This chapter introduces the key research questions of the book and outlines a theoretical framework for studying political crimes as a comparative concept. It highlights the significance of understanding political crimes as a transborder phenomenon and argues that the Qing state confronted serious challenges from the mid nineteenth century onward in handing fugitive renditions, as they became regulated by treaties whose implementation was often subject to the discretion of foreign diplomats, colonial officials, and municipal councils.

This chapter explores the relationship between the sharp rise in banditry, rebellion, and mixed crimes along the Qing Empire’s southern borders in the mid 1880s, and the responses of local administrators in Hong Kong and Canton to the challenges of extraditing fugitives. It traces the concurrent emergence of two contrasting discourses on justice: one framing justice as a system of legal protections against Qing law (prevalent across the Canton–Hong Kong border and increasingly within foreign concessions in treaty ports), and another asserting that foreign interference undermined the traditional justice system (notably along the Yangzi River and in missionary enclaves). This chapter argues that both discourses were strategically adopted by anti-Qing rebellions in the 1890s.

This chapter examines the Chinese government’s approach to political crimes and extradition procedures from the treaty ports during the first two decades of the Republic in the 1910s–1920s. It seeks to understand how the ideas of extradition and the POE changed in this period as a result of both domestic and global political processes: the growth of nationalism and communism, the strengthening and consolidation of the political parties, the increased professionalization of Chinese lawyers and judges, and the emergence of critical voices among foreign powers on the institution of extraterritoriality. The chapter presents a legal and transnational view of the Chinese Revolution in the first two decades of the Republic, illuminating the profound impact of extraterritoriality and changing extradition rules on China’s political trajectory.

Chapter 8 on Extraterritoriality discusses how the cross-border nature of climate impacts is addressed within climate litigation. The author scrutinises the interpretation of ‘jurisdiction’ and related procedural and substantive issues in the context of these transboundary impacts. His analysis showcases how these legal principles and procedural rules either facilitate or constrain courts and quasi-judicial bodies in grappling meaningfully with these impacts. In his exploration of key decisions, the author unravels their implications for the global governance of climate change and the challenges and opportunities they present for transboundary climate lawsuits. He distils emerging best practices that reveal how courts and quasi-judicial bodies, through judicious interpretation of legal principles, are grappling with the global dimensions of climate change. Despite the complexities inherent in integrating extraterritorial considerations into climate litigation, the chapter posits an optimistic outlook and highlights how visionary legal reasoning can tackle these complexities in a manner that is conducive to ensuring access to justice for those most affected by climate impacts.

The contribution contends that current rules of diplomatic law have consolidated during the era of the League of Nations. This holds true, for instance, in relation to the main facets of the protection of diplomatic premises; that is to say, inviolability stricto sensu, the exemption from execution and the obligation to protect the premises against any intrusion. In fact, Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is largely based on the rules crystallised before the extinction of the League of Nations. As for the immunities of diplomatic agents, it is precisely in this period that the distinction between acts performed by the agent in the exercise of his functions and those carried out in his personal capacity crystallised in customary international law, even though immunity in the field of private law has been applied by domestic courts in a heterogeneous manner, especially when exceptions were at issue.

This chapter deals with questions of sovereignty, territory and jurisdiction during the League of Nations era. It discusses how the concept of sovereignty developed until the League era and how it was understood then. Questions of territory and jurisdiction are closely linked with sovereignty, but, given the immense scope of this topic, it will only be considered as far as it affects the central substance of the chapter. This general exposition of the concept of sovereignty will be followed by an explication how the interwar period saw the emergence of, first, its general principle of horizontal protection of the territorial and jurisdictional aspect of states by international law; second, structured exceptions to this principle qua its vertical limitation of sovereignty through the League system; and third, curious cases where the territorial and jurisdictional powers of states had to be reconciled with other innovative legal principles such as human rights and self-determination. These explications will be illustrated and substantiated by a selection of the relevant cases decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice and other judicial bodies.

To function as nations, tribes require territorial jurisdiction. That is, tribes must be able to determine the rules governing their lands and apply the rules to all persons on their land. Much of Indian country’s land is held in trust, and trust status is blamed for many of tribes’ economic woes. Trust land should be replaced with tribal property rights regimes. That is, tribes themselves should be free to determine whether they would like to allow private property ownership. In addition to granting tribes greater authority over their land, tribes need jurisdiction over all persons on their land to function as nations. Land status – fee or trust – should be irrelevant to the equation as should Indian status. For example, outside of Indian country, police do not inquire into the citizenship of the parties prior to making an arrest. Though various rationales are offered to justify denying tribes jurisdiction over non-Indians, the reasons do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, tribes’ lack of jurisdiction over non-Indians is indistinguishable from the long-refuted imperial doctrine of extraterritoriality.

While China’s approach of re-territorializing the cyberspace is well known, this chapter argues that there is an emerging tendency of China expanding its regulatory power beyond territorial borders, which indicates a more spatially expansive notion of China’s digital sovereignty. This chapter examines this shift from territoriality to extraterritoriality in the conception and practice of China’s digital sovereignty by focusing on three recent regulatory initiatives, that is, the Personal Information Protection Law, the Data Security Law, and the order by the Ministry of Commerce on blocking unjustified extraterritorial application of foreign legislation and measures. From these initiatives, the chapter identifies two main approaches of broadening the spatial dimension of China’s digital sovereignty and argues that they reflect how the notion of digital sovereignty is developed to incorporate China’s changing geostrategic interests. This adaptation of China’s digital sovereignty can be compared to practices of the EU and the US to observe both contrasting trends and important regulatory emulations. The trend toward extraterritoriality, while conditioned by multiple internal and external factors, is likely to face important conceptual and practical challenges.

In fall 1945, Lieutenant Colonel William K. Evans, the US Army’s chief civil affairs officer in Taiwan, smuggled sixty kilograms of gold bullion that he confiscated from the Japanese Tenth Area Army and offloaded it on Shanghai’s black market, returning to the United States with $108,000 in cash (worth approximately $1.5 million today). The gold was supposed to go the Chinese Nationalist government. Although US military authorities found overwhelming evidence of Evans’ guilt and had recently sentenced another colonel to ten years in prison for a nearly identical crime committed in Tokyo, Evans walked away a free man after a protracted Sino-US diplomatic struggle and two mistrials in federal court. By examining the Evans case, this chapter sheds light on the transition from extraterritoriality and formal colonialism to America’s postcolonial model of using status of forces agreements (SOFAs) to exercise jurisdiction over US forces stationed abroad.

This chapter starts from the premise that secondary sanctions are invariably adopted to exert pressure upon foreign economic or financial actors operating in third states, with the intention to modify their conduct in alignment with the primary sanctions already imposed by the sanctioning state against the target state. As follows, due to their extraterritorial scope and their exceptional capacity to encroach upon the sovereignty of other countries, the legal status of secondary sanctions under international law is controversial. This contribution seeks to elucidate if secondary sanctions may amount to economic coercion and whether as a result these measures could constitute a breach to the principle of non-intervention. The chapter closes by exploring the potential avenues for regime interaction between the rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction by states and the principle of non-intervention in the context of secondary sanctions.

In 2019, the United States indicted Turkiye Halk Bankasi (Halkbank), a Turkish state-owned bank, alleging a multiyear scheme to evade US sanctions against Iran by using fraudulent transactions to transfer the proceeds of oil and gas sales to Iran. This chapter evaluates the charges against Halkbank under both US domestic law and customary international law. After briefly reviewing the charges against Halkbank and the US district court’s analysis of the extraterritoriality questions, the chapter considers the application of the US presumption against extraterritoriality, concluding that all the charges except for the bank fraud charges survive this analysis. The conclusion with respect to customary international law, however, is quite different. Under customary international law, the United States lacks jurisdiction to prescribe when its only connection to the foreign defendant is the clearing of transactions through banks in the United States. Because the International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorizes sanctions on financial transactions only when the person or property is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the sanctions regulations cannot lawfully be applied to Halkbank.

The growing range and changing nature of unilateral sanctions have seen the emergence of a new label of so-called ‘secondary’ sanctions, as opposed to the more traditional ‘primary’ sanctions. While there is no accepted legal definition of secondary sanctions, in essence, secondary sanctions restrict economic transactions between third countries which may be entirely lawful under the law of these countries. Their extraterritorial character gives secondary sanctions their distinctive and particularly controversial character. Secondary sanctions create inter-State tension and may possibly violate a number of public international law regimes. They may harm the politico-economic interests of third States and cause headaches for private economic operators, whose potential exposure to secondary sanctions complicates the already complex web of multi-jurisdictional norms governing their international business transactions.

The aim of this conceptual chapter is to define international secondary sanctions and to address the contemporary legal challenges they raise. It proposes to explain such complex legal mechanisms, to overcome the apparent definitional wanderings in their regard, and to identify concrete keys to tackle the legal problems encountered by public and private practitioners. To this end, the analysis begins with an explanation of the core concepts underlying secondary sanctions and focuses on the aim of (extraterritorial) secondary sanctions to extend their scope, what the author calls ‘the reach dilemma’. The unilateral and extraterritorial mechanics of secondary sanctions are then illustrated by three original figures, allowing the reader to grasp the complexity of the different levers involved. The study then addresses the additional difficulty arising from the apparent plurality of definitions of secondary sanctions and proposes an explanatory key enabling to retain only one working definition of secondary sanctions stricto sensu. Finally, the chapter goes on with the identification of the main difficulties currently facing public and private legal practices in this field and presents legal solutions that offer avenues for resolution, in the short, medium and long term.

The prohibition of the threat or use of force, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, is the most important principle in the charter, and the need for international solidarity through the collective action of third states is of the utmost importance when a flagrant violation of that principle occurs. After briefly introducing the case study of the 2022 Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, this chapter analyses whether the current customary legal regime on international responsibility provides for any legal obstacles precluding indirectly injured states from adopting secondary sanctions. In particular, the chapter analyses the use of the concept of ‘lawful measures’ in Articles 41(1) and 54 of Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It also considers that the collective system of the United Nations should be conceived, according to these same provisions, as the preferred framework for cooperative action. The chapter finally argues that when the unlawful use of force reaches the level of an act of aggression third states that are indirectly injured should be able to react through secondary sanctions. These measures, if adopted when the United Nations Security Council is deadlocked, should be considered as lawful because their objective is to remedy the wrongful non-compliance of third states with collective obligations arising from a serious breach of jus cogens norms by the aggressor state.