The Durability of Protections against Abuse at INTERPOL Amidst rising Authoritarian Pressures

Introduction

Over centuries and across continents, authoritarian governments have demonstrated a large appetite for international cooperation to target political opponents across borders. In 1851, the “first modern police organization”—the Police Union of German States, whose members included Austria and Prussia—was established “with the express purpose of policing the political opposition of established autocratic regimes.” ¹ During the 1970s and early 1980s, military regimes in South America participated in a secret scheme known as Operation Condor to coordinate their efforts to suppress subversion. ² A recent analysis of twenty-nine “hard authoritarian” regional organizations found that twenty-five were engaged in police cooperation. ³ The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an example. Its member states have agreed to jointly fight the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. ⁴ Following a 2009 demonstration that led to riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang, some organizers fled abroad; at China’s behest, SCO members Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan detained and then extradited them back to China. ⁵

As the world’s premier body for international police cooperation, INTERPOL is not supposed to be a tool for transnational repression. INTERPOL’s constitution articulates the organization’s aims, which are to “contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes,” and to do so “in the spirit of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR].’” ⁶ INTERPOL’s constitution further specifies that it is “strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” ⁷ This prohibition aligns with provisions commonly found in bilateral extradition treaties that allow host states to decline extradition requests when the requesting state seeks a person, or an alleged offense was committed, for political reasons. ⁸ Such exceptions were “predominantly promoted and protected by liberal states, which did not want to cooperate with illiberal states in repressing dissidents.” ⁹

INTERPOL functions mainly as a relay station that allows law enforcement authorities to communicate information to their counterparts in other states. As the organization’s website explains: “All 196 member countries are connected to each other and to the General Secretariat via a secure communications system called I-24/7. It also allows them to access our databases and services in real-time, from both central and remote locations.” ¹⁰ INTERPOL has established a system of notices to structure communications between its members. The most prominent are the “Red Notices,” which request the arrest of named individuals pending extradition.

Concern has grown in recent years that authoritarian governments are using INTERPOL to engage in transnational repression. ¹¹ Indeed, Red Notices are effective tools against dissidents abroad even when they do not result in arrest and extradition. Authoritarian governments cite INTERPOL notices to legitimize their pursuit of their targets, misrepresenting the presence of individuals on INTERPOL lists as “proof of an international consensus regarding their guilt.” ¹² Further, Red Notices “raise the cost of dissent” for those who managed to flee their home countries by inhibiting their ability to “travel freely, normalize their immigration status, open bank accounts, rent property, and find work.” ¹³

Consider one example. In 2017, pursuant to an INTERPOL Red Notice requested by Turkey, Spanish police arrested Doğan Akhanli, a Turkish-German writer and vocal critic of the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. ¹⁴ Akhanli had fled Turkey in 1991 and became a German citizen in 1993 after being granted political asylum. Akhanli’s arrest garnered immediate high-level attention, prompting the Spanish government to release him the day after his arrest. ¹⁵ Then-Chancellor Angela Merkel weighed in publicly, saying: “It is not right and I’m very glad that Spain has now released him…. We must not misuse international organizations like INTERPOL for such purposes.” ¹⁶ Yet Akhanli was still not free to return home to Germany. He was required to stay in Spain, where he had been vacationing, and to register with the police on a weekly basis while Spain awaited and then processed an extradition request from Turkey. ¹⁷ It took two months for the Spanish Justice Ministry to deny the extradition request. ¹⁸

INTERPOL has taken steps to prevent such abuses and to rectify them when they do occur. To implement the constitutional clauses requiring conformity with the spirit of the UDHR and the prohibition on political intervention, INTERPOL has established elaborate rules that govern the processing of data, including Red Notices and other communications from member states. ¹⁹ Around the time that Akhanli’s case generated headlines, INTERPOL took two main steps to reinforce its institutional mechanisms for securing compliance with those rules.

First, former Secretary-General Jürgen Stock established a new Notices and Diffusions Task Force (Task Force) to prevent the issuance of Red Notices and certain other communications that violate the organization’s rules. Stock transformed what had been a small branch of the Secretariat, expanding its size and the scope of its work and elevating its internal status to the highest level. ²⁰ The Task Force is a “dedicated interdisciplinary team” composed of lawyers, police officers, and operations specialists; among other things, the Task Force undertakes a “quality and legal compliance review” of incoming requests for Red Notices and other communications before they are disseminated to other states. ²¹

Second, INTERPOL bolstered the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, or CCF. By filing a request with the CCF, individuals who are (or believe that might be) the subject of INTERPOL communications may seek access to data about them as well as correction or deletion of such data, including Red Notices. ²² The first iteration of the Commission was established in 1982; over the years its mandate, structure, and operations were revised, partly to address concerns about its adequacy in light of developments in human rights law. ²³ Among other things, the 2016 reforms made the CCF’s decisions binding, established a clearer basis for seeking interim remedies, and strengthened individuals’ access to evidence. ²⁴

These two steps were widely credited as meaningful ones to curb abuse. ²⁵ The United States appears to be largely satisfied with the status quo. A 2024 report from the U.S. Departments of Justice and State declares that, “[a]lthough instances of member countries misusing or attempting to misuse INTERPOL notices and diffusions still occur, this particular form of [transnational repression] seems to have receded.” ²⁶

Complacency is dangerous, however, especially when some member states are continuing to develop new methods for targeting political opponents. According to a press report, once review of Red Notices was strengthened, Belarus and Turkey turned to a different INTERPOL database—one for lost and stolen passports—“into a weapon to harass dissidents or strand them abroad.” ²⁷ Lawyers in the United States and Europe have also expressed concern about abuse of Blue Notices, which seek “additional information about a person’s identity, location, or activities in relation to a criminal investigation” ²⁸ —and which are not screened by the Task Force before they are issued. ²⁹

Moreover, the influence of authoritarian states is on the rise globally; this development has implications for universal international organizations, including INTERPOL. ³⁰ Since the mid-1990s, INTERPOL’s membership has been roughly evenly split between democratic and authoritarian states. ³¹ In recent years, candidates from authoritarian states have fared well in leadership elections. The General Assembly elects the president, whose role is mostly ceremonial (the president’s authorities include running meetings of the General Assembly and Executive Committee and overseeing implementation of their decisions). ³² Three of the last five presidents of INTERPOL came from authoritarian states. ³³ A Russian candidate with “close links to Mr. Putin’s regime” narrowly lost to the South Korean candidate in 2018. ³⁴ And in 2021, the candidate from the United Arab Emirates prevailed, notwithstanding ongoing investigations into his complicity in torture. ³⁵ INTERPOL’s member states also elect the secretary-general, who runs the organization’s day-to-day operations. ³⁶ While ballots are secret, an analysis of the results indicates that the newly appointed secretary-general, Valdecy Urquiza, was the preferred candidate of “known INTERPOL abusers.” ³⁷ Finally, authoritarian states have become increasingly significant funders of the organization, both through regular and voluntary contributions. ³⁸

In light of these trends, there is reason to worry about the durability of INTERPOL’s protections against abuse. While the constitutional provisions and institutional mechanisms to curb abuse are unlikely to be eliminated altogether, those protections can be undermined in more subtle ways: INTERPOL’s constitution could be reinterpreted and the institutional mechanisms could be hollowed out.

Eliminating Constitutional and Institutional Protections

Drastic measures like deleting the constitution’s reference to the UDHR are not a realistic threat. Constitutional amendments require approved by a two-thirds majority of INTERPOL’s members, ³⁹ and it is hard to imagine its democratic members going along with such a change. The CCF is unlikely to be eliminated for the same reason: since 2008, it has been enshrined in INTERPOL’s constitution as an “independent body” whose members “shall possess the expertise required for it to accomplish its functions.” ⁴⁰ Dismantling the Commission, or making it a subordinate body, would require a constitutional amendment.

By contrast, the Task Force is not mentioned in the constitution and the secretary-general has discretion to downsize, downgrade, or eliminate the Task Force. Because INTERPOL’s rules for data processing assign the Secretariat the task of reviewing the compliance of notices and diffusions with those rules and with the constitution, ⁴¹ the Secretariat could not abandon this assignment altogether without a decision by the General Assembly. But the care with which the Secretariat undertakes those reviews could be significantly reduced.

Reinterpreting INTERPOL’s Constitution

Recall that Article 3 prohibits INTERPOL from undertaking “any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character.” That language has long been understood as committing INTERPOL to neutrality. ⁴² But what it means to be neutral has been contested throughout the organization’s history. For example, over time INTERPOL has switched positions on whether its constitution permits the organization to facilitate efforts to pursue Nazi war criminals and individuals engaged in terrorism. ⁴³

Recently some members have pressed for an interpretation of neutrality that would restrain the organization from questioning the policies and decisions of individual states. In the Akhanli case, for example, the Turkish Interior Ministry argued that the problem was not Turkey, but INTERPOL: “Interpol’s suspension of the red bulletin, ignoring its own rules, brings into question the reliability and impartiality of the organization.” ⁴⁴ In the course of complaining that INTERPOL was subjecting some of its requests to heightened review, Russia’s Interior Minister insisted that the Russian stance “is based on the rigorous observance and unacceptability of ignoring Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution, which strictly prohibits the organization from interfering in the internal affairs of members in any way or undertaking any politicized activity.” ⁴⁵

The constitutional provision that requires INTERPOL to undertake its work “in the spirit of the [UDHR]”—is similarly subject to debate and reinterpretation. An expansive interpretation of the “in the spirit” clause would require going above and beyond the UDHR, reinforcing the organization’s protections for dissidents. But a restrictive interpretation of “in the spirit” is also linguistically plausible, and would suggest something less demanding than the letter of the UDHR. ⁴⁶ Authoritarian governments could push INTERPOL in this more restrictive direction.

Undermining Institutions for Curbing Abuse

Although the CCF and Task Force are insulated from certain direct attacks, they remain vulnerable. For starters, the Task Force and the CCF will be starved of resources. The concern here is not only about the future. The Task Force and the CCF are already stretched thin. In 2020. the thirty staff members who make up the Task Force reviewed 11,094 Red Notices and 13,618 wanted-person diffusions. ⁴⁷ During that same year, the CCF, which “met only four times for a week at a time,” examined 1,594 new requests related to INTERPOL’s systems. ⁴⁸

When it comes to funding, the Task Force and the CCF are similarly situated. The secretary-general prepares a draft budget, which is then submitted to the Executive Committee and General Assembly for approval by simple majority vote. ⁴⁹ The secretary-general also has discretion about how vigorously—and for what purposes—to lobby states for additional voluntary contributions. Stock prioritized the Task Force. ⁵⁰ His successors may not do the same.

Finally, “personnel is policy,” as the adage goes. When the individuals who make up the Task Force and the CCF are serious, sophisticated, and sincerely committed to preventing abuse of INTERPOL, their work will have a meaningful positive effect. But the opposite is also true. The General Assembly elects the seven members of the CCF, and a recent press report raises questions about its judgment. The former chair of the CCF was arrested in June, apparently due to his alleged involvement in a scheme to help fugitives avoid Red Notices by falsely claiming refugee status. ⁵¹

Conclusion

In short, the legal and institutional protections against abuse at INTERPOL are hardly ironclad. The rise of authoritarian governments requires democratic states to confront questions about what level of abuse they are willing to tolerate—and about whether universal multilateral cooperation with respect to law enforcement remains viable. At some point democratic states may have to consider whether to abandon INTERPOL in favor of a new police cooperation organization with fewer—and more like-minded—member states. ⁵²