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Focusing on the period between the late fourteenth century and the outbreak of the Catalonian Civil War in 1462, Chapter 2 examines municipal government. Two new regimes arose during this period. The first, the Nou regiment, blended direct election with a method preferred by tradespeople, namely, the random selection of officeholders. Moreover, it gave tradespeople a numerical majority within the town’s executive magistracy, or consulate, as well as within the town council. The Nou regiment rolled back older measures enacted by burgher- and merchant-dominated governments; modestly but noticeably, it advanced tradespeople’s interests. Burghers and merchants opposed and worked to undermine the Nou regiment. In 1449, they toppled it and instituted a regime called the Nova forma. The Nova forma restored oligarchical power through a novelty of its own: the Nova forma redefined the town’s occupational groupings and thereby substituted burgher and merchant majorities for those of tradespeople within the consulate and town council.
The Introduction introduces the central research questions of the study and summarizes the main arguments. It also lays out the research design and discusses the key concepts and how it measures them. Finally, it provides summaries of all of the chapters in the book.
Chapter 2 uses an original database on historical elections in South America to explore when and where democracy first emerged in the region. Scholars traditionally portrayed nineteenth-century elections in Latin America as farces, but in recent years historians have challenged this view. This chapter shows that many South American elections in the nineteenth century involved significant participation and competition, and a few were even free and fair. Nevertheless, authoritarian rule predominated. Most elections were non-competitive, numerous restrictions on the franchise existed, and voter turnout tended to be low in comparison to Europe and the United States. Moreover, the few democratic episodes in the nineteenth century proved to be quite brief, as the freely elected presidents were either overthrown or subverted democracy to perpetuate themselves or their allies in power. However, in the first three decades of the twentieth century, a great divide occurred. A few South American countries, namely Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay, established democratic regimes that lasted a dozen years or more. By contrast, authoritarian rule deepened in the other six countries of the region
Chapter 5 shows how the development of strong parties and professional militaries contributed to the emergence of enduring democracies in Chile and Uruguay. Both countries developed strong parties during the late nineteenth century thanks in part to the geographic concentration of the population and the existence of relatively balanced cleavages. During the nineteenth century, these parties at times sought power via armed revolts, but once the military professionalized, the opposition began to focus exclusively on the electoral route to power. This occurred in the late nineteenth century in Chile, but not until the early twentieth century in Uruguay. In both countries, opposition parties pushed for democratic reforms to enfranchise their supporters and level the electoral playing field. It was not until the ruling party split, however, that the opposition managed to enact major reforms, which occurred in Chile in 1890 and Uruguay in 1917. In both countries, strong opposition parties played a central role not only in the enactment of the reforms but also in their enforcement.
Chapter 1 lays out the central theoretical arguments of the book. It argues that three factors played a key role in the emergence of democracy in region: the professionalization of the military, the rise of strong opposition parties, and splits within the ruling party. It analyzes what led to the professionalization of the military and the rise of strong opposition parties and it shows how they led to varying regime outcomes in different South American countries. This chapter also discusses why existing theories of democratization cannot fully explain the emergence of democracy in the region
Chapter 8 examines the failed struggle for democracy in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In contrast to the other South American countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay made relatively little progress in professionalizing their armies in the early twentieth century and were not able to establish a monopoly on violence. As a result, the opposition, especially in Paraguay and Ecuador, continued to seek power via armed revolt, which undermined constitutional rule and encouraged state repression. The weakness of parties in Bolivia and Ecuador also enabled presidents to manipulate elections, resist democratic reforms, and run roughshod over the opposition.
Chapter 7 explores the reasons why Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela experienced relatively stable authoritarianism during the early twentieth century. All three countries professionalized their militaries during this period, which helped bring an end to the frequent revolts that had undermined their prospects for democracy in the nineteenth century. None of the three countries developed strong parties, however. The absence of strong parties impeded democratization in several ways. First, party weakness allowed presidents to concentrate authority and extend their hold on power in some cases. Second, and even more importantly, the weakness of opposition parties meant that the opposition had little chance of winning elections or enacting democratic reforms, particularly in the face of widespread government electoral manipulation. As a result, the opposition frequently abstained from elections, which only deepened authoritarian rule in these countries. In some instances, the opposition also encouraged the military to intervene to overthrow the president, which undermined otherwise mostly stable authoritarian regimes.
The Conclusion summarizes the main arguments in the book and discusses to what extent the factors that shaped regime outcomes in the early twentieth century mattered post-1929. It also examines the broader theoretical implications of the book, analyzes the extent to which the arguments work in Mexico and Central America, and lays out an agenda for future research on historical democratization.
Past research alerts to the increasingly unpleasant climate surrounding public debate on social media. Female politicians, in particular, are reporting serious attacks targeted at them. Yet, research offers inconclusive insights regarding the gender gap in online incivility. This paper aims to address this gap by comparing politicians with varying levels of prominence and public status in different institutional contexts. Using a machine learning approach for analyzing over 23 million tweets addressed to politicians in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we find little consistent evidence of a gender gap in the proportion of incivility. However, more prominent politicians are considerably and consistently more likely than others to receive uncivil attacks. While prominence influences US male and female politicians’ probability to receive uncivil tweets the same way, women in our European sample receive incivility regardless of their status. Most importantly, the incivility varies in quality and across contexts, with women, especially in more plurality contexts, receiving more identity-based attacks than other politicians.
This article proposes the creation of constituency juries to enhance accountability and check oligarchy in representative governments. Constituency juries would be made up of randomly selected citizens from an electoral constituency who exercise oversight over that constituency’s elected representative. Elected representatives would be required to give a regular account of their actions to the constituency jury, and the jury would have the power to sanction the representative. In addition to this general model of constituency juries, I offer a more specific institutional design that shows how the general model can be operationalized and realistically incorporated into existing representative governments. In contrast to lottocratic proposals that replace elections with sortition, constituency juries are a promising way to combine the two to address the oligarchic tendencies of elections in representative government.
This article examines the German Communist Party’s (KPD’s) propaganda campaign during the Reichstag election in the summer of 1932. It asks why a movement which openly rejected parliamentary democracy fervently contested elections and it analyzes the KPD’s strategy, campaign organization, and publicity. The article argues that the party’s culture created a distinctive electoral appeal. As a Stalinized, heavily bureaucratized party, the KPD ran a centralized campaign with tightly controlled ideological messaging. Yet its leadership was also able to compete with better-funded rivals by tapping the party’s ethos of revolutionary activism and showing hitherto unrecognized pragmatism in encouraging independence and initiative. Supercharged by an extra-parliamentary campaign that summer, the KPD waged an edgy, violent “battle of symbols” in the streets which united the party’s revolutionary aims with its supporters’ neighborhood activism. Revolutionary mass propaganda projected a uniquely Communist visual and audio appeal, embodying protest, poverty, and radicalism.
Are shifting party-union relationships impacting the vote intentions of union members in Canada? By analyzing voting intentions within the Canadian labour movement, the findings illuminate the complexity of union members’ electoral behaviour and the strategic opportunities for parties vying for their votes. The authors find that while union members continue to be more likely than the average voter to support the NDP, this support is nuanced by factors such as union type, gender, education, age, and income. Notably, the study finds that the Conservatives have made significant inroads among construction union members and those with college education, challenging traditional assumptions about Canadian labour politics.
Political professionals and scholars maintain that raising money early in the election season is critical to a successful campaign, having downstream consequences on a candidate’s future fundraising potential, the stiffness of competition she will face, and her likelihood of electoral victory. In spite of early money’s perceived importance, there is no common operationalization for money as “early.” Moreover, existing measures often fail to reflect definitional aspects of early money. In this paper, we first lay out a theoretical framework regarding the utility of early campaign fundraising for candidates. We argue that early fundraising can be expressed as two conceptually distinct quantities of interest centered on either a candidate’s own fundraising performance (candidate-centered) or her fundraising performance relative to her electoral competitors (election-centered). We next lay out steps for operationalizing candidate- and election-centered measures of early fundraising. Lastly, we demonstrate that both our proposed measures for early campaign fundraising are predictive of a candidate’s future fundraising and electoral success. By putting forward a set of best practices for early money measurement and, additionally, producing off-the-shelf measures for early fundraising in U.S. House elections, we fill an important gap in scholarly research on the measurement of money in politics.
How do electoral outcomes affect campaign contributions? We argue that in contexts where personal connections to the candidate and investment motivations dominate ideology and partisanship as drivers of donations, two main factors shape donors’ future behaviour: 1) government benefits accrued by donors (for example, contracts) and 2) whether the supported candidate runs again in future elections. Using data from Colombian mayoral elections, a context with no re-election, weak parties, and non-ideological races, we find that donating to the winning candidate reduces the probability of donating in the next election. We further show that, among donors to the winner, those who receive a contract from the municipality are more likely to continue donating than those without contracts. The findings highlight the importance of personal loyalty to the candidate and the fulfilment of donors’ investment expectations determining campaign contributions in non-established democracies.
Which electorates suit which women candidates for higher office? This question becomes increasingly important as greater numbers of women run for office in American elections. Consistent with previous research, we posit that women candidates will win a greater percentage of the vote share in so-called women-friendly electorates. However, we suggest that these contextual effects will vary based on the interaction between candidate partisanship and race. To test these expectations, we use a unique dataset created by the authors to examine 264 women – 209 white, 55 non-white –who ran for executive office in the American states during the 10-year period between 2010 and 2019. We find support for our expectations. There are strong contextual effects that diverge along party and racial lines. Non-white Democratic women candidates’ vote share increases by up to 25 percentage points as the electorate becomes more women friendly; white Democratic women’s vote share increases by 10 percentage points. In contrast, white Republican women candidates’ vote share is highest in less women-friendly electorates. These analyses pose important questions about recruitment, representation, and intersectional identities in American politics. As the pool of candidates for both parties diversifies, these findings may explain patterns of emergence and success.
The existing literature shows that frequent elections depress electoral participation and contribute to the global decline in voter turnout. However, the causal mechanisms remain unclear. This paper investigates the sources of voter fatigue and hypothesizes that frequent elections make electoral abstention more acceptable to citizens. It tests the main hypothesis via an original pre-registered survey experiment fielded in five countries with a total sample size of 12,221 respondents. The results provide pioneering evidence on the psychological effects of election frequency. They confirm that high election frequency increases the social acceptability of electoral abstention and that this effect is proportional to the number of past elections. It can be equally observed among all major social groups, including politically engaged citizens and those who believe that voting is a civic duty. These findings hold major implications for our understanding of voter turnout and democratic institutional engineering.
South America contains some of the oldest democracies in the world, yet we still know relatively little about how and why democracy arose in the region. Raúl L. Madrid argues that three main developments – the professionalization of the military, the growth of parties, and splits within the ruling party – led to democratization in the early twentieth century. Military professionalization increased the incentives for the opposition to abandon the armed struggle and focus on the electoral path to power. The growth of parties boosted the capacity of the opposition to enact and enforce democratic reforms that would level the electoral playing field. And ruling party splits created the opportunity for the opposition and ruling party dissidents to ally and push through reforms. This persuasive and original book offers important implications for the study of democracy. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Eight months after adoption, less than 60 per cent of the country-specific recommendations are partially or fully implemented, and the performance has worsened after the introduction of the European Semester (ES). This chapter employs political economy theories of reform to explain differences in implementation, analyzing the full set of recommendations released between 2002 and 2019. A combination of economic and electoral pressures as well as the costs of noncompliance are associated with these patterns. Proximity to electoral contests lowers the rates of implementation, even though this effect weakens under the ES. In 2002–2010, inflationary pressures acted as drivers of compliance in euro area countries and as obstacles to compliance in non-euro area countries. After the introduction of the ES, the sovereign debt crisis triggered fuller implementation. Moreover, governments adopted especially those actions that were associated with a more established supranational system for sanctioning noncompliance. Raw country power has had different implications. Countries with higher voting power were initially less compliant. Later on, economically larger countries complied more.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the federal enforcement of the 15th Amendment is necessary for Black representation in the U.S. South. Using novel data on Black officeholders in the South from 1866 to 1912 and from 1969 to 1993, we examine Black representation during Reconstruction and after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In both political periods, we find that policies aimed to enforce the 15th Amendment and active Black political participation are necessary preconditions for Black officeholding. This paper helps contextualize scholarship on descriptive representation by identifying this critical link between democracy and representation in the American South. By analyzing broad periods of history, we demonstrate the enduring necessity of active policymaking to ensure fair elections as a precondition of democracy in the American South. Our findings carry significant consequences for understanding the health of American democracy in the twenty-first century.
Voters of governing parties are more satisfied with democracy than opposition voters, but the consequences of this winner-loser gap remain underexplored. We argue that electoral losers should be more supportive of referendums than electoral winners as representative democracy has failed electoral losers, whereas electoral winners aim to protect their party’s ability to govern without constraint. In addition, we theorize that affective polarization should strengthen this gap. Using cross-national survey data from thirteen European democracies, we find that electoral losers consistently show greater support for referendums than winners, and affective polarization amplifies this effect. Yet, the effect of affective polarization is solely attributed to a decrease in support for referendums among polarized election winners. These findings raise questions about the role of affective polarization in undermining the accountability mechanism between electoral winners and their parties. Concerns about electoral losers might be overstated and potentially overlook the democratic implications of electoral victory.