Legal personhood is the status accorded those, like humans, who are recognised as the subjects of the legal system. As such, many argue that we can address animals’ weak legal position by having them recognised as legal persons. This chapter first considers what legal personhood is and highlights how this concept has been heavily influenced by metaphysical accounts of personhood that privilege characteristics associated with the ‘archetypal’ human. Through a discussion of cases involving animal plaintiffs, the chapter shows how a range of different – and, at times, conflicting – conceptions of personhood have influenced the courts’ understanding of legal personhood. In addition to the judicial inconsistency that legal personhood seems to invite, we see evidence of how particular conceptions of personhood have been operationalised to exclude animals (conceptions that also serve to further marginalise vulnerable human groups). This leads the chapter to conclude that legal personhood is not a desirable solution to animals’ lack of legal inclusion. More than this, the chapter argues that a concept like personhood should nor underpin legal subjecthood for any being, human or otherwise.