that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use’.Footnote 57 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights as protecting Indigenous property rights over their ancestral territories, and the right to the use and enjoyment thereon.Footnote 58 These Indigenous property rights necessarily implicate the ownership relationship between Indigenous peoples and the national government under whose jurisdiction they fall. Consequently, we seek to determine whether any nation-states have implemented this international obligation with respect to the rights of their domestic Indigenous populations to use and access the groundwater resources on traditional lands. With regard to the internationally recognized human right to waterFootnote 59 – because groundwater is an important source of drinking water, basic sanitation, and subsistence farming in many parts of the world – we seek to understand whether nations have altered any aspect of their ownership relationship over groundwater as a means to ensure a minimal amount of groundwater for all of their citizens.

4.1. The Nature of Groundwater Ownership

Can groundwater be owned? If so, by whom? Moreover, how does ownership of groundwater function, how is it implemented, and what are its contours or limitations? Overall, four types of groundwater ownership have been recognized in the literature: (i) ownership by national or provincial/state governments, (ii) non-ownership with a custodial or trustee role by the government, (iii) non-ownership until extraction, and (iv) private ownership of the resource.Footnote 60

In our study of ten jurisdictions, we found that eight take the position that groundwater can be owned, either by the nation state through one or more of its organs or a subnational unit, or privately by individuals or entities. Five jurisdictions regard the national government as the owner of groundwater; these include Chile,Footnote 61 China,Footnote 62 Costa Rica,Footnote 63 Italy,Footnote 64 and Kenya.Footnote 65 Two jurisdictions, ArgentinaFootnote 66 and the US,Footnote 67 consider groundwater ownership to be subject to the jurisdiction of subnational units, namely provinces or states. While in California, the state owns the groundwater on behalf of its population,Footnote 68 in Texas, groundwater is deemed private property most often belonging to the overlying landowner.Footnote 69 However, Texas also recognizes that groundwater in the ground can be owned separately from the land containing that water.Footnote 70

An additional difference is that two jurisdictions in the study reject the notion of ownership of groundwater while it is in the ground. In South Africa, the national government is responsible to act as custodian or trustee of all legal title to water as public property. However, neither the state nor a private actor can own groundwater.Footnote 71 In the Netherlands, groundwater is considered res nullius (a thing that is unowned) until it is captured.Footnote 72 Once extracted via a spring, well, or pump, it becomes the property of the extractor.Footnote 73 Nevertheless, the Dutch government, at various levels of the governmental framework, is tasked with the obligation to properly manage the resource.Footnote 74

In the seven jurisdictions in which groundwater is considered to be owned by national or provincial/state governments, the government is expected to assume some level of responsibility for managing and protecting groundwater resources. However, our surveys do not reveal whether these jurisdictions have explicitly or implicitly established a public trust doctrine, whereby ownership is vested in the people while the state holds trustee obligations. Taking China as an example, the state is responsible for protecting, developing, managing, and utilizing groundwater resources,Footnote 75 but Chinese scholars generally do not consider the national government as having trustee responsibilities.Footnote 76

In addition, the legal authority that these nation states assign to themselves does not necessarily serve as absolute grounds for asserting their control over groundwater. For instance, whether a state owns the groundwater does not directly correlate with its right or power to use it. In South Africa, although water is not the property of the national government, the national government retains ‘a supervening right of use and enjoyment superior to that of individuals’.Footnote 77 In contrast, in California, even though the state owns the groundwater, it does not have the right to use or possess it, though it can regulate its use.Footnote 78 In fact, there is no state, regional, or local groundwater-permitting requirement in California beyond the need for a ministerial county permit for the drilling of a well.Footnote 79

The scope of authority that ownership affords nations must be further differentiated from groundwater rights. Groundwater rights pertain to the legal right to withdraw groundwater from the subsurface and put it to a certain use.Footnote 80 Such rights do not necessarily require or implicate ownership of the resource. Rather, in most jurisdictions groundwater rights must be obtained from a relevant governmental authority and depend on that authority’s permission to be implemented. This is the case in jurisdictions that ascribe ownership rights to the nation or the public (such as China, Costa Rica, and Kenya), as well as those that decline to recognize ownership of groundwater in its unextracted state (such as the Netherlands and South Africa). In contrast, in jurisdictions where groundwater is owned privately, such as Texas, groundwater rights are simply derived from ownership of the resource.Footnote 81

Finally, where ownership of groundwater resources resides with the public or the nation, or where the government is placed in a trust relationship to manage the resource, regulation seems to be more substantial. In China, Costa Rica, Kenya, and South Africa,Footnote 82 for example, the right to abstract groundwater can be achieved only through a permit or a licence issued by the government. Such permits and licences are limited in the sense that they cannot be transferred, are of limited duration, and are restricted to a precise volume of water for use at a specific location.

In contrast, the exercise of private groundwater ownership in Texas is considerably less regulated. While use of the resource must not intentionally or maliciously infringe other owners’ rights or lead to wilful waste of groundwater,Footnote 83 Texan courts typically interpret these rules broadly. As a result, no cases were identified as finding unlawful groundwater use.Footnote 84 Beyond these minimal judicial constraints, the Texas Water Code empowers groundwater conservation districts to regulate the construction and spacing of wells; requires permits for both well construction and groundwater extraction; enforces extraction limitations to address subsidence, protect water quality, and maintain recharge and discharge zones.Footnote 85 However, the districts must temper their use of these regulatory tools to avoid over-regulation. Because groundwater in Texas is owned as private property, over-regulation can be viewed by the courts as governmental expropriation.Footnote 86

In a different vein, albeit with a comparable outcome, the ‘non-ownership until extraction’ policy applied in the Netherlands may limit the nation-state’s ability to regulate groundwater. Although the Dutch Water Act mandates that ‘[e]xtraction of groundwater … without a permit … shall be prohibited’,Footnote 87 even groundwater that is extracted illegally can be owned and traded once the resource is withdrawn from the ground. Such an approach has the potential to encourage or contribute to illegal groundwater extraction.Footnote 88 Smaller operations often escape the attention of enforcement authorities, despite the requirement to apply for groundwater extraction permits.Footnote 89 However, even in cases where ownership is explicitly held by the nation state, such as in China, in practice many instances of groundwater extraction also fall outside regulation and monitoring.Footnote 90

4.2. The Right to Use Groundwater

Irrespective of the ownership of groundwater, eight of the ten jurisdictions included in this study provide some entitlement to use the resource, often termed a usufructuary right, through a government-managed concessioning, permitting, or licensing process. In a few jurisdictions, such processes create enforceable rights for that use. For instance, in California,Footnote 91 Chile,Footnote 92 and Texas,Footnote 93 the right to use is regarded as a bona fide property right that is separate from the ownership of the groundwater. In California the usufructuary right is established by ownership of the overlying land,Footnote 94 while in Chile it is related to the permit issued by the appropriate authority.Footnote 95 In Texas, however, the right to use is rolled into the ownership regime, which recognizes private ownership in groundwater resources.Footnote 96 Thus, while the government has authority to regulate groundwater use, the fundamental right to use lies with the owner.

In contrast, in China,Footnote 97 Costa Rica,Footnote 98 Kenya,Footnote 99 the Netherlands,Footnote 100 and South Africa,Footnote 101 while groundwater extraction is subject to a concessioning, permitting, or licensing requirement that does create a usufructuary right, that right is not officially regarded as a property right. Nevertheless, China appears to encourage the trading of water permits, which suggests that the right has some property interest with value.Footnote 102 Moreover, the South African National Water Act provides for the transfer of an administrative right of use under certain circumstances, likewise suggesting some sort of property interest in the right.Footnote 103 However, a recent decision of the country’s highest court (the Constitutional Court) has created some confusion as to the parameters of how transfers may be restricted or permitted.Footnote 104 In a related example, it remains a matter of considerable debate in Italy whether a concession creating a usufructuary right implies private ownership of the concessioned water,Footnote 105 further intensified by statutory provisions granting authority to concessionaires to sell the concessioned water.Footnote 106

Differences also concern the renewal of permits. In some jurisdictions (China,Footnote 107 Costa Rica,Footnote 108 Kenya,Footnote 109 and the NetherlandsFootnote 110 ), the concession, licence or permit expires after a specified period of time unless it is proactively renewed. While not conclusive, the expiry of the extraction authorization suggests very limited, if any, property rights in the authorization. Further, in ChinaFootnote 111 and Argentina,Footnote 112 the concession is revocable by the governmental authorities, suggesting no property rights in the authorizing instrument.

4.3. Transferability of Ownership

The transfer of ownership of groundwater is related directly to whether the jurisdiction allows for private ownership of groundwater resources. Thus, of the ten jurisdictions surveyed in this study, only Texas allows transfer of the ownership of groundwater resources. While in most cases, this occurs in the context of land transfers, Texas recognizes the possibility of severing the groundwater estate as a distinct property right that is separate from the land.Footnote 113 As a result, in Texas it is possible to transfer ownership of the groundwater below a specific tract of land as a separate property interest distinct from the land. In the Netherlands and South Africa, the transfer of ownership of groundwater is an impossibility. This is because both nations reject ownership of groundwater resources in their unextracted, natural state.Footnote 114 In the remaining seven jurisdictions, where ownership rests with the public or the government, the transfer of ownership to private, non-governmental or other parties is prohibited.

The majority of these jurisdictions, however, recognize the possibility of transferring the usufructuary right – the right to use the groundwater – from one user to another. For example, Chile,Footnote 115 China,Footnote 116 and ItalyFootnote 117 allow transfers of usufructuary rights and concessions provided that such transfers are authorized by the relevant governmental authority. In California,Footnote 118 Costa Rica,Footnote 119 KenyaFootnote 120 and the Netherlands,Footnote 121 the right to extract from a specific tract of land is transferable primarily in conjunction with the sale of the land. While transfers of water use authorizations are permitted in South Africa, its Constitutional Court in 2023 considered that section 25(2) of the National Water Act does not expressly prohibit trading in water-use licences. The Court (at footnote 24) expressed its doubts that ‘a water use entitlement is a right that is capable of being sold in the legal sense’, echoing the intention of the National Water Act that an underlying right of use is an entitlement and not a true property interest.Footnote 122 Only in ArgentinaFootnote 123 is the right of use (recognized as an administrative right) not transferable.

4.4. Institutional Arrangement Related to Ownership

The domestic institutional structure relating to the ownership of groundwater plays a lesser role in this analysis as seven of the ten jurisdictions covered by this study recognize that ownership of groundwater resources lies permanently with the nation-state or the people.Footnote 124 As a result, there is no need to manage that ownership, although management of the resource and its uses are a separate matter. Similarly, in the two jurisdictions that disallow ownership of groundwater (the Netherlands and South Africa), at least while it is in the ground, an institutional ownership mechanism is unnecessary. In Texas, where private ownership is the norm, the institutional mechanism related to ownership is connected directly to the public registry for real property maintained by each county in the state,Footnote 125 which pertains to the ownership of the land and, thereby, the groundwater below it. Even where the groundwater estate is severed from the land in which it is contained, that estate is recorded in the public property registry.

4.5. Level of Governance

The level of governance at which groundwater ownership and use are managed or regulated among the ten jurisdictions reviewed in this study can be broken down into national, state/provincial, and local levels. A fourth category is also present in which governance of ownership does not occur at all. In some circumstances, Indigenous, customary or traditional rights may also affect or modify groundwater governance.

Four jurisdictions take a very centralized approach and administer groundwater ownership exclusively at the national level. Management generally takes the form of concessions, permits, or licences issued by national agencies and ministries. In ChileFootnote 126 and Costa Rica,Footnote 127 groundwater ownership and use are governed under a national water law and implemented through a single national agency: the General Board of Water in Chile, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy in Costa Rica. In China and Kenya, groundwater ownership is vested and overseen at the national level, though some management of the use of the resource occurs at regional and local levels. In China, groundwater is governed at both the administrative regional and watershed levels. The water administration department of the State Council establishes basin management organizations for rivers and lakes designated as important for the nation, such as the Yellow River and Yangtze River.Footnote 128 Local water administration departments at the county level and above are also responsible for the management of water resources within their respective administrative regions.Footnote 129 This often creates confusion caused by overlapping governance and conflicting institutional priorities.Footnote 130 Certain small-scale uses in China, however, may be exempt from groundwater withdrawal permits.Footnote 131 In Kenya, management occurs on three levels. The National Water Resources Authority (WRA) creates policies to conserve groundwater, receives and issues permit applications, and enforces permit conditions.Footnote 132 Basin Water Resource Committees are local catchment stakeholder groups that provide regional planning.Footnote 133 Finally, at the most local level in Kenya, water resources users associations manage water for the local community.Footnote 134

Argentina and the two US states of California and Texas take a substantially decentralized approach to the governance of groundwater ownership by assigning the responsibility to the provincial or state level. In Argentina, the national constitution assigns ownership, as well as the management and control of groundwater resources, to the country’s 23 provinces,Footnote 135 each of which has its own water code. However, a Federal Water Council (COHIFE) promotes coordination and integrated water management.Footnote 136 Meanwhile, in the US, regulation of groundwater ownership and governance has devolved to the states, including California and Texas. Therefore, each state has authority to regulate groundwater resource ownership according to their own state-level laws and policies. In Texas, where ownership of groundwater has always been regarded as the private property of the overlying landowner, management of groundwater resources occurs by local groundwater conservation districts, where such districts exist.Footnote 137 Where these are absent, governance occurs through the court systems upon claims of interference with adjacent groundwater rights.Footnote 138

In Italy, while the ownership of most groundwater resources lies with the state, the management of groundwater ownership and use lies at the regional level of general-purpose government, which can delegate it to the lower (provincial) level of general-purpose government.Footnote 139 Local communities and municipalities oversee the ownership of communally held springs and are responsible for their management.Footnote 140

In the Netherlands and South Africa, where neither country recognizes any sort of ownership of groundwater resources, there is no mechanism for managing the ownership of groundwater at any level of governance. Nevertheless, both governments, at various levels of authority, have responsibility to manage the resource on behalf of the public. In the Netherlands, for example, the proper permitting agency varies by use – the nation’s 12 provinces each regulate abstractions for drinking water supplies and a limited number of additional applications,Footnote 141 while regional water authorities oversee certain other uses.Footnote 142 In South Africa, catchment management agencies hold delegated powers to allocate water-use entitlements, while water user associations operate on a more restricted basis.Footnote 143

4.6. Indigenous, Customary, and Traditional Practices

Of the ten jurisdictions included in the study, one-half – Argentina, Italy, the Netherlands, and the US states of California and Texas – have no laws recognizing Indigenous, customary or traditional water management practices. Italy, however, does recognize certain historical practices in which communal property status is applied to springs located on communally held land.Footnote 144 Moreover, in California, a 2017 federal lawsuit recognized rights in groundwater for the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians in the Coachella Valley of Southern California based on the argument that when the US created the Tribe’s reservation, that action implicitly included adequate water to sustain the purpose of that reservation. In this parched region of southern California, that understanding applies to groundwater.Footnote 145

The other five jurisdictions surveyed for this study recognize such practices and incorporate them in various ways into their legal regimes. Chile recognizes ancestral water use rights that predate the national Water Code and afford superiority to those practices over all other claims of use.Footnote 146 Similarly, Kenya recognizes Indigenous, customary, and traditional water management practices, but does not necessarily prioritize water use on designated public lands held in trust for the benefit of these communities.Footnote 147 While neither Chile nor Kenya recognize groundwater ownership rights in their respective Indigenous communities, in affording primacy to those rights in relation to other water rights claims, both countries seem to recognize substantial property interests in the use of groundwater held by their Indigenous communities.

China,Footnote 148 Costa Rica,Footnote 149 and South AfricaFootnote 150 all recognize Indigenous, customary, and traditional water management practices in their legal regimes. However, in these jurisdictions, traditional water rights are subject to the national constitution and national legislation. In China, traditional practices are acknowledged, not in national legislation but rather at regional and local levels, and enforcement is usually left to each ethnic community.Footnote 151 However, it is important to note that their traditional beliefs, knowledge, and practices are facing increasing challenges and disruption from modern practices.Footnote 152

4.7. The Human Right to Water

Under a 2010 United Nations General Assembly Resolution, ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water [is] a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’.Footnote 153 In theory, the recognition of a human right to water ties into ownership of the groundwater. Though the right is necessarily multi-dimensional, it generally implies an individual right to water access that is supposed to supersede other governmental priorities.Footnote 154 Moreover, given that many of the surveyed jurisdictions vest groundwater ownership in the state, it is possible that citizens seeking increased access to drinking water might argue for a usufructuary right to nearby groundwater irrespective of ownership or the standard permitting regime. In this respect, it is important to note that whether or not the human right to water can displace use restrictions derived from the ownership of groundwater has not been resolved by the present study.

Four of the jurisdictions involved in this survey have affirmed some version of a human right to water under their domestic law: Costa Rica,Footnote 155 Kenya,Footnote 156 South Africa,Footnote 157 and California.Footnote 158 Moreover, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concludedFootnote 159 that a human right to water exists in the Americas under Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).Footnote 160 While not addressing the issue of groundwater or its ownership, the Court ordered Argentina to prepare an action plan to ensure that its Indigenous population had access to water.Footnote 161 Conceptually, this obligation applies to all freshwater resources, including groundwater, and nations in the American hemisphere that have ratified the ACHR, including Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica, but not the US.

The human right to water, however, has proven to be challenging in terms of enforcement and has only sparingly been applied directly to groundwater. One notable exception is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which admonished the government of Costa Rica to better regulate and control the use of agrochemicals in its pineapple industry in order to minimize groundwater pollution and ensure the human rights of local communities to access clean water.Footnote 162 Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the obligation under international law translates into domestic legal responsibilities, or how it pertains to the ownership of groundwater (and other freshwater) resources. As a result, there are significant variations in how nations implement the right. For example, the Californian human right to water carries no binding language. It instructs the state’s agencies merely to ‘consider’ the human right to water in establishing policies and regulations affecting water, and specifically disclaims any obligation to provide water or expend additional resources to develop water infrastructure.Footnote 163 To date, Californian courts that have reviewed the provision have all concluded that it creates no binding obligations on the government.Footnote 164 One scholar, however, suggests that a groundwater service plan that fails to protect drinking water uses might be deemed to violate the statute.Footnote 165

Arguably, however, the right to water may underlie the rationale for other aspects of national groundwater regulation. In Kenya, for example, permits are not required ‘for the abstraction or use of water, without the employment of works, from any water resource for domestic purposes’.Footnote 166 This could be seen as implementing the human right to water in so far as it makes it easier for individuals to withdraw groundwater to meet their basic needs.Footnote 167 In Italy, water for human consumption has priority in the allocation of available supplies,Footnote 168 which could be seen as implementing the human right to water to the extent that it is aimed at ensuring the satisfaction of basic human needs in relation to competing water demands. In South Africa, the right to water is implemented in part through the creation of a Reserve, a quantity of water set aside for satisfaction of basic human needs and the protection of aquatic ecosystems.Footnote 169 All significant water resources must be considered for the Reserve, including groundwater.Footnote 170 This, too, is intended to ensure a minimum threshold of groundwater for individual use and consumption.Footnote 171

In addition, the right to water in South Africa, articulated as a ‘right to have access to … sufficient’ water for human needs, is determined, in the first instance, by the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution.Footnote 172 In the context of this right, it is important to note that the right pertains to treated, reticulated water, fit for human consumption. In a case before the Constitutional Court of South Africa relating to various general rights under the Constitution, the court interpreted the human right to water as imposing an obligation for the nation-state to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures progressively to realize the achievement of the right of access to sufficient water, within available resources’.Footnote 173 It explicitly declined to state a ‘minimum core’ of the right that could be judicially enforceable against the nation and subjected its analysis of a challenged water policy only to an examination of reasonableness.Footnote 174 Accordingly, while groundwater forms a general part of the reserve component of water for basic human needs in South Africa,Footnote 175 the entitlement falls within the context of potable, reticulated water, governed by the country’s Water Services Act and its regulations.Footnote 176 In other words, the practical application of having the state provide access to water is found in physical infrastructural mechanisms.

5. Discussion

This study presents the results of a comparative analysis of domestic groundwater ownership regimes across ten jurisdictions in nine countries spanning five continents. It offers unique insight into how nations with different legal traditions, governance structures, and customary practices address ownership of groundwater resources. It also suggests that different ownership (and non-ownership) models can have distinct implications for other aspects of groundwater governance.

As a preliminary matter, ownership often helps to determine the authority that manages and regulates the resource as well as the scope of its powers. Where groundwater is owned by a national or provincial/state government, or where it is unowned in its unextracted natural state but subject to the custody or trusteeship of the government, that government is empowered to use, allocate, and conserve the resource on behalf and for the benefit of its citizenry. Such obligations allow governments to issue permits, licences, and concessions, as well as impose withdrawal limits, prioritized uses, and other regulations. Such responsibility becomes substantially constrained where groundwater is owned only after it is extracted, meaning that it is unowned in its unextracted natural state, or where it is subject to private ownership. In such cases, the government’s responsibility is often relegated to managing the use of the water, and has limited authority to address extraction and over-exploitation. Ownership by the government, however, does not always correlate with more governmental authority. For example, while California recognizes groundwater ownership by the state on behalf of its population and thereby has a right to regulate its extraction and use, its status as the ‘owner’ does not afford it the authority to use or possess the resource.Footnote 177 In addition, the right to use the groundwater can be segregated from ownership of the groundwater itself. Thus, in California,Footnote 178 Chile,Footnote 179 and Texas,Footnote 180 the right to use is treated as a bona fide property right that is separate from ownership of the resource.

In addition, ownership in its various forms can affect how and whether that ownership can be transferred. Generally, where ownership of groundwater is held by the state, ownership cannot be transferred, especially where ownership is coupled with a trustee relationship, which effectively prohibits the government from relinquishing its trustee obligations. In contrast, where groundwater can be owned privately, that ownership may be transferred either in conjunction with the transfer of the land overlying that groundwater, or as a separate groundwater estate severed from the land. Finally, where groundwater cannot be owned in its unextracted natural state, there is nothing to transfer.

The usufructuary right is often also transferable in the context of groundwater resources. Yet, ownership of the right is not always necessary to transfer the usufruct. In China,Footnote 181 Costa Rica,Footnote 182 and Kenya,Footnote 183 for example, where the usufructuary right is treated as a concession or licence without associated property rights, the right is transferable, albeit subject to certain constraints. These amount to a governmental authorization in China, and transferable primarily in conjunction with the sale of the land overlying the groundwater in Costa Rica and Kenya. Interestingly, while the Netherlands treats groundwater as res nullius,Footnote 184 it does issue authorizations to extract, which can be transferred along with the sale of the land to which the authorization is connected.Footnote 185

Ownership models for groundwater resources appear to have limited bearing on Indigenous, customary, and traditional water management practices. Of the five jurisdictions that recognize such practices in their groundwater governance regime, none afford full ownership rights in groundwater resources to Indigenous or traditional communities. Chile and Kenya, however, do seem to recognize that these communities hold a substantial property interest in the use of groundwater for their water management practices. This recognition, however, appears distinct from Chile’s treatment of usufructuary rights as a bona fide property right, or Kenya’s opposite perspective in not recognizing property interests in the right to use groundwater. Italy, however, is somewhat unique from the other jurisdictions reviewed in this study in that it recognizes communal property rights associated with certain historical practices related to springs located on communally held land.Footnote 186 While these communities are not regarded as Indigenous peoples, they nevertheless abide by historical and traditional practices that have been maintained for hundreds of years.

In a different vein, particular ownership regimes may have considerable implications for the human right to water. Ensuring that respect for human rights is the responsibility of government, and whether the government owns or has control over groundwater resources should be irrelevant to this obligation. Yet, when governments are responsible for the management, allocation, and conservation of groundwater resources (as they are in Costa RicaFootnote 187 and KenyaFootnote 188 ), they are endowed with the capacity and authority to implement measures that can support access to freshwater. In contrast, when groundwater resources are owned privately (such as in TexasFootnote 189 ), the government’s ability to develop relevant measures is severely constrained because of the potential for interference with private property rights that rises to the level of expropriation. Although the strictness of laws on regulatory takings and expropriation may vary, they are found in numerous jurisdictions, including in Europe.Footnote 190 Where ownership of the resource is prohibited or denied, the government’s ability to develop relevant measures also may be limited, though this can be countered through legislation or constitutional provisions. Thus, while South Africa rejects all ownership rights in unextracted groundwater, it has constitutional obligations that empower it to manage the resource on behalf of the citizenry.Footnote 191

Ultimately, this study demonstrates that groundwater resources can be owned under a variety of legal arrangements and regimes. It also indicates that the system used in each jurisdiction is typically a function of the legal tradition followed by that jurisdiction, but can also be influenced by Indigenous, traditional, and customary practices. In turn, the study also indicates that the type of ownership mechanism applied can have meaningful implications for the management and governance of groundwater resources. Thus, the extent to which the government may have authority to regulate groundwater abstraction and use, the transferability of ownership of the resource or the usufructuary right, the ability to ensure that a population has access to fresh groundwater, and other governance issues can be significantly affected by the ownership regime applied to groundwater.

6. Conclusion

Groundwater has become a critical resource around the world. It is a lifeline not only to nations in arid and semi-arid regions, but also increasingly relied upon by many countries and communities that historically believed they had adequate surface water supplies. As these nations continue to expand their reliance on subsurface water, many are straining existing governance structures that were not designed for modern conditions of well interference, aquifer contamination, and depleting supplies caused by climate change, population growth, and evolving priorities. Others are simply struggling with the same pressures to create viable regimes where none existed previously.

The purpose of this analysis was to pursue insight into and enhance knowledge about the various approaches used to govern groundwater resources around the world. As a first step towards that ambitious goal, this project started by addressing only the ownership aspect of groundwater governance regimes and presented the outcome of a survey of ten jurisdictions in nine countries on five continents. Given the limited sample size, the study cannot offer any definitive conclusions about how groundwater resources are owned globally, or which ownership models are more or less effective. Nevertheless, the diversity of jurisdictions evidences a variety of approaches that are each a function of the distinct histories, traditions, institutions, and customary practices that spawned them. What also seems evident is that these regimes continue to evolve and be tested by growing demand, changing climatic conditions, increasing environmental stress, expanding human rights concerns, and other factors that are likely to continue to drive reforms in groundwater governance globally.

As the first in a series of comparative studies into national laws and regulation of groundwater resources, this analysis sets the groundwork for subsequent assessments that can build and expand the knowledge base, not only on the topic of ownership but also on other important groundwater regulatory issues. Following a similar methodology, albeit refined by the experience of this study, a second project is already under way, designed to explore rights in, to, and to use groundwater resources. Other topics that may be considered for subsequent research projects include allocation and permitting regimes, conjunctive management, quality protection, and economic tools for compliance.

We firmly believe that the results of this comparative initiative will enhance understanding of groundwater regulation and governance around the world. More specifically, it will provide nations with examples and experiences from which they can draw to develop and enhance their specific regimes. Ultimately, it could also help countries to better align hydrologic realities with distinct geological, climatic, historical, political, economic, and cultural priorities and needs in order to establish a legal, regulatory governance that works best for their groundwater-related circumstances.

Supplementary material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102525100149

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the International Association for Water Law (AIDA) for orchestrating this opportunity as well as for its ongoing support of the initiative.

Funding statement

Not applicable.

Competing interests

The authors declare none.

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3 Loaiciga & Doh, n. 1 above, p. 332.

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16 Garner, ibid. (asserting that ‘property’ ‘refers to any external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised’); Italian Civil Code (1942), Art. 810 (stating that ‘[t]hings that can be subject to rights are considered property’).

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20 E.g., Emerich, n. 18 above, p. 89.

21 A. di Robilant, ‘Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?’ (2019) 66(3) Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 869–932, at 871.

22 Emerich, n. 18 above, p. 94.

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24 Ibid., p. 7.

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34 D.A. Caponera, Water Laws in Moslem Countries (UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1954), pp. 23–4.

35 Ibid., p. 17. The Mejelle – the Civil Code of the Ottoman Empire enacted in 1858 – built on Sharia law and offered similar rights and entitlements: T. Naff, ‘Islamic Law and the Politics of Water’, in J. Dellapenna & J. Gupta (eds), The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water (Springer, 2009), pp. 37–52, at 46–8.

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38 Texas Company v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (TX (US), 1927); Evans v. Ropte, 96 S.W.2d 973, 974 (TX (US), 1936). While not included in this study, groundwater in India is considered an absolute part of the soil that belongs to the landowner, a feature that dates back to the Indian Easement Act of 1892: P. Cullet & J. Gupta, ‘India: Evolution of Water Law and Policy’, in Dellapenna & Gupta, n. 35 above, pp. 157–73, at 162.

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40 Solli, n. 13 above, pp. 22, 25.

41 Cole & Ostrom, n. 19 above, p. 42.

42 Ibid., p. 40.

43 As used in this article, the term ‘nation-state’ refers to the governing authority of a nation. In contrast, the term ‘state’, when used on its own, refers to a subnational governing unit, such as a province.

44 D.A. Caponera & M. Nanni, Principles of Water Law and Administration (Routledge, 2018), p. 173.

45 Solli, n. 13 above, pp. 22, 25.

46 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Water Resources Allocation: Sharing Risks and Opportunities (OECD Publishing, 2015), p. 42.

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48 H.J. Bosch, J. Gupta & H. Verrest, ‘A Water Property Right Inventory in 60 Countries’ (2021) 30(2) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, pp. 263–74, at 264–5.

49 Solli, n. 13 above, pp. 22, 26.

50 Cole & Ostrom, n. 19 above, p. 42.

51 Emerich, n. 18 above, pp. 99–100.

52 Ibid., p. 99.

53 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803(XVII), ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, 14 Dec. 1962, UN Doc. A/RES/1803(XVII), Art. I, available at: https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/1803(xvii); K.N. Gess, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: An Analytical Review of the United Nations Declaration and its Genesis’ (1964) 13(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 398–449, at 409.

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56 C. Renglet, ‘The Recognition of the Special Relationship of Indigenous Peoples with their Environment under International Law: A Potential Advantage in Climate Litigation?’ (2022) 29(4) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, pp. 720–46, at 723–4.

57 UNGA Resolution 61/295, ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 13 Sept. 2007, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295, Art. 26(2).

58 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 27 June 2012, (Ser. C), No. 245, paras 145–6.

59 UNGA Resolution 64/292, ‘The Human Right to Water and Sanitation’, 28 July 2010, UN Doc. A/RES/64/292.

60 Solli, n. 13 above, p. 25.

61 Civil Code of Chile (1865), Art. 595; Chilean Water Code Reformation Act, No. 21435 (2022), Art. 1(2); National Water Code of Chile (1981), Art. 5.

62 Water Law of People’s Republic of China, (2016) Art. 3.

63 Water Law of Costa Rica (1942), Art. 1.

64 Law No. 36 of Italy (1944), Art. 1.

65 Water Act of Kenya (2002), Pt II(5).

66 Constitution of Argentina (1994), Art. 124.

67 G. Eckstein, ‘Rethinking Transboundary Ground Water Resources Management: A Local Approach along the Mexico-U.S. Border’ (2013) 25(1) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, pp. 95–128, at 108.

68 Water Code of California (2024), s. 102.

69 Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 832 (TX (US), 2012); Water Code of Texas (2024), s. 36.002.

70 Texas Company v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (TX (US), 1927); Evans v. Ropte, 96 S.W.2d 973, 974 (TX (US), 1936).

71 National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Art. 3.

72 A. Keessen & W. Ernst, ‘The Adaptiveness of Dutch Water Law Put to the Test: Water Scarcity in a Water-Rich Country’ (2014) 24(5) Journal of Water Law, pp. 239–48, at 242.

73 Civil Code of the Netherlands (1992), Art. 5:20(1)(c); Kamerstukken II of Netherlands (2017/18), 34864, nr. 3, p. 54.

74 Water Act of The Netherlands (2009), ss. 3.6, 5.2, 6.4; H. Havekes et al., ‘Water Governance: The Dutch Water Authority Model’, Dutch Water Authorities, June 2017, p. 23, available at: https://dutchwaterauthorities.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/The-Dutch-water-authority-model.pdf.

75 Water Law of People’s Republic of China (2016), Art. 2; Constitution of People’s Republic of China (2018), Ch. I, Art. 9.

76 Q. Piao (朴), ‘Public Trust, State Ownership and Natural Resource Protection: American Experience and China’s Development (公共信托、国家所有权与自然资源保护:美国经验与中国发展)’ (2013) 6 Scientific Socialism (bimonthly) (⟪科学社会主义⟫(双月刊)), pp. 153–6; J. Wang (王) & N. Lan (蓝), ‘Research on the Role of Trust System in the Process of Initial Water Rights Allocation (信托制度在水权出让环节的作用研究)’ (2017) 17(5) Journal of China University of Geosciences (Social Sciences Edition) (中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)), pp. 64–71.

77 National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Art. 3.

78 Water Code of California (2024), s. 102.

79 California Department of Water Resources, ‘Permitting Agencies’, available at: https://water.ca.gov/Programs/Groundwater-Management/Wells/Permitting-Agencies.

80 Solli, n. 13 above, pp. 22, 24.

81 Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, n. 69 above.

82 See Section 4.2 below.

83 Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 30 (TX (US), 1978). These restrictions are also recognized in the Water Code of Texas (2024), s. 36.002(b)(1).

84 City of Fort Worth v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 276 S.W.2d 798, 803 (TX (US), 1955).

85 Texas Water Code (2024), s. 36.101.

86 City of Fort Worth v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 276 S.W.2d 833 (TX (US), 1955).

87 Water Act of The Netherlands (2009), s. 6.4(1).

88 C. Klassert et al., ‘Unexpected Growth of an Illegal Water Market’ (2023) 6 Nature Sustainability, pp. 1406–17, at 1406–10; M. Biancardi, G. Iannucci & G. Villani’ (2023) 116 Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, article 106872.

89 N.P. Pellenbarg, ‘Groundwater Management in the Netherlands: Background and Legislation’ (1997) ILRA Workshop on Groundwater Management, pp. 137–49.

90 Y. Jin (金), ‘Research on the Implementation Issues and Countermeasures of the Water Extraction Permit System in Xianyang City (咸阳市取水许可制度执行问题及对策研究)’ (MSci thesis, Northwest University (西北大学) (China), 2021); J. Wang et al., ‘Agriculture and Groundwater Development in Northern China: Trends, Institutional Responses, and Policy Options’ (2007) 9(S1) Water Policy, pp. 61–74.

91 California Water Code (2024), s. 102; City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 860 n. 7 (CA (US), 2000).

92 Chilean Water Code Reformation Act, No. 21435 (2022), Art. 6.

93 Texas Water Code (2024), s. 36.002.

94 See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, n. 91 above.

95 M.P.C. Victorero, ‘Regularization of Customary Water Use Rights: The Protection of Indigenous Waters in the North of the Country (Regularización de los derechos consuetudinarios de aprovechamiento de aguas: La protección de las aguas indígenas en el norte del país)’ (Bachelor’s thesis in Legal and Social Sciences, Universidad de Chile, 2020), pp. 8–9, available at: https://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/185523/Regularizacion-de-derechos-consuetudinarios-de-aprovechamiento-de-aguas-la-proteccion-de-aguas-indigenas.pdf.

96 Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, n. 69 above; Water Code of Texas, s. 36.002 (2024).

97 Water Law of People’s Republic of China (2016), Arts 6, 48.

98 Water Law of Costa Rica (1942), Art. 7; Minister of Environment and Energy, Decree No. 44410 (29 Feb. 2024) (creating rules for Chapters 1–4 of the Water Law).

99 Water Act of Kenya (2016), Pt II(5–7).

100 Kamerstukken II, 2017/18, 34864, nr. 3, pp. 54, 73; Pellenbarg, n. 89 above, p. 144; T. Barshini, ‘Groundwater Management in Times of Housing Shortage: On the (Im)possibilities of Water Boards to Regulate Vertical Drainage and Ground Perforation in Times of Housing Shortage [Het grondwaterbeheer in tijden van woningnood: Over de (on)mogelijkheden van waterschappen om de activiteiten van verticale drainage en grondperforatie te reguleren in de waterschapverordening in tijden van woningnood]’ (2022) 2022(10) Milieu en Recht, pp. 766–75.

101 National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Art. 4.

102 Ministry of Water Resources of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), ‘Interim Measures for the Administration of Water Rights Transactions’ (水权交易管理暂行办法), 5 May 2016, Art. 1, available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-05/22/content_5075679.htm (in Chinese). According to Art. 3 of this regulation, the original permit holder is legally entitled to earn financial returns from such transactions, which is referred to as youchang zhuanrang (有偿转让) or compensated transfer. The ability to earn financial returns can be considered a key attribute of property rights.

103 National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Art. 25.

104 Minister of Water and Sanitation and Others v. Lotter N.O. and Others; Minister of Water and Sanitation and Others v. Wiid and Others; Minister of Water and Sanitation v. South African Association for Water Users Associations 2023 (4) SA 434 (Constitutional Court of South Africa).

105 In the Matter of Public and Private Waters as a Result of the Reform Inaugurated by Law No. 36 of 5 January 1994 [In tema di acque pubbliche e private a seguito della riforma operata dalla legge 5 gennaio 1994, n. 36], 16 Dec. 1997, pp. 44–6 (Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato (National Council of Notaries)), available at: https://notariato.it/sites/default/files/1196.pdf.

106 Royal Decree 1775 of 11 Dec. 1933, Art. 40(3).

107 Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, ‘Measures for the Administration of Water Abstraction Licensing’ (取水许可管理办法), 22 Dec. 2017, Art. 26.

108 Water Law of Costa Rica (1942), Art. 7; Minister of Environment and Energy, Decree No. 44410 (29 Feb. 2024).

109 Water Act of Kenya (2016), Pt III(43(4)).

110 Barshini, n. 100 above; Omgevingswet, 23 Mar. 2016, https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0037885/2024-01-01; Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33 962, nr. 3, p. 506 & Kamerstukken II, 2017/18, 34 986, nr. 3, p. 197.

111 Water Law of People’s Republic of China (2016), Art. 69; Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, n. 107 above, Art. 30.

112 See I.M. de la Riva, ‘La concesión de uso de bienes del dominio público [The Granting of Use of Public Domain Assets]’ (2010) 13 Domino Público, pp. 55–66, at 56–8.

113 Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (TX (US), 1927); Evans v. Ropte, 96 S.W.2d 973, 974 (TX (US), 1936).

114 Keessen & Ernst, n. 72 above, p. 242; National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Arts 3–4.

115 National Water Code of Chile (1981), Art. 21.

116 Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, n. 102 above. Within China’s water trading system, water rights held by governmental units can also be transferred to other governmental bodies without permits: ibid.

117 Royal Decree No. 1775 of 11 Dec. 1933, Art. 10.

118 City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, n. 91 above.

119 Water Law of Costa Rica (1942); Organic Environmental Law of Costa Rica (1995); Mining Code of Costa Rica (1982); Organic Regulation of MINAET No. 35669-MINAET (6 Jan. 2010); Regulation for the Registration of Subsoil Drilling for the Exploration and Use of Groundwater No. 35884-MINAET (7 Mar. 2010); Regulation for Drilling Permits and Water Concessions for Self-supply in Condominiums No. 35271-S-MINAET (2 June 2009); Regulation on Marine Water Concessions for Desalination No. 35870-S-MINAET (12 Apr. 2010).

120 Water Act of Kenya (2016), Pt III(45).

121 Pellenbarg, n. 89 above, p. 144; Barshini, n. 100 above; Civil Code of the Netherlands (1992), Art. 5:20(1)(c).

122 Lötter N O and Others v. Minister of Water and Sanitation and Others (725/2020) [2021] ZASCA 159, 8 Nov. 2021.

123 See Civil and Commercial Code of Argentina (2014), Art. 237; De la Riva, n. 112 above, pp. 56–8.

124 Civil Code of Chile (1865), Art. 595; National Water Code of Chile (1981), Art. 5; Water Law of People’s Republic of China (2016), Art. 3; Water Law of Costa Rica (1942), Art. 1; Law No. 36 of Italy (1994), Art. 1; Water Act of Kenya (2002), Art. 5; Constitution of Argentina (1994), Art. 124; Water Code of California (2024), s. 102.

125 See Property Code of Texas, s. 11.001(a).

126 National Water Code of Chile (1981), Arts 298–9.

127 Water Law of Costa Rica (1942), Art. 7; Minister of Environment and Energy, Decree No. 44410 (29 Feb. 2024).

128 Water Law of People’s Republic of China (2016), Art. 3(2).

129 Ibid., Art. 3(1).

130 Z.M. Lü (吕), ‘Fundamental Issues in the Application of the Yangtze River Protection Law (长江保护法适用的基础性问题)’ (2021) 49(3) Environmental Protection (环境保护), pp. 22–29.

131 Water Law of the People’s Republic of China (2016), Arts 7, 48; Regulation on the Administration of the Licence for Water Drawing and the Levy of Water Resource Fees (取水许可和水资源费征收管理条例) (2017), Art. 4.

132 Water Act of Kenya (2016), Pt III(11–13).

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid., Pt III(29).

135 Constitution of Argentina (1994), Art. 124.

136 Federal Water Council, ‘Who We Are’, available at: https://www.cohife.org.ar/estructura-del-cohife.

137 Texas Water Code (2024), Ch. 36.

138 G. Eckstein, ‘State Surveys: Texas’, in R.E. Beck, A.K. Kelley & J.J. Richardson, Jr. (eds), Waters and Water Rights (LexisNexis/Matthew Bender, 3rd edn, 2024).

139 Legislative Decree 112 of Italy (1998), Art. 86.

140 Law No. 168 of Italy (2017), Art. 2(4).

141 Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 34 864, nr. 3, pp. 54, 73; Water Act of The Netherlands (2009), s. 6.4; Pellenbarg, n. 89 above, p. 144.

142 Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 34 864, nr. 3, pp. 54, 73; Water Act of The Netherlands (2009), s. 6.4; Pellenbarg, n. 89 above, p. 144.

143 National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Arts 8–11 (catchment management agencies); ibid., Preamble to Ch. 8 (water user associations).

144 Law No. 168 of Italy (2017), Art. 3(1)(f); Judgment No. 18 of 10 Feb. 2020 (Commissariat for the Liquidation of Civic Uses for the Regions of Lazio, Umbria, and Tuscany), available at: https://www.demaniocivico.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/sentenza-CUCLAzio2020.pdf; Judgment No. 2 of 20 Jan. 2021 (Commissariat for the Liquidation of Civic Uses for the Regions of Lazio, Umbria, and Tuscany), available at: https://www.demaniocivico.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/SantAnatolia-di-Narco-2021.pdf.

145 Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District, 849 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2017). The US Supreme Court declined to accept the appeal of this case, leaving the 9th Circuit Court’s decision in place: Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District, 138 S. Ct 468 (2017). While the case focused exclusively on the Agua Caliente Tribe, it has implications for other Tribes in California, as well as those in other states that comprise the 9th Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington), whose reservations were created under federal authority.

146 Victorero, n. 95 above, p. 9. Judgment No. 1084-2004 (Supreme Court of Chile); Judgment No. 5342-2006 (Supreme Court of Chile); Judgment No. 7410-2008 (Supreme Court of Chile); Judgment No. 9.197-2009 (Supreme Court of Chile); Judgment No. 1442-2012 (Supreme Court of Chile); Judgment No. 16.578-2014 (Supreme Court of Chile); Judgment No. 996-2015 (Supreme Court of Chile).

147 Community Land Act (2016), Pt VII(35); J. Troell & S. Keene, Legal Recognition of Customary Water Tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unpacking the Land-Water Nexus (International Water Management Institute, 2022), pp. 10–2.

148 L. Huang (黄) & H. Yang (杨), ‘On the Change of Ethnic Traditional Water Culture in Yunnan from the Perspective of Social Change (论社会变迁视域下云南少数民族传统水文化的变迁)’ (2016) 2016(5) Academic Exploration (学术探索), pp. 137–42.

149 Indigenous Law of Costa Rica (1977), Arts 1–3.

150 Though the National Water Act is silent on the issue of customary law, the South African constitution recognizes customary law as an independent and original source of law: Constitution of South Africa (1996), Art. 211.

151 Huang & Yang, n. 148 above.

152 Ibid.; Q. Zhang (张), ‘The Ecological Function and Inheritance Education of the Traditional Water Worships of the Ethnic Minorities in Yunnan’ (云南少数民族传统水信仰的生态功能与传承教育) (2018) 34(7) Journal of Yuxi Normal University (玉溪师范学院学报), pp. 41-8.

153 UNGA Resolution 64/292, n. 59 above.

154 E. Fantini, ‘An Introduction to the Human Right to Water: Law, Politics, and Beyond’ (2019) 7(2) WIREs Water, article e1405, p. 2.

155 Political Constitution of Costa Rica (1949), Art. 50.

156 Constitution of Kenya (2010), Art. 43(1)(d); Water Act of Kenya (2016), Pt IV(63).

157 Constitution of South Africa (1996), Art. 27(1)(b); Water Services Act of South Africa (1997), Art. 3.

158 Water Code of California (2024), s. 106.3.

159 Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat (Our Land) Association v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 6 Feb. 2020, (Ser. C) No. 420, para. 222 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights).

160 San José (Costa Rica), 22 Nov. 1969, in force 18 July 1978, available at: http://www.cidh.org/basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm.

161 Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat (Our Land) Association, n. 159 above, para. 332; M.A. Tigre, ‘International Decisions, Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat (Our Land) Association v. Argentina’ (2021) 115(4) American Journal of International Law, pp. 706–13, 711.

162 Costa Rica: Access to Water to Rural Communities, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32yxFaJHil0 (Public Hearing of the 154 Period of Sessions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (CIDH), 20 Mar. 2015); G. Cuadrado-Quesada, ‘Realising the Human Right to Water in Costa Rica through Social Movements’ (2020) 16(2) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 96–109.

163 Water Code of California (2024), s. 106.3(b)–(c).

164 See e.g., Gelber v. City of Willets, No. 23-cv-00681, 23 Oct. 2023 (US District Court for the Northern District of California) (stating ‘that statute does not contain any substantive predicates’); Badell v. California-American Water Company, Decision No. 21-12-037, at *7, 16 Dec. 2021 (California Public Utilities Commission) (the statute is ‘not a substantive provision that can be a basis for an actionable claim’).

165 E. Garner et al., ‘The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and the Common Law of Groundwater Rights: Finding a Consistent Path Forward for Groundwater Allocation’ (2020) 38(2) UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, pp. 163–215, at 196–7.

166 Water Act of Kenya (2016), Pt III(37(1)(a)). The Act defines ‘works’ in Pt 1(2) to refer to ‘any structure, apparatus, contrivance, device or thing for storing, recharging, treating, carrying, conducting, providing or utilizing water or liquid waste’; the definition explicitly excludes ‘hand utensils or such other contrivances’, which is understood to encompass hand-dug wells.

167 K. Muigua, ‘Fulfilling the Right to Water as a Socio-Economic Right for the People of Kenya’ (2022) 8(2) Journal of Conflict Management & Sustainable Development, pp. 1–25.

168 Law No. 36 of Italy (1994), Art. 2.

169 National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Pt 3.

170 Ibid.

171 G. Viljoen, ‘Critical Perspectives on South Africa’s Groundwater Law: Established Practice and the Novel Concept of Public Trusteeship’ (2020) 38(4) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, pp. 391–408, at 404–5.

172 Constitution of South Africa (1996), Art. 27.

173 Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg (2010) (4) SA 1 (CC), para. 50 (Constitutional Court of South Africa).

174 Ibid., para. 56.

175 See National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Art. 1(xviii).

176 Water Services Act of South Africa (1997), Art. 108.

177 Water Code of California (2024), s. 102.

178 Ibid.; City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, n. 91 above.

179 Chilean Water Code Reformation Act, No. 21435 (2022), Art. 1(2)–1(3).

180 Water Code of Texas (2024), s. 36.002.

181 Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, n. 102 above. Within China’s water trading system, water rights held by governmental units can also be transferred to other governmental bodies without permits: Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, Interim Measures for Water Transactions (水权交易管理暂行办法) (2016).

182 Water Law of Costa Rica (1942); Organic Environmental Law of Costa Rica (1995); Mining Code of Costa Rica (1982); Organic Regulation of MINAET No. 35669-MINAET (6 Jan. 2010); Regulation for the Registration of Subsoil Drilling for the Exploration and Use of Groundwater No. 35884-MINAET (7 Mar. 2010); Regulation for Drilling Permits and Water Concessions for Self-supply in Condominiums No. 35271-S-MINAET (2 June 2009); Regulation on Marine Water Concessions for Desalination No. 35870-S-MINAET (12 Apr. 2010).

183 Kenyan Water Act (2016), Pt 2(45)(1).

184 Kamerstukken II (2017/18), 34 864, nr. 3, p. 54, 73; Pellenbarg, n. 89 above, p. 144; Barshini, n. 100 above.

185 Pellenbarg, n. 89 above, p. 144; Barshini, n. 100 above; Civil Code of the Netherlands (1992), Art. 5:20(1)(c).

186 Law No. 168 of Italy (2017), Art. 3(1)(f); Commissariat for the Liquidation of Civic Uses for the Regions of Lazio, Umbria, and Tuscany, Judgment No. 18 of 10 Feb. 2020 and Judgment No. 2 of 20 Jan. 2021, both at n. 144 above.

187 Water Law of Costa Rica (1942), Art. 1.

188 Water Act of Kenya (2002), Art. 5.

189 Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, n. 69 above; Water Code of Texas (2024), s. 36.002.

190 Solli, n. 13 above, p. 36.

191 Water Act of The Netherlands (2009), ss. 3.6, 5.2, 6.4; National Water Act of South Africa (1998), Art. 3.

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