What explains far‐right mobilisation in the protest arena? After decades of growing electoral support and policy influence, the far right is experiencing an increase in grassroots mobilisation. Scholars of social movements and political parties have devoted little attention to the determinants of far‐right protest mobilisation in Europe. In this article, we bridge previous research on the far right and social movements to advance hypotheses on the drivers of far‐right protest mobilisation based on grievances, opportunities and resource mobilisation models. We use an original dataset combining novel data on 4,845 far‐right protest events in 11 East and West European countries (2008–2018), with existing measures accounting for the (political, economic and cultural) context of mobilisation. We find that classical approaches to collective action can be fruitfully applied to the study of the far right. Cultural grievances, notably concerns about immigration, as well as the availability of institutional access points in contexts characterised by divided government increase far‐right protest mobilisation. But far‐right protest mobilisation also rests on the organisational resources available to nativist collective actors, that is, the network in which they are embedded, their visibility in the media and elected officials. These findings have important implications to understand far‐right success in advanced democracies. They show that far‐right mobilisation in the protest arena not only rests on favourable circumstances, but also on whether far‐right actors can profit from them. More broadly, the study links party politics and social movement research to grasp the far right's modes of political contestation, locating research on this phenomenon at the intersection of political sociology and comparative politics.

This paper studies the interactions between governments, challengers and third party actors in the context of 60 contentious policy episodes in 12 European countries during the Great Recession. More specifically, we focus on the endogenous dynamics that develop in the course of these episodes. Based on the combination of a new event dataset, which allows for the construction of action sequences, and a novel method (contentious episode analysis) to study the impact of actor‐specific actions on subsequent actions within a sequence, we test a set of hypotheses on the determinants of actors’ overall action repertoires within specific contexts. Overall, our results are more supportive of the interdependence of cooperation than of the interdependence of conflict: the repression‐radical mobilisation‐external legitimation of conflictive behaviour nexus is weaker than the concession‐cooperation‐mediation nexus. While the literature tends to focus on conflict dynamics, we find that there is a more systematic dynamics of cooperation in the course of contentious episodes.

Its reliance on social media and television to mobilise supporters and popularise the figure of its charismatic leader, political science lecturer Pablo Iglesias, is one of the main characteristic features of Podemos, a new, left-leaning populist party that has shaken the political establishment of Spain since its irruption as a decisive political force in the 2014 European elections. Podemos could actually be defined as a ‘transmedia party’, as it combines the use of social media to reach young constituents with traditional TV talk show appearances to reach a wider, and also older, audience. This dualism (traditionalism and innovation) is also present in Podemos’ own configuration as a blend of a social movement and a vertically ruled political party, with a simultaneous presence outside and inside representative structures like parliaments and local governments. Far from hiding from recurrent accusations of populism, Podemos takes pride in being considered a populist movement. Actually, their leaders see their party-cum-movement as a practical implementation of the theories of the Argentinean philosopher Ernesto Laclau: their left-leaning populist formation is the necessary vanguard of a new democratic majority that will replace the current neoliberal hegemony. This unusual reflexivity is studied through a critical discourse analysis of published interviews with Podemos’ leaders.

Urgent alarms now warn of the erosion of democratic norms and the decline of democratic institutions. These antidemocratic trends have prompted some democratic theorists to reject the seeming inevitability of democratic forms of government and instead to consider democracy as a fugitive phenomenon. Fugitive democracy, as we argue below, is a theory composed of two parts. First, it includes a robust, normative ideal of democracy and, second, a clear-eyed vision of the historical defeats and generic difficulties attendant to that ideal. This article considers how democratic theorists might respond to the challenges posed by fugitive democracy and the implications of such an understanding for future research in democratic theory.

In Latin America, it is recognised that social movements have a relevant role in changing social policies on abortion and marriage; however, little is known about the operating conditions accounting for the causal implication. Resorting to a qualitative comparative analysis of 24 Mexican policies, this research explores the conditions taken from moral policy literature. Drawing on extensive data, it argues three causal patterns, where influential movements are a necessary but no sufficient, (1) influential movements require a context full of “legal opportunities”—favourable legal precedents and Court intervention; (2) if they only find favourable legal precedents, conservative actors influence must be scarce, and (3) in cases where the Congress is conservative, the Court intervention, and the minimum conservative influence are required for movements to achieve legal changes on abortion and marriage. The novelty of this article consists of a new model that explains the conditions that play a relevant role in analysing abortion and equal marriage policy changes; in addition, valuable inputs are included for the benefit of the interested parties.

Over the past years, the economic crisis has significantly challenged the ways through which social movements have conceptualised and interacted with European Union institutions and policies. Although valuable research on the Europeanisation of movements has already been conducted, finding moderate numbers of Europeanised protests and actors, more recent studies on the subject have been limited to austerity measures and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has been investigated more from a trade unions’ or an international relations perspective. In this article, the TTIP is used as a very promising case study to analyse social movements’ Europeanisation – that is, their capacity to mobilise referring to European issues, targets and identities. Furthermore, the TTIP is a crucial test case because it concerns a policy area (foreign trade) which falls under the exclusive competence of the EU. In addition, political opportunities for civil society actors are ‘closed’ in that negotiations are kept ‘secret’ and discussed mainly within the European Council, and it is difficult to mobilise a large public on such a technical issue. So why and how has this movement become ‘Europeanised’? This comparative study tests the Europeanisation hypothesis with a protest event analysis on anti‐TTIP mobilisation in six European countries (Italy, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Austria) at the EU level in the period 2014–2016 (for a total of 784 events) and uses semi‐structured interviews in Brussels with key representatives of the movement and policy makers. The findings show that there is strong adaptation of social movements to multilevel governance – with the growing presence of not only purely European actors, but also European targets, mobilisations and transnational movement networks – with a ‘differential Europeanisation’. Not only do the paths of Europeanisation vary from country to country (and type of actor), but they are also influenced by the interplay between the political opportunities at the EU and domestic levels.

‘Service user involvement’ is a widespread and well-known phenomenon within welfare policy and practice in Western countries and is usually perceived as a way of improving welfare services to better aid service users in managing their predicaments. However, the presented ethnographical study of service user involvement within a Swedish psychiatry organization shows that user involvement initiatives might also result in unintended and undesired effects on the collective user movement (i.e. the service user organizations involved in the activities). The analysis suggests that initiatives on user involvement might affect both the constitution of the user movement as well as the way the movement operates. Theoretically co-optation theory informs the analysis.

In the past three decades, Brazil’s state and civil society have undergone a transformation. Non-profit organizations have proliferated, revealing new opportunities for participation, while sustainability and corporate social responsibility have produced new agendas for corporations. Against this background, accountability has emerged within the debate, particularly with regard to governmental transparency and efficiency. This paper examines the Rede Nossa São Paulo movement, which pledges social justice and sustainability and promotes social accountability as its main strategy to achieve its mission. Thus, the main objective of this study is to understand social accountability; more broadly, the goal is to examine governmental accountability in the mobilization process developed by Rede Nossa São Paulo by referring to the framing perspective as a core aspect in the understanding of social movements. Social accountability is presented as a frame that is composed of the union between movements that are historically bonded by the motto of social justice and other groups that are related to urban development and social and environmental responsibility.

This article examines how the various claims to, and demands for, rights have enabled and shaped the various equity and justice seeking social movements that have emerged in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, the key point being that claims to rights are fundamental of the logic and coherence of social movements. The article is divided into three sections. The first sets the conceptual and analytical frame by elaborating on the rights–social movements nexus. This is followed by a discussion of the historical and conceptual location of the Niger Delta. The rest of the article interrogates the contexts of relative deprivation, rights denial, and injustice within which social movements have emerged in the Niger Delta. A major objective is to account for why the social movements have been largely ethnic and most recently generational and to analyze the dynamics and outcomes of the rights struggles waged by the various social movements.

This article analyses the Ufungamano Initiative, a broad-based movement involved in constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. By analysing the rise, operations, achievements, and challenges of the Initiative, I argue that contemporary constitutional reform struggles in Kenya were societal responses to an avaricious political and economic class. It is further argued that the movement resulted from a fragmented elite consensus that widened political opportunities for contentious politics and therefore forced concessions for popular engagement in re-defining the relationship between the people and the political class. Ultimately, the Ufungamano Initiative’s power eroded as a result of multiple competing parochial interests in the movement.

To illuminate the obstacles to the development of a global civil society, the experience of the most developed transnational social movement—the environmental movement—in the most developed supranational political system—the European Union—is considered. National differences are shown to be persistent and there is little evidence of Europeanization. It is argued that the impediments to the development of a global civil society are yet greater and that, despite the advent of antiglobalization protests, global civil society remains an aspiration rather than an accomplished fact.

Is the concept of “global civil society” a Sorelian-type myth that captures intuitively an emergent political project? Or is it, rather, a discursive political terrain open to many interpretations, not all of which might be progressive? A radical democratic content would be one way of filling out the “empty signifier, ” which “global civil society” is, but not the only one.

Democratic innovation is one way the multiple crises of democracy can be addressed. The literature on democratic innovation has yet to adequately interrogate the role of social movements, and more specifically the movement of democratic imaginaries, in innovation, nor has it considered the specific mechanisms through which movements translate democratic imaginaries and practices into innovation. This article provides a preliminary roadmap for methodological and conceptual innovation in our understanding of the role of social movements in democratic innovation. It introduces the concept of democratic innovation repertoires and argues that: a) we need to broaden our conceptualization and analysis of democratic innovation to encompass the role of social movements; and b) we need to understand how the relationship between democratic movement imaginaries and the praxis that movements develop in their quest to “save” or strengthen democracy can shape democratic innovation beyond movement arenas after mobilizing “events” have passed.

Although happy New Left radical may seem like an oxymoron, many veterans of the protest cycle of the late 1960s-early 1970s in Japan seem to find happiness through political participation in an alternative invisible civil society. Guided by actor-network theory and utilizing long-term participant observation data, the study finds that participants bring distinctive cultural capital to their political activism and use their specialized skills to organize events and produce material objects that explain and promote their ideas. They derive personal enjoyment and a sense of purpose from the creative activities of “making and doing” that characterize their autonomous participation in the invisible civil society, and simultaneously build networks rich in social capital. Their activities meet the criteria for experiencing well-being or happiness both through strong network relations (social capital theory), and engaging in activities with autonomous motivation (self-determination theory).

Social movements provide a vital lens for assessing visions of the public good. Social movement (SM) theory explains the motives and structures of movement activity. Emerging in the 1960s, theories that remain relevant to this day include resource mobilization theory, framing, and political opportunity. Despite the prominence of these theories, several critiques of SM theory have emerged. Newer theories such as cognitive liberation and collective identity extend the scope of SM analysis and also focus on internal aspects of movement activity. Latin America, as one of the new sites of analysis, has received much attention from a wide range of SM theories. Yet, the Caribbean, in particular, the Anglophone Caribbean has received little attention. This paper will place both original and newer theories within the context of the Anglophone Caribbean. Specifically, SM theory will be applied to the Bahamian women’s suffrage movement of 1948–1967. The paper will also explain the historical roots of Bahamian culture as a way to explain movement activity and development.

This paper argues that recent struggles against neoliberal axioms such as free trade and open markets have led to a militant reframing of global civil society by grassroots social movements. It contests that this struggle to invest the concept of global civil society with transformative potential rests upon an identifiable praxis, a “strange attractor” that disturbs other civil society actors, through its rearticulation ofa politics that privileges self-organization, direct action, and direct democracy. The paper further suggests that the emergence of this “antagonistic” orientation is best understood through the lens of complexity theory and offers some conceptual tools to begin the process of analyzing global civil society as an outcome and effect of global complexity.

Over a period of three months, starting in late 2013, Ukraine experienced a remarkable civic transformation. What started as peaceful protests largely consisting of young idealists, grew quickly into an organized yet decentralized social movement, a conglomeration of semi-formal initiatives, and a loosely defined network of related formal and informal organizations—a process that ultimately prompted significant political and social changes in Ukraine. This paper offers three case studies related to EuroMaidan to provide insight into the formal and informal dimensions of civil society, contrasting those with official designations. The discussion contributes to the long-debated question of the strength or weakness of civil society in the context of Eastern Europe and suggests directions for future research with regard to the conceptualization of civil society and our understanding of formality.

Environmental activism organizations depend on recruiting and retaining individuals willing to engage in leadership tasks on a voluntary basis. This study examined the resources which help or hinder sustained environmental volunteer activist leadership behaviors. Interviews with 21 environmental volunteer activist leaders were analyzed within a Resource Mobilization Theory framework. While six resources supporting sustained engagement in volunteer activist leadership behaviors were identified, only three were sought by all participants: time, community support, and social relationships. Money, volunteers and network connections were considered valuable resources, however their acquisition generated significant additional administrative burdens. Social relationships sustained volunteer activist leaders through fostering feelings of positive emotions connected with the group. We conclude with suggestions for organizations seeking to increase retention of activist volunteer leaders: namely larger organizations sharing their resources to reduce administrative demands on volunteer activist leaders in smaller organizations; developing movement infrastructure groups to build and sustain networks; and the prioritization of positive relationships within volunteer teams.

Research on the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in collective action predicts they will not interact with grassroots groups, citing partnerships with corporations and states, the apolitical delivery of social services and accountability towards donors as disconnecting professionalized actors from volunteer-based grassroots groups. Using interviews with core activists in the movement confronting Canadian resource extraction abroad, I depart from this approach by investigating the mechanisms, or threads, that bind organizations into coordinated action. I find that NGOs and grassroots groups coordinate as a result of: shared values and environmental justice frames; the allocation of resources; and engagement in complimentary forms of advocacy driven by a division of labour and a diversity of tactics. My research develops existing approaches to theorizing coordinated action and invites scholarship on NGOization to include the conceptual toolkit provided by social movement theories to better account for NGO–grassroots dynamics.

Extreme right-wing violence has resulted in an intense academic debate on how democratic actors can respond to movement on the extreme right. This article explores how various types of CSOs perceive their role, interest, and willingness when it comes to counteracting right-wing extremism. Building on a theoretical framework that makes visible a variety of CSO responses and differences between types of CSOs, the results show that CSOs view themselves as having a watchdog role in relation to right-wing extremism. However, CSOs place the principal responsibility of response to right-wing extremism outside organized civil society in the hands of politicians, citizens, and the media. In addition, not all CSOs are willing to respond in the same way or to the same extent. Humanitarian and social service organizations are more inclined to engage in dialogue and protest compared with sports and recreation organizations and culture organizations. The article concludes by discussing the notion that bridging organizations may be more willing to respond to right-wing extremism and to use dialogue and deliberation compared to bonding organizations.