A rather unique feature of global climate negotiations is that most governments allow representatives of civil society organisations to be part of their national delegation. It remains unclear, however, why states grant such access in the first place. While there are likely to be benefits from formally including civil society, there are also substantial costs stemming from constraints on sovereignty. In light of this tradeoff, this article argues for a ‘contagion’ effect that explains this phenomenon besides domestic determinants. In particular, states, which are more central to the broader network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states' actions and policies toward civil society. In turn, more central governments are likely to include civil society actors if other governments do so as well. This argument is tested with data on the participation of civil society organisations in national delegations to global climate negotiations between 1995 and 2005. To further uncover the underlying mechanisms, the article also provides an analysis of survey data collected at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Durban in 2011.

Analysing transatlantic relations from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the 2009 Copenhagen accord, the article identifies underlying explanations for the divergences between the EU and US during international climate negotiations. It traces how a climate divide opened between the EU and the US in the early 2000s, involving confrontation over the implementation of the KP. However, a phase of EU–US rapprochement closed the climate gap in the late 2000s, leading to common positions during the 2009 COP-15 negotiations. Yet the Copenhagen Accord served to reinforce American influence, while undermining the coherence and credibility of the European stance. This led to multiple rifts in the post-Copenhagen landscape concerning climate treaty architecture, policy implementation and international relationships, jeopardising the success of future negotiations.

Promoting renewable energy sources (RES) has been addressed a key strategy for mitigating climate change, the governing in which has turned out a challenging and protracted task for the EU. There is often an implicit assumption that concern for climate change drives energy policy, but a closer look at the development of European RES policy indicates how EU governors have had to confront a range of governance dilemmas in trying to balance various objectives and conflicting interests. Therefore, while energy security and environmental concerns have provided a rationale for crafting renewable energy as a specific EU policy domain, the main driver for RES policy coordination has been internal market concerns, and not the concern about an impending climate catastrophe. More recently, rising concerns about energy insecurity and climate change have forced the EU to seek greater policy coordination in the context of more integrated energy markets. Although seemingly propitious for further harmonisation, it is doubtful whether the Member States and their citizens are yet prepared to accept new efforts towards deeper integration of European energy policy.

This study explores the polarised nature of climate change politics in the USA. First, it describes the opposing stances on climate change taken by Republican and Democratic leaders. It then uses survey data to show that Republican and Democratic citizens hold widely differing views on climate change and that these differences are greatest among the most educated. Partisan polarisation poses a challenge to those seeking to build support for new policy efforts on climate change.

Over the past 20 years, the US Federal Government has been considered to be intransigent in its response to climate change by many commentators and not-for-profit environmental advocacy organizations (nonprofits). An enduring source of pressure on the US Government has been nonprofit campaigns operating at both a state and federal level. Six US environmental nonprofits representing a diversity of resources and prominence were selected for an in-depth examination of their climate-focused campaigns. Given the resistance at the federal level, these nonprofits have undertaken state-focused campaigns to achieve adequate climate policy development. This research examined some climate campaigns in California by the selected nonprofits that have supported, enhanced, and influenced the Californian Government’s efforts to address climate change. The campaigns have gained leverage from existing state competition for economic advancement and political leadership on issues of public concern. In addition, they appear to have benefited from a high level of environmental awareness in the community, a history of progressive environmental legislation, Governor Schwarzenegger’s use of climate change to differentiate his political leadership, and strong public trust of nonprofits. Recent climate-related political pledges and legislative changes at a federal level are convergent with the nonprofit-influenced, state-level developments.

The political consequences of climate change have been topics at numerous political science conferences. Contrary to the plurality of discussions at these meetings, it is striking that there is no systematic account of the carbon footprint of political science conferences themselves. Applying a GIS-based approach I estimate the travel induced greenhouse gas emissions of the last six ECPR General Conferences (2013–18). The results show that for the five conferences that took part in Europe the average emissions per attendee were between 0.5–1.3 tons CO2-equivalents. At the 2015 conference in Montreal it were even 1.9–3.4 tons. Compared to estimations based on the latest IPCC reports which call for a reduction of per capita emissions to 2.5 tons by 2030 and even 0.7 tons by 2050 in order to keep on track with the 1.5-degree goal, the travel induced GHG-emissions of ECPR conferences are very high. Yet, further estimations demonstrate that significant emission reductions are possible: by choosing more central conference venues, promoting low-emission landbound means of transportation and introducing online participation for researchers from far away, the carbon footprint could be reduced by 75–90 per cent. The article also gives concrete recommendations how the carbon footprint of conferences could be reduced.

This paper compares climate change campaigns conducted by environmental nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. The NGOs represent a diversity of political access, financial resources, and international connections. Three campaign activities common to both countries undertaken between 2004 and 2006 are analyzed for their effectiveness via interviews and document review. This examination is embedded within an analysis of the political, economic, policy, and social contexts of each country. It is shown that in the UK climate change has been used as a pivotal leadership issue, that the fossil fuel industry’s influence is not predominant, and that NGOs enjoy political legitimacy. Whereas, in Australia climate change has only recently emerged as a political priority, the fossil fuel industry has had significant political and financial influence, and NGO advocacy has been marginalized. It is argued that NGOs are embedded in the political and policy contexts of their country, and the greatest campaign traction and NGO influence can only be achieved when these contexts provide favorable conditions.

In addition to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, societies worldwide have to cope with the potential impacts of climate change. The central question of this paper is to what extent our historically grown institutions enable actors to cope with the new challenges of climate adaptation. We present six qualities of governance institutions that are crucial to allow for, and encourage adaptation, and apply them to the National Adaptation Strategies of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden. We conclude that although the governance institutions involved seem to have the basic qualities required, they face five institutional weaknesses, causing tensions on the long term: (1) lack of openness towards learning and variety; (2) strong one-sided reliance on scientific experts; (3) tension between top-down policy development and bottom-up implementation; (4) distrust in the problem-solving capacity of civil society; and (5) wickedness of reserving funding for long-term action.

In spite of growing evidence of non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) active participation in both bottom-up and top-down climate change policy negotiations and implementation, a research effort that focuses on the former barely exists. Grounded within the qualitative research approach, this paper contributes to the emerging climate policy literature by drawing on experiences from three purposefully selected non-state actors’ adaptation program in Ghana. The paper observes that through tripartite mechanisms—climate advocacy, direct climate service provision and local empowerment, NGOs significantly play a complementary role in building local adaptive capacities, especially among people who are already living at or close to the margins of survival. The paper again found that NGOs tacitly explore four interrelated “social tactics” (rulemaking, alliance brokerage, resource brokerage, and framing) to gain the cooperation of local actors for the implementation of adaptation interventions. In order to improve the performance and sustainability of adaptation interventions, the paper puts forward that NGOs should, among other things, harmonize their interventions to resonate with local interest and identity and also nurture capable project caretakers before community exit.

This study examines the impact of climate change, defined as long-term changes in temperature and precipitation patterns due to natural and human factors, on women's employment in Burkina Faso, highlighting labour market participation and gender disparities. Using a static computable general equilibrium model calibrated with a gender-specific social accounting matrix, it evaluates two climate scenarios: a 2.4°C temperature increase and a 7.5 per cent decrease in precipitation by 2050. The results indicate that these climate shocks significantly reduce women's employment opportunities. The supply of paid labour for women may decrease by 3.9 per cent, with skilled women experiencing greater job losses than their unskilled counterparts. In rural areas, the domestic workload could increase by up to 0.28 per cent, further limiting women's labour market participation. These changes reinforce gender inequalities and contribute to a decline in real GDP. To counter these effects, investments in climate-resilient agriculture, water and energy infrastructure, and women's entrepreneurship are essential. Gender-responsive policies are needed to promote inclusive economic growth and reduce employment disparities.

This article introduces the first of two international Themed Collections on gender and work, published as, Part A across Volumes 35(4) and 36(2), and as Part B in Volume 36(3) of The Economic and Labour Relations Review. In introducing the 11 Part A articles, we identify three main themes: contexts, impacts, and effects on gender status. Contexts include climate crisis, uncertain gender impacts of artificial intelligence (AI), and ongoing skill under-recognition in feminised ‘ancillary’ occupations. Impacts include increasing care load and violence in traditionally feminised teaching work, LGBTQ+ workers’ intertwined experiences of stigmatisation and job insecurity, and immigrant experience of unregulated care work in private households. Impacts on well-being, safety, and security include restricted access to nutrition, rest, creativity, life cycle, and community participation, and diminished status, agency, voice, and recognition of productivity contribution. An alternative productivity calculus is provided in articles documenting the benefits of Australia’s universal statutory 10 days’ family and domestic violence leave entitlement, a proposed Indian green jobs guarantee programme that could transition millions of women into the formal labour market, and an Australian calculation of the unrecognised GDP contribution of breastmilk. A Sub-Saharan African article shows that legally mandated maternity protections are inaccessible to women in informal labour markets. In the context of the United Nations’ key normative and programme role, and its stocktakes of equality and empowerment milestones, we foreshadow questions of official structure and grassroots agency to be addressed in the Part B exploration in (Volume 36(3)) of informal economy work, community agency, and intersectional voice.

The 2025 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change constitutes a diligent and reasoned exposition of the main bodies of international law on climate change. The Court read this law harmoniously and clearly identified States’ obligations as well as the legal consequences of breach. Under both treaty and customary international law, States must act with due diligence and do their utmost to mitigate climate change, including through action on fossil fuel production and consumption. The Court confirmed that the law of State responsibility applies if States fail to fulfil their obligations, and sketches a pathway for establishing causation of harm that would become relevant if reparation were sought.

This article examines the key dimensions of the Advisory Opinion, including the applicable law identified by the Court and its analysis of State responsibility, informing readers of the Court’s main findings and their consequences. It also puts forward a few reflections, including on the Advisory Opinion’s emphasis on international cooperation and finance flows, the Court’s views on sea-level rise and self-determination, the role of science in the Advisory Opinion and what the Court left for the future.

Language models (LMs) have attracted the attention of researchers from the natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning (ML) communities working in specialized domains, including climate change. NLP and ML practitioners have been making efforts to reap the benefits of LMs of various sizes, including large language models, in order to both simplify and accelerate the processing of large collections of text data, and in doing so, help climate change stakeholders to gain a better understanding of past and current climate-related developments, thereby staying on top of both ongoing changes and increasing amounts of data. This paper presents a brief history of language models and ties LMs’ beginnings to them becoming an emerging technology for analysing and interacting with texts in the specialized domain of climate change. The paper reviews existing domain-specific LMs and systems based on general-purpose large language models for analysing climate change data, with special attention being paid to the LMs’ and LM-based systems’ functionalities, intended use and audience, architecture, the data used in their development, the applied evaluation methods, and their accessibility. The paper concludes with a brief overview of potential avenues for future research vis-à-vis the advantages and disadvantages of deploying LMs and LM-based solutions in a high-stakes scenario such as climate change research. For the convenience of readers, explanations of specialized terms used in NLP and ML are provided.