This paper examines Britain’s process of electrification following a disruptive stock market boom and bust in 1882. This is done by noting the companies that raise finance on British stock exchanges, the amounts raised, and the returns earned on that money. It also examines the impact of the Lighting Act of 1882, finding that the Act inhibited investment, but with important exceptions. We find the Act was not a barrier to entrepreneurs alert to the possibilities of electrification. However, the limited British electrical investment after the 1882 crash was more heavily and successfully concentrated on supplying electricity to end users than on developing electrical equipment. When electrification began in earnest after 1888, upon the amendment of the 1882 Lighting Act, there existed only a very weak engineering base to support it, leading to slow, expensive, and unimaginative electrification.

Although Britain's electrification started with considerable technological and market advantages, it proceeded remarkably slowly and hesitantly. Using share-price data, this study investigates the conventional explanations for this disappointing outcome: notably, perverse regulation and competition from entrenched gas-light providers. It finds that these oft-cited factors had an imperceptible impact on the course of the British electrical industry's turbulent market launch in 1882. However, we show that, owing to the fledgling electrical industry's need for incessant experimentation, short-sighted, self-serving decisions by the management of the early British industry's most prominent firm squandered a well-funded start, with long-lasting adverse consequences.