The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.

In this article social movement theory is used to assess the strategic repertoire of a relatively new sector of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) advocating for migrants rights in Ireland. Pro-migrant NGOs are majority community-led and face a challenging political and societal context for mobilization including a restrictive immigration regime, political and media discourse that racializes migrants, weak public support for the expansion of migrants’ rights, and high rates of discrimination and social exclusion experienced by migrant communities. A competitive funding environment also inhibits pro-migrant NGOs capacity to work with emerging migrant-led organizations that simultaneously compete for state and foundation funds. Pro-migrant NGOs in Ireland have responded with a three levelled strategy, namely alliance building with sympathetic public officials and service and information provision to state bodies, campaigns contesting negative media and societal framing of migrants, and networking with transnational NGO coalitions working on immigration issues.

This article reviews the general characteristics of the ‘crisis’ faced by the EU when confronted by the George W. Bush administration in the US, and considers it in relation to the EU's capacity for collective international action. On the basis of a range of examples, it appears that the EU's foreign policy ‘crisis’ was limited to one end of an extensive spectrum, and that in other areas there is considerable evidence of success in maintaining solidarity and proposing alternative policies. The article concludes by proposing an approach to EU collective international action that can account for and accommodate this unevenness, and which might be applied to EU–US relations more generally.

This symposium makes a first step in bridging the emerging eco-social debate and the established political science theories and concepts, indicating the mutually beneficial analytical perspectives and common research pathways that may arise. In addition to identifying several aspects in the policy, politics and polity dimensions that appear to be particularly relevant in view of the emerging eco-social policies, this collection of articles points out two cross-cutting themes, namely the transformation of the welfare state set-ups, and new cleavages and power relations, which pose new questions and open a promising research agenda for political scientists.

The preliminary reference procedure under which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) responds to questions from national courts regarding the interpretation of EU law is a key mechanism in many accounts of the development of European integration and law. While the significance of the procedure has been broadly acknowledged, one aspect has been largely omitted: The opportunity for member state governments to submit their views (‘observations’) to the Court in ongoing cases. Previous research has shown that these observations matter for the Court's decisions, and thus that they are likely to have a significant impact on the course of European integration. Still, little is known about when and why member states decide to engage in the preliminary reference procedure by submitting observations. This article shows that there is significant variation, both between cases and between member states, in the number of observations filed. A theoretical argument is developed to explain this variation. Most importantly, a distinction is made between legal and political reasons for governments to get involved in the preliminary reference cases, and it is argued that both types of factors should be relevant. By matching empirical data from inter‐governmental negotiations on legislative acts in the Council of the EU with member states’ subsequent participation in the Court procedures, a research design is developed to test these arguments. It is found that the decision to submit observations can be tied both to concerns with the doctrinal development of EU law and to more immediate political preferences. The conclusion is that the legal (the CJEU) and political (the Council) arenas of the EU system are more interconnected than some of the previous literature would lead us to believe.

The use of simulations in higher education teaching is burgeoning in political science curricula, particularly in international relations and European Union studies. This article contends that most simulations suffer from complexity bias and put too much emphasis on substantive knowledge. Drawing on the author’s experience, two ideal types of simulations are developed. ‘Complex’ simulations focusing on negotiating content and ‘simple’ simulations focusing on negotiating dynamics. It is argued that the transmission of transferable skills is facilitated by multiple repetitions of similar negotiating contexts within the same module. This suggests that instructors face a trade-off between teaching transferable skills and substantive knowledge and should locate their simulations at either end of this continuum. Where students are not native speakers, not yet familiar with specialised terminology or simply unversed in negotiating dynamics, there is a particularly strong argument to make for carrying out simple simulations first, followed by complex simulations later in the curriculum. Finally, opportunities for collaborative research are highlighted. Gathering and pooling data from simple simulations bridges pedagogy and research at minimal additional cost.

At first glance, one might view the political differentiation in the European Union as a reflection of the autonomy of its member states, signifying flexibility and the dispersion of democratic control. However, under conditions of complex interdependence and economic integration, political differentiation can undermine the fundamental conditions for democratic self‐rule. Political differentiation may cause dominance. It is argued in this article that we must move beyond Philip Pettit's conception of dominance as the capacity to interfere with others on an arbitrary basis, in order to properly identify the undemocratic consequences of differentiation. Political freedom is also a question of institutional provisions to co‐determine laws. From this vantage point, differentiation raises the spectre of dominance in the form of decisional exclusion and the pre‐emption of political autonomy. Drawing on a re‐conceptualisation of dominance, the effects of differentiation on the possibility of self‐rule are examined, and two systematic effects of political differentiation are identified. It is argued that segmentation is the systemic effect of differentiation in the vertical dimension of integration. Here, dominance occurs in the form of exclusion from decision‐making bodies and the denial of choice opportunities. In the external horizontal dimension, the systemic effect of differentiation is hegemony. Some states are vulnerable to arbitrary interference and the pre‐emption of public autonomy. The article discusses developments within the Eurozone as a case of segmentation and the statues of associated non‐members as a case of hegemony. With regard to the latter, we are faced with the phenomenon of self‐incurred dominance.

Simulations can be extremely successful in acquainting participants with a negotiation’s logic and process, especially in those political systems in which negotiations are prominent, such as the European Union (EU). After a brief introduction on the simulations in teaching the European integration, in this article we present, step-by-step, a simulation game on the adoption of a real piece of European legislation: the regulation that implemented the European Citizens’ Initiative, one of the main innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. Special attention is devoted to the different phases of a simulation design, from the choice of the topic, the choice and allocation of roles, the preparation of all the necessary documentation, to the debriefing and assessment phases. The article originates from a 4-year long study with undergraduate students from two Italian universities.

The European Union (EU) is considered to be a unique economic and political union that integrates most European countries. This article focuses on the cultural aspect of European integration, which has been increasingly debated over the course of deepening and widening integration and in the context of the legitimation crisis of the EU. Among the main goals of the EU is to promote certain values, which raises the question of whether it has been efficient in (or enabled) reducing cultural value gaps among the participating countries. World polity and institutional isomorphism theories suggest that cultural values may trickle down in a vertical manner from the institutions of the EU to its member states and candidates. Furthermore, hybridisation theory postulates that values diffuse horizontally through intensified interactions enabled by the EU. These two perspectives imply the possibility of cultural convergence among countries associated with the EU. By contrast, the culture clash thesis assumes that differences in cultural identity prevent value convergence across countries; growing awareness of such differences may even increase the pre‐existing cultural value distances. To test these different scenarios, distances in emancipative and secular values are compared across pairs of countries using combined repeated cross‐sectional data from the European Values Study and the World Values Survey gathered between 1992 and 2011. This study finds that the longer a country has been part of the EU, the more closely its values approximate those of the EU founding countries, which in turn are the most homogenous. Initial cultural distance to the founders’ average values appears irrelevant to acquiring membership or candidacy status. However, new member states experienced substantial cultural convergence with old member states after 1992, as did current candidates between 2001 and 2008. Since 1992, nations not participating in the integration process have diverged substantially from EU members, essentially leading to cultural polarisation in Europe. The findings are independent of (changes in) economic disparities and suggest the importance of cultural diffusion as one of the fundamental mechanisms of cultural change. This empirical study contributes to the literature on European integration, political and sociological theories of globalisation, and cross‐cultural theories of societal value change.

In recent years, the topic of differentiated integration in the European Union has become increasingly discussed in both political science research and politics in general. Whereas differentiated integration is viewed as necessary for deeper cooperation, recent findings suggest that it increases the gulf between participants and non‐participants, making it difficult for non‐participating countries to join in later negotiations. However, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical work regarding the relationship between different levels of participation in the EU and national policy outcomes. This article addresses this question by comparing the policy outcomes in fully participating, selectively participating (opting‐in) and non‐participating (opting‐out) EU Member States relative to EU legislation. The findings show that selective participation (opting‐in) increases state conformity with EU laws relative to no integration at all (opting‐out), but it does not completely bridge the gap between fully integrated Member States and non‐participants. The results suggest that countries with flexible arrangements are generally less likely to implement EU laws than full participants, even when they choose to legally commit to the EU requirements. This finding raises some further questions about the rationale behind selective participation and its consequences for policy conformity, if its application expands to other policy areas and more Member States in the future.

Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and over a decade after its reunification, the European Union (EU) is experiencing increasingly more challenges toward its unity. The EU has experienced a number of crises in the early 2000s, the breakaway of one of its members in 2019, and is challenged by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. The latter crisis exhibits, on the one hand, the need for social coherence and unified policies, and on the other, has prompted the physical closure of borders, and divergent responses by domestic political elite. One such reaction—the adopted strengthening of power for Hungary’s Prime Minister—has prompted an international outcry and re-heated the debate of the democratic backtracking of some of the new EU member-states. Analyzing the process of European Enlargement and the changing sentiments about European Integration in a number of East European countries, this symposium brings to the fore important questions about the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe. Although there is a general consensus that both the East and the West have benefited and continue to benefit from their reunion, it is nevertheless the case that the quick assimilation of liberal values has led to policies seen as threatening the liberal democracy model of the EU that we need to address in order to preserve the stability of the Union.

International organisations have considered national unity a necessary prerequisite to maintaining political stability and restoring economic growth in countries facing severe economic crisis. The European Union and the International Monetary Fund promoted such unity in Greece when making stabilisation packages available during the country's sovereign debt crisis in 2011–2012. Focused on the conditions under which diverse political groups can credibly coordinate their economic and political strategies, this article examines domestic and international factors that impact the prospect of political unity in Greece and small European economies. Anchored in the historical institutionalism tradition, it finds that political unity in small European economies has been consolidated during periods of economic growth and when complementary international institutions existed, but has regularly been undermined in countries experiencing the opposite conditions, including Greece. National unity in Greece over the long term requires domestic reforms, but such reforms will not be sustainable without external economic growth and a multilateral architecture that incentivises economic groups to share the benefits and costs of structural reform. Since the latter conditions are not ones that a small country itself can produce, sustained political unity rests as much with the actions of big economies as it does with Greece overcoming the historic legacies of its particular model of capitalism.

This article identifies previously ignored determinants of public support for the European Union's security and defence ambitions. In contrast to public opinion vis‐à‐vis the EU in general, the literature on attitudes towards a putative European army or the existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) suggests that the explanatory power of sociodemographic and economic variables is weak, and focuses instead on national identity as the main determinant of one's support. This article explores the possible impact of strategic culture, and argues that preferences vis‐à‐vis the EU's security and defence ambitions are formed in part through pre‐existing social representations of security. To test this proposition, ‘national’ strategic cultures are disaggregated and a typology is produced that contains four strategic postures: pacifism, traditionalism, humanitarianism and globalism. Applying regression analysis on individual‐level Eurobarometer survey data, it is found that strategic postures help explain both the general level of support for CSDP and support for specific Petersberg tasks.

Liberal democratic states have three kinds of duties towards migrants and refugees. First, they should enhance their own citizens opportunities of free movement through entering reciprocity-based agreements with other states that are sufficiently similar or with whom they share a political union. Second, they should admit economic migrants if there are expected benefits for the receiving country, the sending country and the migrants themselves. Third, they have to allow for family reunification and to contribute to refugees protection because of their commitments to universal human rights. States can contribute to the latter goal by taking in refugees or by supporting other states that do so. In the international state system, a fair distribution of both types of burdens among all states cannot be secured. In the European Union, however, the principle of sincere cooperation and the need for coordination of refugee flows in the Schengen area of internally open borders combine a normative commitment with self-interests of states to overcome this prisoners’ dilemma. All the more tragic is the blocking of European solutions by unwilling member states who are ready to sacrifice European integration because they are not ready to accept their duties towards refugees.

Since 2003, the European Commission has produced analytical documents (called Impact Assessments, IAs) to appraise its policy proposals. This appraisal process is the cornerstone of the regulatory reform policy of the European Union. Previous research has been concerned with the quality of the IAs in terms of evidence-based policy, usages of economic analysis and other standards of smart regulation. Instead, we move to a different perspective. We draw on the narrative policy framework to explore IAs as a text and discursive instrument. Conceptually, insights from discursive institutionalism are used to explore narratives as tools of coordination within complex organizations such as the European Commission, and as communicative tools through which policy-makers seek to enhance the plausibility, acceptability and, ultimately, legitimacy for their policy proposals. Empirically, we consider a sample of IAs that differ by originating DGs, legal instrument, and level of saliency. The findings show that both in coordinating and communicating policy, the European bureaucracy projects a certain definition of its identity via the narratives it deploys. The Commission may use IAs to produce evidence-based policy, but it also an active narrator. It engages with IAs to provide a presentation of self, to establish EU norms and values, and to create consensus around policy proposals by using causal plots, doomsday scenarios, and narrative dramatization.

Following the June 2010 elections, Belgium was left for more than a year without a full government, as negotiations about constitutional reform dragged on. In this article, I investigate why this interregnum did not have any fatal consequences for Belgian governance and society. On a formal level, the Belgian constitution allows a caretaker government to take all necessary steps to ensure continuity, thus avoiding government deadlock. From a political science perspective it can be noted that in a system of multi-level governance, other levels typically step in if one level fails. This is especially the case in a country like Belgium with a strong pro-European consensus, where European Union (EU)-interference is considered as legitimate. The theoretical relevance is that multi-level governance can be seen as a safeguard against government failure.

The editorial to the symposium briefly contextualises current debates on the European ‘public sphere’ and/or on absence thereof. In light of concern with the EU's so-called ‘democratic deficit’, the issue of how to create a polis without a demos has focused, in part, on the role of the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) with respect, for example, to the mass media, law, and organisations within civil society. The editorial introduces the individual papers and seeks to identify their potential contributions to academic and policy debate within and beyond the EU.

In the face of the discourse about the democratic deficit and declining public support for the European Union (EU), institutionalist scholars have examined the roles of institutions in EU decision making and in particular the implications of the empowered European Parliament. Almost in isolation from this literature, prior research on public attitudes toward the EU has largely adopted utilitarian, identity and informational accounts that focus on individual‐level attributes. By combining the insights from the institutional and behavioural literature, this article reports on a novel cross‐national conjoint experiment designed to investigate multidimensionality of public attitudes by taking into account the specific roles of institutions and distinct stages in EU decision making. Analysing data from a large‐scale experimental survey in 13 EU member states, the findings demonstrate how and to what extent the institutional design of EU decision making shapes public support. In particular, the study finds a general pattern of public consensus about preferred institutional reform regarding powers of proposal, adoption and voting among European citizens in different countries, but notable dissent about sanctioning powers. The results show that utilitarian and partisan considerations matter primarily for the sanctioning dimension in which many respondents in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden prefer national courts to the Court of Justice of the EU.