This paper explores Aquinas’s ethics. For Aquinas, the moral life begins with a surrender to God on the part of a person who comes to faith. That surrender includes a change in the person’s will from the state of resisting God’s love and grace to quiescence, the cessation of resistance. Once a person’s will is in this quiescent state, God infuses grace into his will. On Aquinas’s views, in an instant this grace moves the person’s will to the will of faith. In that same instant, the Holy Spirit comes to indwell in him and also brings into him also all the infused virtues, as well as all the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit. The paper explores Aquinas’s claims about the infused virtues and the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit, and it argues that for Aquinas the moral life is first and foremost a matter of having a right second-personal relationship to God.

Aquinas presents his argument for the existence of an uncaused cause of all effects in his Second Way in the Summa theologiae as a deductively valid argument from premises known with certainty. This seems unwarranted, since the argument gives no reason for there being only one uncaused cause, and the reasons it gives for rejecting an endless causal regress seem unconvincing. These apparent shortcomings can be better understood by examining Aquinas’s metaphysics of causation, which is presupposed by the argument. He uses a form of composition argument to justify the claim that endless per se causal series cannot exist. He does not argue against the possibility of a multiplicity of uncaused causes because he sees no rational grounds for entertaining this possibility. Given Aquinas’s metaphysical assumptions, it is correct to take the Second Way to be a deductively sound argument.

The article considers various grounds on which lying is forbidden, even in the case of Nazis at the door searching for Jewish refugees. It discusses eight such grounds, seven philosophical (natural law) arguments, and one theological argument. It is concluded that whilst only one of the initial seven grounds appears to permit lying to the Nazis, the theological ground prohibiting lying is the strongest of all.

For years, Thomists have debated Aquinas’s view on the status of human beings or persons between death and resurrection. Survivalists hold that, for Aquinas, the survival of the separated soul is sufficient for the continued existence of the human being; corruptionists deny this, insisting that the body is also necessary for a human being to exist, absolutely speaking. Most survivalists agree that matter is part of a human being’s nature, signified by its essential definition. So how can a human being survive the loss of its body at death? Many survivalists reply that a thing’s essence and definition only express what it is naturally, or normally, or typically, but not necessarily. In this paper, I argue that this view of essences and definitions is not Aquinas’s own. This comes out clearly in Aquinas’s treatments of God’s absolute power, which he thinks is limited only by logical contradiction. In such treatments, Aquinas consistently appeals to the natures of things to explain why not even God can make things to be other than they are by definition, on pain of logical contradiction. This shows that he thinks of a thing’s essence and definition as strictly necessary, not merely normative, for its existence.

While various parts of St Thomas’ work have been suggested as places to discern a Thomistic ecclesiology, this article tries to situate the Church in a discussion of creation and the communication of divine goodness that is at the heart of the mystery of providence and predestination. Despite the assurance that God works for good with those who love him, our understanding of divine providence must begin with the frank admission of a tension between our intuition that creation must be ordered, and our experience of contingency. By understanding the Church’s place within creation, in a hidden and shadowy way from Abel until its manifestation in the Lord’s Paschal Mystery, we can see how God’s loving purposes are worked out both in the implicit faith in a Mediator, which finds its expression in a belief in God’s providential care of creation, and in the life of the visible Church where the mystery of predestination is worked out in the lives of the faithful until all is at last made manifest at the end of time. Such an ecclesiology allows us to see the fundamental importance, and mystical meaning, of the visible hierarchical Church.

The doctrine that God is unlimited in power has been challenged recently by figures such as Thomas Oord and Philip Goff. This article responds to these challenges from the perspective of classical theism. It is argued that omnipotence follows from God’s being the reason why there is something rather than nothing, and that understanding God in this way is the only coherent way of fleshing out the claim that God is the creator. The relationship of creator and creature is discussed, and the point is made that God and creatures are not in metaphysical competition, defusing Oord’s worry that an omnipotent God would be controlling. The issue of evil in the world, and its claimed incompatibility with omnipotence is broached. In response to concerns about evil and omnipotence appeal is made to Brian Davies’ work on classical theism and evil, before concluding that the Christian classical theist can acknowledge there being a mystery about the presence of evil in the world whilst, without prejudice to her intellectual integrity, resting trustfully in the mysterious love of God.

While many people think of self-knowledge as about having particular knowledge of oneself, and contemporary philosophers think of self-knowledge as about knowing one’s own mental states, historically, many thinkers have thought about self-knowledge as about knowing one’s nature. This is clear in Thomas Aquinas’s account of self-knowledge. Yet how is knowing one’s nature, which is one of the least individual aspects of oneself, self-knowledge rather than more general anthropological knowledge? This article defends the idea that there is a knowledge of one’s nature which qualifies as self-knowledge and not just anthropological knowledge. In particular, it defends Aquinas’s conception of self-knowledge in dialogue with contemporary epistemology and Leo Tolstoy’s ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyich’. It is argued that Aquinas’s account of self-cognition describes a first-personal knowledge of our nature which is self-knowledge insofar as it is acquired through reflection on one’s experience of oneself in contrast to third-personal anthropological knowledge.

This article explores some ethical implications of nuclear energy from a theological perspective. The key point argued for is that the few texts in the literature that address nuclear energy from a theological perspective do not give adequate weight to the importance of the potential benefits of nuclear energy as part of climate change mitigation strategies. The same also applies to the possible role of nuclear energy in providing compensation for future generations in terms of energy resource durability. The texts thus fail to address matters of importance for intergenerational justice. I examine first an article by Jame Schaefer that discusses Aquinas’ conception of prudence in relation to nuclear energy. I then discuss the relevant sections of the papal encyclical, Laudato Si’ and the Japanese Bishops Conference’s document, Abolition of Nuclear Power. All these texts fail to articulate the potential benefits of nuclear energy pertaining to some perspectives on intergenerational justice, because they do not take sufficient note of advances in nuclear technology that would allay some of the concerns expressed within the texts with which I take issue.

All orthodox believers accept that ‘God’s ways are not our ways’ and that ‘the peace of God passes all understanding’. The sceptical theist tries to apply these principles to the mystery of evil in the world, by arguing that we cannot tell what the divine purpose might be in the sufferings that we cannot explain. There is a danger that an undisciplined putting of evil into the fog of mystery might free our understanding too much from rational constraint. I argue that by combining sceptical theism with the way that Peter van Inwagen deploys the fact of our fallen nature to explain Divine withdrawal, we can give a rational account of the limitations there are on how we can judge God’s justice.

In recent years, a large amount of scholarship has been written about St Thomas Aquinas’s views on free will and determinism. This paper is an attempt to bring some Thomist views of libertarian free will into dialogue with analytic philosopher Peter van Inwagen and his ‘mysterianism’ about free will. The thesis of this paper is that Thomist libertarians about free will are committed to Peter van Inwagen’s mysterianism about free will. The paper intends to accomplish this aim by showing how recent accounts of Thomist libertarianism cannot defeat the intuitive strength of van Inwagen’s ‘Replay argument’. The significance of this conclusion is that some Thomists are committed to mysterianism and that mysterianism is a legitimate position a Thomist can hold. This also provides evidence that the Thomist tradition can grow and be nourished by engagement with contemporary analytic philosophy.

The disciples of St Thomas Aquinas have organized their enquiries in diverse ways throughout the history of Thomism. The surge of reinvigorated interest in Thomas Aquinas following Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris inspired a wide variety of purported types of Thomism in the twentieth century. What should Thomists of the twenty-first century learn from their inheritance of past centuries of Thomism? How can they take up Leo XIII’s call vetera novis augere et perficere. I aim to address two issues in this essay. First, to identify a more principled demarcation of approaches to Thomistic enquiry, which eschews the commonplace but problematic and merely sociological classifications of the last century’s ‘schools’ of Thomism. I argue that a more principled and agenda-setting criteria distinguishes “defensive-constructive commentary Thomism” and “tradition-constituted-enquiry Thomism”. The first stresses fidelity to the conclusions found in careful readings of Aquinas’s texts. The second emphasizes fidelity to Aquinas’s systematic forms of enquiry directed to the truth. Second, I then probe the resources these two forms of Thomism have for addressing the epistemological crises facing Thomism, focusing on those concerning how to engage the nova of the sciences and rival philosophical traditions.

This article considers the question whether we can have direct, non-inferential knowledge of God, as experientialists such as Alston and Plantinga claim. Moreover, this needs to be done in a way that takes religious diversity into account. I contend that two developments in recent philosophy enable us to argue for direct knowledge of God in an inter-religious manner. The first is naturalized epistemology. I use a version of it in place of the epistemology employed by the experientialists. Specifically, I use methodological continuity between epistemology of science and epistemology of religion. This would help us to overcome dangers of religious balkanization and fideism. The second development is the increased focus on the importance of nature mysticism. This helps us to maintain the autonomy of religious experience. Since these experiences are considered universal, they enable us to engage in an experientialist version of natural theology in a manner that is at once continuous and discontinuous with Aquinas. It is continuous in its universality and generality and is discontinuous in using nature mystical experiences and not sense experience, as its starting point. The knowledge of God it gives is an inchoate awareness that finds different expression in different cultures.

One of the most enduring criticisms of papal infallibility is that it seems to set the pope apart from the Church. Much has already been done to correct this impression, but the current ‘synodal moment’ offers a unique opportunity to substantially further this ecclesiological integration. Along such lines, the present article first proposes that the teachings on infallibility in Lumen gentium be read through the chapter on the People of God (LG25 through LG12), thereby treating the pope as a member of the faithful and drawing out the charismatic dimension of infallibility. The article then pivots to exploring the widely overlooked Eastern Catholic reception of Vatican I. Specifically, it details the dogmatic importance of a clause added to Pastor aeternus by two patriarchs as part of their conditional acceptance – something drawing from a deeper tradition of synodal examination of papal teaching. These two sections converge to reveal a more synodal infallibility at the level of initial discernment and reception. More so, these genuinely synodal elements of papal infallibility are discovered as existing within the previous tradition. Elements that, going forward, can fruitfully be given a new hermeneutical priority.

This essay examines Aquinas’s views on necessity in the created world. Although Aquinas holds that all created being is contingent upon God’s free act of creation, he nevertheless maintains that there are aspects of the created world that cannot be otherwise. This raises difficult questions about how such necessities arise in a contingent world and how they relate to God’s power. Aquinas’s analysis is complicated by his view that “necessity” is said in many ways. In various contexts, he distinguishes between absolute, natural, material, conditional, intrinsic, and extrinsic necessity. The essay offers a roadmap through these diverse kinds of created necessity, clarifying their sources and interrelations. It also considers the diverse ways Aquinas deploys the term “absolute necessity” in different contexts and explores how created necessities relate to God’s power.

Commentary on the election of Pope Leo XIV has been framed in terms drawn from political and cultural oppositions: conservative vs liberal, traditionalist vs progressive, made vivid by the 2024 film Conclave based on Robert Harris’s 2016 novel. Part of my concern is to urge rejection of these as general terms of analysis of Catholicism, or at least to circumscribe their applications to matters inessential to Catholic faith and morals per se. In aid of that, and by way of broader purpose, I discuss the nature of Catholicism itself. Observing the long history of challenges, crises, and divisions, I then proceed to distinguish between subjective and objective modes of identifying the nature of individuals and institutions. Catholicism has a robust objective nature comprising a synthesis of Hebrew and Christian scripture, apostolic tradition, conciliar and other authoritative teachings, and sacramental practices, together consolidated and expressed in orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Political and cultural classifications are irrelevant to and distracting from this identification.

The once-popular thesis that non-Christians who are inculpably ignorant of the gospel can be saved through ‘implicit faith’ in Christ has fallen on hard times. In this paper, we consider objections raised against this position by a range of Catholic critics, including Thomas Crean, Augustine DiNoia, Gavin D’Costa, and Stephen Bullivant. In our judgement, criticisms of ‘implicit faith’ often suffer from a lack of clarity about the nature of such faith, although admittedly this ambiguity was present even in original Scholastic uses of the term. However, in the past few decades, analytic philosophers have explored many forms of belief, which one might call ‘implicit’. Accordingly, we draw on both Scholastic and analytic epistemology to arrive at a more attractive characterisation of implicit faith. We argue that once implicit faith is understood in this way, recent objections to the claim that non-Christians can be saved soluble.

The famous apse mosaic of San Clemente in Rome has been thoroughly studied, but it is so rich that it still has the capacity to surprise. This article focuses on the inscription below the apse and points out that one word is standardly misread: the word is not CRUX (‘Cross’), but CRUS. This turns out to have a highly relevant sense. The article explores the implications of this word and of the inscription more widely.1

Among the less considered ‘conversions’ of the Confessions is the conversion of grief. The Confessions traces how Augustine learns to grieve justly and with hope. Augustine’s grief in book four is presented in stark contrast to his grief in book nine. In many ways, these two books serve as a counter image of each other. The striking narrative similarities that Augustine presents between the death of his boyhood friend in book four and that of his mother in book nine serve, however, to highlight the significant differences that Augustine wants to accent between these two experiences of death and grief. Holding these two scenes next to each other allows us to witness another profound conversion of the Confessions, namely, how Augustine learns to grieve profound loss in hope.

This paper relates the metatheological approach known as ‘Perfect Being Theology’ (PBT) and criticisms of the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) in its Thomistic version. After briefly contrasting PBT with Thomas Aquinas’ alternative approach, which will be labeled ‘Analogical Natural Theology’ (ANT), it is shown that an option for the first approach dominates much of what has been written on simplicity. Then the structure of ANT is outlined in an attempt to explain the stronger commitment this project has toward DDS.