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This chapter systematizes the argument that the Court should and can calibrate its proportionality test to the infrastructural dimension of the populist attack on democratic and rule of law provisions – and, as such, operate the test as ‘anti-populist detector and responder’. While the general argument is all stages of proportionality aims at enhancing deliberation, representation and the rule of law in populist context, the specific argument is Court should revise its approach to the second stage of the proportionality assessment, the purpose or ‘legitimate aim’ of the interference, by holistically inferentially screening a wider spectrum of potential infrastructural erosion.
Chapter 3 lays down the normative foundations of the investigation with respect to populism as an ideational construct. The main claim is that populism distorts democracy and corrupts the rule of law. More precisely, populism distorts democracy in depriving the democratic process from the requirements of deliberation and representation, which I take as constitutive of democratic legitimacy. The rule of law (thinly or thickly defined) is not only distorted – it is corrupt.
Chapter 10 offers a summary of the structure, methodology, and findings of the book. It highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the investigation, in particular how a philosophically grounded argument can bear upon the reasoning of the Court while simultaneously addressing a pressing societal challenge.
Chapter 4 explains the key parameters of the Court’s adjudication and the role ‘democratic society’ plays in the Court’s reasoning. I explain the rise of ‘procedural review’ as a facet of subsidiarity and highlight implications for the proportionality analysis of the Court and their relevance in the populist context. It also explains how ‘democratic society’ can be used heuristic device to explore the Court’s interpretive equipment and identify the principled link between proportionality and democracy.
In Chapter 10, we conclude with an overview of the broader themes seen throughout this work, showcasing the tell-tale signs of innovation failure. These patterns go to the core of our work, lessons learned from past innovations that can help us to avoid repeating similar mistakes in the future. No one, not even the cagiest upgrader, is going to be able to predict every new technology that will succeed or flop. But with this mindset, you can avoid some of the more obvious traps that investors, politicians, and the public continue to fall for, while valuing the evidence-based alternatives we so often neglect.
The book offers the first systematic account of the European Court of Human Rights' actual and potential response to the wave of authoritarian populism consolidating across Council of Europe states. It develops an original framework combining philosophical, social-scientific and legal analysis. The book first develops the claim that authoritarian populism is characterised by a severe distortion of democracy and a corrupt rule of law. Drawing on these insights, the book points to the infrastructural erosion of Convention rights, highlighting the limits of the Court's 'democratic society' in the media, judicial, and electoral domains. Taking into account the Court's subsidiary position, the book demonstrates how the Court's proportionality test can and should be enhanced to better detect and respond to infrastructural erosion across these areas.
This article examines the growing use of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled decision support systems in targeting operations and their implications for proportionality assessments under international humanitarian law (IHL). Emphasizing the primacy of the duty of constant care and precautions in attack as obligations that must be exhausted before and during proportionality assessments, the article advocates for a fuller understanding of civilian harm. It traces the historical trajectory of “quantification logics” in targeting, from the Vietnam War to contemporary AI integration, and analyzes how such systems may reshape decision spaces, cognitive processes and accountability within the context of armed conflict. Specifically, the article argues that over-reliance on computational models risks displacing the contextual, qualitative judgement essential to lawful proportionality determinations, potentially normalizing civilian harm. It concludes with recommendations to preserve the space that human reasoning occupies as central to IHL compliance in targeting operations.
When judging how ‘fair’ voting rules are, a fundamental criterion used by both scholars and politicians is their ability or inability to produce proportional results – that is, the extent parties’ seat distribution after the elections accurately reflects their vote shares. How about citizens? Do citizens care about how proportional the outcome is? Or do they judge the outcome solely on the basis of how well (or poorly) their party performed? Taking advantage of a uniquely designed survey experiment, this article investigates the causal effect of proportionality on voter support for voting rules in four countries: Austria, England, Ireland and Sweden. The results show that proportionality drives support for the voting rules not above, but beyond party performance. There is little cross‐country variation, which suggests that proportionality is appreciated in different contexts with little status quo bias. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the causal mechanisms linking electoral rules to voter support.
This article uses Arash Abizadeh to illustrate the appeal and difficulties of the claim that random selection is a more democratic way to select a legislature than election. It agrees with Abizadeh that representative democracy cannot be reduced to the right of voters to choose their legislators. However, it challenges his view that elections are inherently inegalitarian because they enable voters to discriminate unfairly among electoral candidates and his assimilation of gyroscopic to descriptive representation. Finally, the article highlights the difficulties of justifying random selection while rejecting election on egalitarian grounds. It therefore concludes that democratic equality requires more, not less, attention to the ethics of voting and to the conceptual, moral, and political dimensions of citizens’ claims on elected office.
The proportionality between crime and punishment is made, and the way it is made makes for a certain kind of criminal law. By analyzing how punitive measures are justified in Swedish criminal law and crime policy through appeals to proportionality, the Article demonstrates how proportionality has been made and remade to legitimize an increasingly punitive crime policy, obscuring the reasons for these legislative changes. The Article thus calls for the principle of proportionality to be dismantled and employs a discursive approach to reverse-engineer claims of proportionality in Swedish legislative proposals. The purpose of this approach is to make visible the meanings and limits of the contemporary crime policy understanding of crime, punishment, and a just criminal law.
This article discusses the potential influence of the existence of an underlying armed conflict in Gaza on the applicability and application of jus ad bellum. It rejects the Israeli ‘displacement’ approach whereby jus ad bellum does not play a role during an ongoing armed conflict as it finds no support in the sources of international law, in particular state practice. The article then provides possible explanations for the Israeli reliance on ‘displacement’ regardless of its shaky foundations: namely, the preference to provide overall justification for the operation, to avoid difficult political topics, and to allow Israel freedom of action in other arenas (such as Lebanon and Syria). Regardless of such findings, the article acknowledges that jus ad bellum faces challenges to its application during hostilities. It analyses the right of self-defence, as Israel has relied on such right to justify its use of force in Gaza, addressing relatively briefly jus ad bellum necessity while focusing on the various approaches to jus ad bellum proportionality, and the differences between such approaches when it comes to the legality of the use of force in self-defence in Gaza. Ultimately, the article argues that states must provide clear pronouncements on this issue to prevent the adoption of an overly permissive approach to the regulation of jus ad bellum during hostilities.
Under the rule of law, everyone has a constitutional right to a remedy—that is, access to a court that decides a dispute over private rights and obligations according to the law of the land. Dispute resolution agreements are an instance of reflexive contracting, in other words, agreements on which substantive and procedural rules shall govern a contractual relationship. Where the choice for one or both parties is for a law or forum other than that applicable by default, dispute resolution agreements contain a waiver of the constitutional right to a remedy according to the law of the land. Party autonomy—that is, the freedom to contract on the rights and remedies applicable to the main contract—is conferred by reflexive contract law, that is, the law applicable to dispute resolution agreements. In this article I argue that reflexive contract law, in specifying the conditions under which reflexive contracts are enforced by the state, shall reflect the extent to which agreements to arbitrate, on forum selection, or on choice of law interfere with the constitutional right to a remedy. Coherent requirements as to the form and validity of consent, ex-ante information, or ex-post judicial control shall be proportional to the entailed dangers and the proficiency of the involved parties. However, as dispute resolution agreements are regulated by diverse instruments on the national, supranational, and international levels, consistency is very difficult to achieve. Moreover, the US and EU regulatory approaches regarding the protection of consumers and employees seem to be incommensurable.
Freedom to protest is important for similar reasons to freedom of expression, it is, after all, a core form of political expression. Yet while protest is important, protests can also be disruptive, annoying, offensive, harmful and violent. In a rights-based system we thus have to consider where lines should be drawn between competing rights and interests and by whom. This chapter examines how the domestic and ECtHR case law reflects these tensions, with some cases leaning towards a more deferential approach and others establishing a more robust role for the courts. This chapter primarily examines Article 11 the right to freedom of association and assembly, but it also highlights the ways in which many of the other Convention rights safeguard the freedom to protest. In respect of domestic law, this chapter observes that the post-HRA period has also seen the enactment of far wider legislative restrictions than existed previously. There are also concerns about the growing use of surveillance, police brutality and increased restrictions on access to land.
This chapter examines the history and operation of European human rights law. It provides insight into how the ECHR and the ECtHR emerged, how they have evolved and how this relates to the different conceptions of human rights law considered in Chapter 1. It also examines how the ECtHR processes cases and interprets rights, observing that the manner in which the ECtHR approaches those tasks is fundamental to the relationship between the ECtHR and Contracting States. Indeed, it is the interpretation of rights and the processing of cases that have been the focus of reform of the Convention system. This is reflected in the various measures that have been adopted in order to ensure the effective operation of an institution that has seen its workload grow exponentially, and to preserve the continuing participation of States. The processes for derogating from rights and the suspension, expulsion and withdrawal of States from the ECtHR are further important aspects of the relationship between the Court and the Contracting States which are considered in this chapter.
The article examines how the Czech courts addressed restrictions on the right to conduct business during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although grounded in the Czech authorities’ response to the health crisis, the analysis extends to broader conclusions about the necessity of upholding rule-of-law principles. The article therefore highlights how constitutional imperatives of proportionality, equality and the justification of government actions must be preserved in judicial review, even in times of crises.
This chapter explores the applicability of competition law, particularly in its EU dimension, to actvities, tournaments, broadcasting and others of the ATP, although the same rules apply mutatis mutandis to the WTA and the ITF. The chapter commences by examining good governance standards in EU law and policy and explores access to the organisational market for rival tennis tours under competition law. In doing so, it examines the legality of blocking rivals from accessing the organisational market, in particular in relation to rules 1.07, 1.14 and 8.05A(2)(e) of the ATP Rulebook. The chapter assesses the compatibility of these rules with EU competition law, especially in relation to recent judgments adopted by the CJEU and whether the restrictions to competition imposed therein are compatible with legitimate objectives and proportionality. The chapter examines whether wild cards are compatible with Article 56 of the TFEU and the freedom to provide services.
Calls to defund the police gained prominence with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and take various forms. Depending on what will be defunded, the idea has attracted support from different parts of the political spectrum. The politicized nature of the debate often cuts short reflection on how best to assess proposals to defund the police. This article takes up that task. It begins by developing a typology of defund measures: abolitionist cuts, abolitionist reallocation, disaggregative cuts, and disaggregative reallocation. It then outlines a framework to evaluate policing and defund measures, drawing on criteria from the ethics of defensive force. Since policing relies on force, it faces a high justificatory bar and must satisfy the principles of just aim, proportionality, and necessity. The state should not fund unjustified forms of policing that violate those principles. Different violations, though, demand different policy responses.
This chapter focuses on the practices of confiscation and forfeiture, by which the government permanently transfers money or property from the individual to the state, without compensation, because of a connection between the property and alleged unlawful conduct. The chapter describes and critically considers the rules on both conviction-based confiscation and forfeiture and those allowed without obtaining a conviction in six jurisdictions in Europe (the European Union, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, England & Wales) and relatively common practices at the federal and state levels in the United States. The chapter describes and examines several of the purported benefits and costs of these practices as well as key issues related to adjudicatory processes and statutory and constitutional protections. In doing so, the chapter identifies a number of fundamental areas of concern, offering some suggested avenues for reform or further study.
What kinds of consideration should guide decisions about the scope of the criminal law? This chapter compares the ways in which German and Anglo-American theorists have tackled this question. After some comments on what it is to criminalise conduct, and on the kinds of reason that an inquiry into principles of criminalisation should aim to identify, it offers some historical background to the contemporary debates. It then turns to a critical comparative discussion of two popular principles of criminalisation, the Rechtsgutslehre and the Harm Principle, in the course of which it also attends to Legal Moralism, and to the role of the Proportionality Principle – a principle explicitly central in German theorising, and at least implicitly essential to Anglo-American theories. Finally, it considers some alternative principles of criminalisation, and asks whether we should look not for a systematic account of ‘the principles of criminalisation’, but for a messier, more pluralist account of the range of considerations (principles, reasons) that should bear on criminalisation decisions.