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In this chapter, we focus on the meso- and micro-levels of social organisation, below the macro-levels discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. We first discuss social network theory, including crucial concepts such as ties, density and multiplexity, and explain the relationship with innovation diffusion and norm enforcement. We then explore to what extent social network theory can be applied to historical situations, distinguishing between functional and emotional ties. Examples and case studies of historical network studies are taken from English and Afrikaans. The chapter also discusses related models such as coalitions and communities, in particular, communities of practice, text communities and discourse communities. The final part of the chapter addresses individual variation and style shifting on the basis of examples from English and German data.
A large literature examines the composition of cabinets in parliamentary systems, but very little attention has been paid to the size of those cabinets. Yet not only is the size of the cabinet related to the division of portfolios that may take place, cabinet size is also related to policy outcomes. In this article, a theory of party size is considered which examines how coalition bargaining considerations, intra‐party politics and efficiency concerns affect the size of cabinets. Hypotheses derived from the theory are examined using an extensive cross‐national dataset on coalition governments which allows us to track changes in cabinet size and membership both across and within cabinets.
This article makes two arguments. First, it seeks to warn foreign policy analysis scholars against directly applying models and theories developed in the context of West European countries to other regions such as the Global South. More specifically, we highlight some of the particularities present in cases from the Global South that might limit any direct attempt to apply hypothesised mechanisms derived from the existing coalition foreign-policy literature. Second, we argue that the scholarship on coalition foreign policy needs to more systematically integrate the lessons and insights from coalition experiences from the Global South. We look at the recent Indian experience with coalitions to illustrate some of our arguments about the benefits and limitations of the existing scholarship as well as to explore the need to develop new frameworks.
Can voters in multi‐party systems predict which coalition will form the government with any degree of accuracy? To date, studies which explore voter expectations of coalition formation have emphasized individual level attributes, such as education, but the complexity of the environment at the time the coalitions are forming should also be consequential in enabling (or handicapping) voters in forming expectations. We examine the relative effects of individual level attributes (e.g., education, cognitive mobilization) versus contextual factors (e.g., information availability) in 19 German state elections and 3 German general elections between 2009 and 2017. We find that the ease of identifiability of alternative future governments varies significantly across multi‐party systems. We find that respondents are more likely to predict governments that they would like to see in office, that have a higher probability of receiving a majority of seats, and that consist of ideologically proximate parties. Combining survey data with a novel indicator of coalition signals, measured through a quantitative text analysis of newspaper coverage, we also find that voters consider positive pre‐election coalition signals when predicting the government. Finally, we find that the information environment is much more relevant for correct coalition predictions than individual‐level characteristics of respondents. Although individual attributes do influence predictive ability, these factors are strongly dominated by the context in which the prediction is taking place. The information environment has by far the largest effect on predicting coalition outcomes. Our results have implications for the literature on strategic voting in multi‐party settings, as well as the literature on accountability.
Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision. Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses on voters' attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a realistic environment. The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high political sophistication. The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus, the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading.
Multi-party coalitions are an increasingly common type of government across different political regimes and world regions. Since they are the locus of national foreign-policy-making, the dynamics of coalition government have significant implications for International Relations. Despite this growing significance, the foreign-policy-making of coalition governments is only partly understood. This symposium advances the study of coalition foreign policy in three closely related ways. First, it brings together in one place the state of the art in research on coalition foreign policy. Second, the symposium pushes the boundaries of our knowledge on four dimensions that are key to a comprehensive research agenda on coalition foreign policy: the foreign-policy outputs of multi-party coalitions; the process of foreign-policy-making in different types of coalitions; coalition foreign policy in the ‘Global South’; and coalition dynamics in non-democratic settings. Finally, the symposium puts forward promising avenues for further research by emphasising, for instance, the value of theory-guided comparative research that employs multi-method strategies and transcends the space of Western European parliamentary democracies.
This study investigated the question of how civil society groups cross political, cultural, social, economic, and language boundaries to find common ground and to act collectively in coalitions to effect international change. A set of constituents emerged in answer to the research question; Complementarity, Speed and Democracy, Rules of Engagement, Contingent Alliance, and Convergence. Convergence emerged as a central and unifying construct. Convergence is the uniting of people who are different, or even opposed, around a common cause. It is based on the presumption that diversity is critical to coalition success and that it needs be employed to leverage its many potential benefits. The analyses led to the conceptualization of the Convergence System, a model that employs global civil society (GCS) diversity to discern complementarity within GCS coalitions, to discover Points of Convergence, and to facilitate collective action toward shared objectives, thus enabling efficacious action by GCS within the international polity.
Social Network Analysis (SNA) conceptualizes a policy-making process as a network of actors. It can assess if an interest group (IGs) occupies a leading central position within this policy network, if it belongs to various ad hoc coalitions or if it plays a brokering role between different stakeholders. Such network variables are crucial to capture how IGs mobilize and gain access to policymakers, and to explain their goal achievements and potential policy influence as well. This article reviews recent studies applying the methodological tools of SNA. It then proposes an innovative research design to investigate how IGs seek to influence the course of a policy-making process across many institutional venues.
Policymaking in the EU requires member states to delegate negotiations to individual ministers. For coalition governments, this creates information asymmetries because parties holding the relevant ministerial portfolio gain privileged access while their coalition partners are sidelined. This paper argues that bicameralism in the EU mitigates this problem: sidelined parties can shadow their coalition partners through the committees of the European Parliament. Committees allow parties to monitor legislative processes and negotiations in the Council, which is particularly attractive for sidelined parties. Analyzing original data on committee and rapporteur assignments between 2004 and 2024, I find that MEPs systematically shadow their coalition partners in policy areas where their national party lacks direct representation in the Council and is misaligned with its coalition partners.
During 1969, growing GI dissent intersected with movement outreach and the opening of new coffeehouses to expand civilian/military collaboration. More government leaders publicly supported antiwar activism. The Woodstock festival was the most visible sign of increased overlap between political and cultural dissent. Various elements of the movement coalesced into the most spectacular outpouring of antiwar passion in the nation’s history during the October Moratorium. Repression of the antiwar movement escalated under the Nixon administration. Activists faced local red squads and vigilante attacks on GI coffeehouses, as well as administration threats against the media, conspiracy trials, and intelligence agencies using COINTELPRO and Operation CHAOS. The president’s fear of stimulating additional antiwar sentiment contributed to his decision to keep secret his expansion of the air war into Cambodia. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with various dissenting groups to buy additional time. Once Nixon developed his Vietnamization policy, it forced the movement to adapt to new circumstances, but local grassroots activism and conventional dissent persisted.
Richard Nixon stimulated the greatest antiwar activity in 1970 with the Cambodian invasion. Massive student protests in the spring grew spontaneously and by fall many campus activists channeled their energy into electoral campaigns. Liberal groups joined them. Government leaders, especially in the US Senate, tried unsuccessfully to restrict the war’s continuation. Leftists and radicals made a splash through the spring New Mobilization demonstrations and with the reemergence of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, but by year’s end the coalition split along ideological lines. By late 1970, mass demonstrations planned by umbrella coalitions were giving way to events conducted by single sponsors. This also reduced the movement’s radical presence. From this point antiwar activism appeared more locally and regionally, even as it retained national impact. Local actions, such as during the national student strike, often appeared and operated without waiting for national coordinating bodies to catch up. Most antiwar events occurred on college campuses and in local communities, not in Washington, DC, and they continued even when the lack of national demonstrations made it appear inactive.
“Alignment” is an umbrella term to describe a relationship between two or more states that involves mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future. The types of alignment explored in this chapter are alliances, thin and thick security institutions, coalitions, and strategic partnerships. The distinguishing features of these alignments are their differing levels of formality and the reason for their creation, or their objectives. Strategic alignments remain one of the dominant means that sovereign states possess to cooperate and coordinate their actions around common threats and political interests. States are either pulled into distrustful relations through security dilemmas or they are obliged to work together to solve common problems. Alliances, security institutions, coalitions, and strategic partnerships offer a variety of ways that states may seek to address security issues, threats, or challenges to their territories or interests.
Social networks are a valuable object of investigation in historical sociolinguistics, as they can contribute both to the onset of change and to the maintenance of linguistic norms. However, their characteristics make them complex to analyse, as their intrinsic variability may hinder the identification of phenomena that span different networks across time and space. This chapter is focused on Late Modern English materials, to present new resources through which network contiguities can be studied; this is the case, for instance, with the exchanges of emigrants, political activists, scholars and business correspondents. After addressing a few methodological issues, the chapter presents an overview of the materials at hand and outlines how networks and coalitions have had an impact, not only on the usage of participants (as shown in recent studies) but also on how language has been perceived, described and codified.
Expectations about election outcomes shape voter behavior, yet little research has examined how expectations regarding the post-election formateur influence voting decisions. This study examines the conditions under which voters engage in formateur optimization – strategically supporting parties with a realistic chance of forming the government rather than their most preferred party. We argue that while formateur uncertainty plays a key role, its effect depends on voters’ preferences regarding their most preferred party and their preferred formateur. Using modules 1–5 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and German pre-election surveys (1998–2021), we find that formateur optimization is more likely in tightly contested elections. However, our results also show that voters’ preferences moderate the effect of formateur uncertainty: formateur optimization remains low even under high uncertainty when voters strongly favor a non-formateur party over the formateur’s party. Furthermore, we find that voters who expect their preferred formateur candidate to lose behave similarly to those uncertain about the outcome – and still engage in formateur optimization. These findings highlight the interplay between expectations and preferences in shaping voting decisions in coalition systems, offering new insights into voter calculations in multiparty democracies.
This article investigates female voting behavior in the 2016 US presidential election through the lens of tall poppy syndrome, a theory suggesting that those in less prominent or celebrated roles sometimes seek to undermine individuals who pursue or attain extraordinary public success. Using data from the ANES, VOTER, and CCES surveys and controlling for alternative explanations, I find that women outside the workforce were more likely to vote against Hillary Clinton, indicating that their voting behavior may have been driven by tall poppy syndrome rather than solely by social conservatism. These findings highlight an underexplored factor in voting behavior, suggest widening avenues of partisan polarization, and point to the unique challenges that are faced by women who seek elected office.
Economists have modelled the economic rationale for intra-industry trade, yet political scientists largely have neglected it until recently. Every Firm for Itself explores how dramatic shifts in the way countries trade have radically changed trade politics in the US and EU. It explores how electorally minded policymakers respond to heavy lobbying by powerful corporations and provide trade policies that further advantage these large firms. It explains puzzling empirical phenomena such as the rise of individual firm lobbying, the decline of broad trade coalitions, the decline of labor union activity in trade politics, and the rising public backlash to globalization due to trade politics becoming increasingly dominated by large firms. With an approach that connects economics and politics, this book shows how contemporary trading patterns among rich countries undermine longstanding coalitions and industry associations that once successfully represented large and small firms alike.
Chapter 6 investigates a setting with a narrow policy scope and low expectations. Unlike their Brazilian counterparts, Chilean mayors are not expected to implement important policies; the national government controls most public goods provision. Consistent with the book’s theory regarding settings with low expectations, mayors in Chile enjoy an incumbency advantage. The chapter also establishes that the ayors’ ability to obtain a return from holding office hinges on fiscal transfers and public goods spending. Chile also offers a natural experiment for examining theoretical expectations about the sources of personal versus partisan incumbency bias. During the most recent electoral cycle, some mayors were subject to term limits, while others were allowed to seek reelection. The chapter analyzes the impact of this institutional change using a differences-in-differences design. The results suggest that Chilean mayors’ incumbency advantage is strictly personal, as the theory predicts for settings with personalistic parties.
◦ This case study illustrates how a particular auction design, used for public procurement, can unintentionally provide fertile ground for bidding rings.
◦ Essentially, the average bid auction format awards the contract to the bidder whose bid is nearest to the average bid. The average bid auction format has been advocated in order to prevent contracts being awarded to bidders with unrealistically low bids that might result in low quality or ex post renegotiation.
◦ This case study shows how it facilitates collusion. The setting is the tendering of public work projects in Turin, Italy over 2000–2003 where subgroups of construction firms formed cartels and coordinated their bids to enhance their chance of winning the contract at an inflated price.
◦ To understand the ease with which bidders can collude when participating in an average bid auction, suppose the current expectation (in the absence of coordination) is that firms bid aggressively. In order to have a chance to win, a firm would have to submit a relatively low bid in order for it to be close to the average bid. Now consider firms forming a cartel. All they need to do is agree to submit high prices. That will reap higher profits and without the temptation to deviate as is present with the usual auction design where the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. A firm that thinks about submitting a lower bid will move its bid farther away from the average bid and thus reduce its chances of winning. Once firms agree to submit high bids, such an agreement is self-enforcing. The average bid auction format thus makes collusion more likely because cartel stability is so easy to maintain.
◦ The case study also explores an incentive for a subset of firms to form its own coalition in order to increase their chances of winning. If it comprises enough firms, they can move the average bid up or down in a manner to cause their bids to be closer to the average bid than the bids of firms outside of their coalition. As a result, a collection of bidders can respond to a coalition by forming its own coalition. The proliferation of these coalitions is well documented for the Turin case.
◦ This understanding of cartel conduct is used to develop a marker for collusion based on the frequency of joint participation.
This chapter traces how, in an increasingly unstable domestic and regional context, the ruling coalition of religion and secular nationalists promoted a “Turkish-Islamist Synthesis 2.0” (TIS 2.0). This agenda infused the anti-pluralist, Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the 1980s with an attempt to Islamicize public life. Such efforts culminated in a major critical juncture: abandonment of Turkey’s 150-year-old parliamentary tradition for an executive presidency.
The consolidation of the TIS 2.0 enlivened resistance among diverse groups who came together in the seventh major pluralizing coalition since the late Ottoman period. Coalescing around multiple – but not always compatible – visions of living in diversity, the coalition brought together pro-secular Turks on the right and left including municipal actors, youth, women and LGBTQ+ activists, ethnic and religious minorities, and environmentalists, among others. Innovating frames for political, religious, ethnic, and gender pluralism, the coalition registered a major success, retaking city governments in the 2019 elections, an outcome it repeated in 2024.
This chapter grapples with a major tension in interdisciplinary Turkish/Middle Eastern area studies, comparative politics, and the study of religion and politics: namely, how to deal with the persistence of Orientalist explanations despite their explanatory poverty. It does so via an intellectual history, identifying three “waves” or logics via which analysts and practitioners have sought to reckon with Orientalist binaries and their limitations. The chapter argues that today, a third wave within which this project is situated, seeks to dispense with Orientalism and Occidentalism alike toward making clear-eyed sense of the complex, interacting forces that shape politics in Muslim-majority countries, like anywhere else.