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Research on nonprofit lobbying conceives of strategy in various ways. This article presents a more comprehensive view encompassing four components: lobbying motivation (lobbying for organizational or self-interest as well as for societal benefit), concentration (lobbying in a narrow versus wide range of policy domains), type (lobbying policymakers directly or indirectly), and target (lobbying different levels of government). Based on the analysis of the population of nonprofit organizations that registered to lobby in the State of North Carolina in 2010 (N = 402), findings demonstrate the complexity and distinctiveness of nonprofit lobbying strategies: Most nonprofits register to lobby for organizational and societal benefit, in multiple policy domains, directly and indirectly, and at several levels of government. The article discusses the findings and their implications and suggests a research agenda on nonprofit lobbying strategy that would incorporate the roots of these strategic choices.
Scholars have used varying terminology for describing non-state entities seeking to influence public policy or work with the EU’s institutions. This paper argues that the use of this terminology is not and should not be random, as different ‘frames’ come with different normative visions about the role(s) of these entities in EU democracy. A novel bibliometric analysis of 780 academic publications between 1992 and 2020 reveals that three frames stand out: The interest group frame, the NGO frame, as well as the civil society organisation frame; a number of publications also use multiple frames. This article reveals the specific democratic visions contained in these frames, including a pluralist view for interest groups; a governance view for NGOs as ‘third sector’ organisations, and participatory and deliberative democracy contributions for civil society organisations. The use of these frames has dynamically changed over time, with ‘interest groups’ on the rise. The results demonstrate the shifting focus of studies on non-state actors in the EU and consolidation within the sub-field; the original visions of European policy-makers emerging from the 2001 White Paper on governance may only partially come true.
This article provides an empirical test of an informational model of lobbying. The model predicts when lobbyists provide useful information to policy makers and when policy makers follow lobbyists' advice. The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organised groups in the context of 28 policy proposals advanced by United Kingdom governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the interactions between policy makers and lobbyists are driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policy makers, providing lobbyists with strong incentives to provide correct advice to policy makers. There is little support for the expectation that lobbyists can successfully persuade policy makers to take a course of action that is beneficial to the lobbyist at the expense of wider constituencies.
This article discusses the potential of case study and process-tracing methods for studying lobbying and framing in the European Union (EU). It argues that case studies and process tracing allow us to explore different sets of questions than large-N and quantitative approaches and to shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to policy change. Through these methods it is possible to study long-term processes and under-researched areas, to analyse the social construction of frames and to single out the conditions that lead to successful framing. In order to show the advantages of case studies and process tracing, illustrative examples drawn from the case study of EU foreign policy towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are provided.
Social Network Analysis (SNA) conceptualizes a policy-making process as a network of actors. It can assess if an interest group (IGs) occupies a leading central position within this policy network, if it belongs to various ad hoc coalitions or if it plays a brokering role between different stakeholders. Such network variables are crucial to capture how IGs mobilize and gain access to policymakers, and to explain their goal achievements and potential policy influence as well. This article reviews recent studies applying the methodological tools of SNA. It then proposes an innovative research design to investigate how IGs seek to influence the course of a policy-making process across many institutional venues.
Focusing on the3million—a major organisation that was formed after the 2016 Brexit Referendum to represent EU citizens in the UK, this article explores the role of online communication in supporting civic actors’ lobbying and mobilisation strategies at local, national and international levels. Apart from multi-scalar dimensions of these civic organisations’ work and of the way EU citizens themselves engage, we identify different strategies of impact. These are inter-linked and performed in a nonlinear fashion and include: emotionalising; politicising; channelling; contesting. These findings elaborate on the way multinational diaspora formation and mobilisation in the 21st century should be conceptualised, and their importance for stakeholder empowerment. We argue that contextual factors—both in terms of the socio-political capital of the people engaged in mobilisation and the features and dynamics of opportunity structures in a particular country and historical moment—are important in understanding why civic actors emerge, how they mobilise and the way their status and focus of their work transforms over time. The article significantly contributes to research studying the use of digital communications and especially e-newsletters and e-mails by non-state actors for mobilising and lobbying purposes.
Chapter 2 explores the drivers behind corporate governing, spanning internal organizational dynamics, and broader societal pressures. Within firms, Millennial and Gen Z employees have emerged as a force for change, leveraging social media to advocate for prosocial commitments and ESG priorities. Investors, increasingly treating ESG factors as financially material, have further reshaped strategic expectations. These pressures have begun to challenge shareholder primacy and expand the perceived boundaries of corporate purpose. This chapter also considers the influence of corporate political spending and lobbying in shaping public positioning. In Section B, attention turns to the cultural and political shifts of the mid-to-late 2010s. Movements like Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, the Climate Movement, and March for Our Lives heightened demands for corporate engagement, as did high-profile federal policies under the first Trump administration. Faced with polarization, institutional dysfunction, and declining government responsiveness, many companies stepped into policy vacuums – assuming roles once thought to belong solely to public institutions.
This Element examines clientelism and its impact on democratic institutions and markets, emphasizing that, alongside electoral competition, politics hosts two additional arenas: one where political actors seek campaign resources and active supporters, and another where socioeconomic actors pursue access to state-distributed resources. Clientelism emerges from reciprocal exchanges between these actors. Political parties use clientelism to incentivize collective action and organize campaigns. Playing this 'clientelist game', no party can reduce clientelistic practices without risking electoral defeat or internal fragmentation. Clientelism weakens the provision of public goods and skews policymaking to benefit clients over general welfare. Eventually, it generates an economic 'tragedy of the commons', as state resources are overexploited and the economy suffers, while formal institutions often fail to constrain it. Even in advanced democracies like the United States, political competition is not only electoral, targeting voters, but structurally clientelist. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Studying lobbying influence in politics has been confronted with the challenge of gaining insights into processes that usually take place behind closed doors and about which honest answers from participants are difficult to obtain. Therefore, innovative methods of indirect measurement of lobby success – via text analysis or interviews – have been used to get at the hidden politics of lobbying. In this research note, we propose an additional technique to study lobby influence much more directly, the randomized response technique (RRT). This method has been successfully used to study doping in elite sports, for instance, but has been almost absent from political research in the past. The note presents the method and illustrates its applicability with a study of lobby influence in German Parliaments. The study reached out to 2386 present and to 850 former MPs (Members of Parliaments). The response dataset added up to 273 present and 160 former MPs, equaling response rates of 11.4% and 18.8% respectively. Despite these low response rates, it was nevertheless possible to estimate rates of lobby-friendly behavior among German MPs at comparably low rates of instruction noncompliance. Although the results should be interpreted cautiously due to the low response rate, the study demonstrates the viability of RRT surveys as a means to study sensitive issues in politics.
A liberal reformist core dominated antiwar activities through the end of 1966. That year the movement maintained a predominantly decentralized orientation, both lacking and resisting true national coordination. Primarily through grassroots activity, the movement incorporated new constituencies and provided alternative sources of information that challenged the government’s credibility. Antiwar activists pursued change largely through the established political system, but also in coalition building for mass demonstrations and draft resistance. Dissent within the government became more visible, which gave wartime dissent a degree of respectability. Protesting napalm production signified an early economic challenge, and the case of the Fort Hood Three exemplified cooperation between active-duty military and civilian antiwar activists. Despite continued growth and some impressive achievements, the movement also faced more significant government and right-wing opposition, and the war’s continued escalation left many activists feeling frustrated and alienated.
Chapter 5 explains the persistence of the impunity agenda. It argues that Trump’s resurgence in 2024 has already thrust the agenda back to the forefront and that it could even be self-executing after Trump eventually leaves office. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 show how the conservative media space and an emboldened right wing in Congress discourage advocates from backing away from publicly testing IHL. Section 5.3 traces the expanding coalition of the impunity movement, which now not only includes Fox News and Republican lawmakers but also lobbyist organizations and troops granted clemency by Trump. Section 5.4 describes how close-knit professional and social networks amplify the power of the impunity coalition, even more now given Trump’s re-ascendance to the White House and Pete Hegseth’s selection as Defense Secretary.
This article provides a systematic literature review of the scholarly work on lobbying coalitions in political science, spanning the period from 1985 to 2023. By applying the PRISMA protocol for scoping reviews, the study maps the key trends, definitions adopted, research methods, and theoretical frameworks within this field, specifically focusing on the main explanations used to account for interest groups’ choice to form or join a coalition. The review reveals that the study of lobbying coalitions has grown in prominence, with a prevailing focus on the United States and the European Union and with a predominant use of large-N quantitative methods. The review identifies the dominance of behavioral definitions of interest groups and lobbying coalitions while also highlighting significant methodological gaps, particularly the underuse of social network analysis and qualitative comparative analysis. Furthermore, the study presents a meta-analysis of theoretical hypotheses, showing that the decision to form or join coalitions is primarily influenced by micro- and meso-level factors such as ideological affinity and issue salience. The review finds mixed empirical support for the idea that coalition formation serves as a ‘weapon of the weak’, with both weaker and stronger groups demonstrating likelihood of joining coalitions under certain conditions. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for future research, including the further exploration of mixed-method designs and the potential for alternative methodological approaches to refine the understanding of lobbying coalitions.
Political institutions have been depicted by academics as a marketplace where citizens transact with each other to accomplish collective ends difficult to accomplish otherwise. This depiction supports a romantic notion of democracy in which democratic governments are accountable to their citizens, and act in their best interests. In Politics as Exchange, Randall Holcombe explains why this view of democracy is too optimistic. He argues that while there is a political marketplace in which public policy is made, access to the political marketplace is limited to an elite few. A small group of well-connected individuals-legislators, lobbyists, agency heads, and others-negotiate to produce public policies with which the masses must comply. Examining the political transactions that determine policy, Holcombe discusses how political institutions, citizen mobility, and competition can limit the ability of elites to abuse their power.
This chapter traces the evolution of American interests in external property rights from the American Revolution to the present day. It examines the United States’ colonial experience in the Philippines, highlighting the challenges of implementing effective property rights reforms and the prioritization of other economic interests over property rights. The chapter identifies a pivotal shift in the 1980s toward prioritizing property rights abroad, influenced by the lobbying efforts of American firms and the growing salience of the trade deficit. It presents original data involving over a dozen government agencies, 160 countries, and more than 340 unique activities, illustrating the extensive scope and scale of United States’ efforts to enhance property rights globally through a multifaceted approach encompassing international treaties, domestic development programs, and bureaucratic initiatives.
The failure of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) has been attributed to various organized interests, including the New Right and insurance companies. This study examines trends in lobby efforts regarding the amendment and correlations between lobby efforts and roll call votes among state legislators. Lobbyists active on the amendment appeared most often in states they perceived were most likely to approve. A second data set consisting of 6,952 votes reveals that explicitly pro- and anti-ERA lobby efforts were correlated with votes cast only by Republican state legislators. Lobby efforts by insurance companies were not correlated with any votes. The efforts of pro- and anti-amendment lobbyists, however, likely had no effect on the ultimate fate of the proposed amendment. Women and non-white legislators voted more often for the amendment, regardless of party. Moreover, changes in public support for the amendment led to partisan differences in legislators’ votes.
Le régime québécois d’encadrement du lobbyisme exclut actuellement de son champ d’application les lobbyistes travaillant au sein d’organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL). Cette exception fait l’objet de critiques de la part de plusieurs acteurs du milieu. Le Commissaire au lobbyisme du Québec suggère d’ailleurs au législateur de modifier la loi afin d’inclure plus de lobbyistes dans son champ d’application, ce à quoi s’opposent plusieurs OBNL. La récente initiative médiatique du Commissaire au lobbyisme visant à promouvoir le droit à la transparence et à proposer une réforme de l’encadrement du lobbyisme au Québec constitue une occasion propice pour analyser l’idée d’assujettir tous les OBNL à la Loi sur la transparence et l’éthique en matière de lobbyisme. Pour éclairer cet enjeu, l’analyse vise à déterminer les impacts potentiels d’une modification législative sur la légitimité des OBNL en tant que groupes d’intérêt. L’article offre ainsi une nouvelle perspective sur le débat relatif à l’inclusion des lobbyistes travaillant au sein d’OBNL dans le champ d’application du régime québécois d’encadrement du lobbyisme.
This chapter presents qualitative case studies of the dramatically different political dynamics of TPP and TTIP negotiations. Why was lobbying so much more contentious over TPP while lobbying over TTIP was muted and almost entirely in favor of the agreement? The chapter traces the development of industry and labor union positions on each agreement, showing how the effects of endowments-based, inter-industry trade on the basis of comparative advantage (much more prevalent with TPP partners) serves to unify industries and unions around their particular position, facilitating strong collective action. With TTIP, the chapter shows how internationally engaged firms were highly motivated to lobby in favor of increased market access and the removal of regulatory barriers, while domestic-oriented firms either sat out of the political process entirely or formed cross-sectoral ad hoc coalitions. These cases elucidate how and why actors came to these decisions.
This chapter assesses the effects of intra-industry trade on lobbying in the EU. It includes the results of analysis of an original dataset of EU-based lobbying over several trade agreements. First, the chapter briefly discusses the nature of trade policy in the EU, and then surveys the literature on the politics of trade in Europe, with a focus on the state of our knowledge about the character of political coalitions and the involvement of industry associations and individual firms in the trade policymaking process. Second, the chapter discusses the role of intra-industry trade in the EU and presents an argument about the way that IIT has eroded the ability of European industry associations to lobby jointly over trade policy. Third, the chapter introduces the dataset used to assess the argument and discusses the quantitative analysis and results. The results support the theory developed in this book and demonstrate that IIT affects societal coalitions across diverse institutional contexts.
This chapter assesses the book's theory about the effects of intra-industry trade on lobbying in the US case. First, the chapter examines the changing dynamics of trade politics in the United States during the postwar period, and it demonstrates the ways that these dynamics diverge from what is predicted by the classic trade models. Second, the chapter presents testable hypotheses to assess the influence of intra-industry trade on the structure of trade politics coalitions. In the remaining sections, I test my hypotheses and discuss my results and their implications for the politics of international trade. Using firm-level data on trade policy lobbying expenditures for 459 US manufacturing industries, I show that industry associations become less active in their lobbying efforts, relative to individual firms, as intra-industry trade increases. Furthermore, I find that this effect is stronger in import-competing sectors than in strong exporting sectors. This suggests that in import-competing sectors, exporting firms break away from protectionist industry associations to lobby alone for liberalization.
The book opens with some compelling examples of puzzling episodes in recent trade policy negotiations. I question why Americans were largely unaware of TTIP, while the TPP became a lightning rod for controversy and went down in flames on day one of the Trump presidency. I also discuss the dramatic rise in firm-level lobbying over these and other trade agreements, despite the IPE literature’s longstanding assumption that firms primarily engage in trade politics collectively via industry associations or class-based coalitions. Then I briefly introduce my theoretical story, which makes sense of these and other puzzles. I discuss the state of our understanding of trade politics in developed democracies before presenting the plan of the book to follow.