The dramatic rise of charitable crowdfunding has changed the landscape of fundraising and giving. Little empirical work, however, has been done to explore critical factors that are associated with successful charitable crowdfunding campaigns run both by formal charities and non-charities. To advance the literature on donation-based charitable crowdfunding, we draw on a unique dataset of 427 COVID-19 crowdfunding campaigns in China, examining whether and how external and internal quality signals are related to crowdfunding success measured by total donation amount. Our results show that crowdfunding success is positively associated with internal signals (updates and predefined duration), whereas the role of external signals (platform and award) is less certain. While we find a positive relationship between award information and funding success, informal campaigns using an alternative medium seem to generate more donations than formal campaigns using authorized platforms. The implications of this study for theory, practice and policy are also discussed.

This study examines the signaling effect of support from nonprofit experts on celebrity credibility regarding advocacy efforts. Furthermore, we provide detailed insights into celebrity–nonprofit partnerships by exploring the congruence between the celebrity and advocacy content, and examining whether the impact of support from nonprofit experts differs based on the celebrities’ source characteristics. A survey experiment manipulating the support of nonprofit organizations for celebrity advocacy was conducted, and data from 776 Japanese respondents collected through an online panel were analyzed. The results indicated that signals of nonprofits’ support significantly enhanced perceptions of celebrity expertise but only when strong congruence existed between the celebrity and advocacy content. However, these signals did not enhance the perception of celebrity trustworthiness. We present a causal explanation of how nonprofit experts’ support affects perceived celebrity expertise, which ultimately leads to increased cognitive involvement in social issues. The findings integrate signaling theory and the source credibility model to explain the mechanisms underlying celebrity–nonprofit partnerships in advocacy efforts.

Empirical evidence from single-country studies on the relation between volunteering and wages is mixed. This paper uses an international framework to show that the relation between activities in voluntary associations and wages differs depending on country-specific factors. In particular, we argue that participating in voluntary associations serves as a signal in collectivistic (as opposed to individualistic) countries and is therefore positively related to wages. In countries with a low (as opposed to high) formal educational level, the human capital effects of participating are strong; therefore, activities in voluntary associations correlate with wages positively. Using data on 9295 individuals from 17 countries, we confirm that the relation between participating in voluntary associations and wage is positive but declines (1) as individualism increases and (2) as formal educational levels increase. In countries with high values for individualism or very high formal education levels, the relation between activities in voluntary associations and wage becomes negative.

Alliance formation typically entails some risk of abandonment, wherein an ally may not honor its obligations in the future. When potential security partners’ preferences are misaligned, this risk looms large, discouraging mutually beneficial investment in an alliance. How can a prospective ally credibly reassure an uncertain patron that their preferences align, to mitigate abandonment risks and elicit a security commitment? We show formally that pre-alliance bargaining with third parties is one way to do so. When the patron holds abandonment concerns, the prospective ally can reassure the patron by making greater concessions to the patron’s existing allies, but more hard-line demands of its rivals. This finding implies that the prospect of an alliance can alternately promote conflict with a prospective patron’s enemies and forestall conflict with its friends. Indeed, we show that incentives for pre-alliance reassurance can result in war, even with perfect asset divisibility, no commitment problems, and complete information among the belligerents. The results are illustrated by China’s intervention in the Korean War and Australia’s post-World War II rapprochement with Japan, which were motivated largely to foster security cooperation with the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively.

Social entrepreneurship is presented by its supporters as an alternative to traditional charity, viewing those who would be beneficiaries on a charitable model as customers instead. In this essay, I explore the idea of social entrepreneurship as an alternative model for service-provision by thinking about the specific service of women’s refuges. I ask whether it would be possible to shift women’s refuges out of the government or charitable sectors and into the market. I also consider two speculative proposals for market-based provision.

This paper reports findings of a laboratory experiment, which explores how reported self-assessment regarding the own relative performance is perceived by others. In particular, I investigate whether overconfident or underconfident subjects are considered as more likeable, and who of the two is expected to win in a tournament, thereby controlling for performance. Underconfidence beats overconfidence in both respects. Underconfident subjects are rewarded significantly more often than overconfident subjects, and are significantly more often expected to win. Subjects being less convinced of their performance are taken as more congenial and are expected to be more ambitious to improve, whereas overconfident subjects are rather expected to rest on their high beliefs. While subjects do not anticipate the stronger performance signal of underconfidence, they anticipate its higher sympathy value. The comparison to a non-strategic setting shows that men strategically deflate their self-assessment to be rewarded by others. Women, in contrast, either do not deflate their self-assessment or do so even in non-strategic situations, a behavior that might be driven by non-monetary image concerns of women.

We present an interactive eye-tracking study that explores the strategic use of gaze. We analyze gaze behavior in an experiment with four simple games. The game can either be a competitive (hide & seek) game in which players want to be unpredictable, or a game of common interest in which players want to be predictable. Gaze is transmitted either in real time to another subject, or it is not transmitted and therefore non-strategic. We find that subjects are able to interpret non-strategic gaze, obtaining substantially higher payoffs than subjects who do not see gaze. If gaze is transmitted in real time, gaze becomes more informative in the common interest games and players predominantly succeed to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In contrast, gaze becomes less informative in the competitive game.

We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a critical mass of players choose that action. We design a baseline version of the game in which payoffs remain constant for values above the critical mass, and an increasing returns version in which payoffs keep increasing for values above the critical mass. We test the predictive power of security and payoff-dominance under different information treatments. Our results show that convergence to the payoff- dominant equilibrium is the modal limit outcome when players have full information about others’ previous round choices, while this outcome never occurs in the remaining treatments. The paths of play in some groups reveal a tacit dynamic coordination by which groups converge to the efficient equilibrium in a step-like manner. Moreover, the frequency and speed of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium are higher, ceteris paribus, when increasing returns are present. Finally, successful coordination seems to crucially depend on players’ willingness to signal to others the choice of the action supporting the efficient equilibrium.

Moral condemnation of hypocrisy is both ubiquitous and peculiar. Its incessant focus on word–action consistency gives rise to two properties that distinguish it from other types of moral judgment: non-additivity and content independence. Non-additivity refers to the fact that, in judgments of hypocrisy, good words do not offset bad actions, nor do good actions offset bad words. Content independence refers to the fact that we condemn hypocrisy regardless of whether we would condemn the words or actions in isolation from one another. To make sense of these peculiar properties, we present a costly signaling model of social cooperation, in which hypocrisy norms allow a separating equilibrium to emerge, thus facilitating reliable communication and higher levels of social trust. We compare our functionalist account of hypocrisy to other philosophical accounts, arguing that a functionalist analysis better illuminates our moral practices and public discourse.

People buy some goods that they do not enjoy and wish did not exist. They might even be willing to pay a great deal for such goods, whether the currency involves time, commitment or money. One reason involves signaling to others; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to friends or colleagues. Another reason involves self-signaling; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to an agent about himself or herself. Yet another reason involves a combination of network effects and status competition; nonconsumption might deprive people of the benefits of participating in a network and thus cause them to lose relative position. With respect to real-world goods (including activities) of this kind, there is typically heterogeneity in relevant populations, with some people deriving positive utility from goods to which other people are indifferent, or which other people deplore. Efforts to measure people’s willingness to pay for goods of this kind will suggest a welfare gain, and possibly a substantial one, even though the existence of such goods produces a welfare loss, and possibly a substantial one. Collective action, private or public, is necessary to eliminate goods that people consume but wish did not exist. Legal responses here might be contemplated when someone successfully maneuvers people into a situation in which they are incentivized to act against their interests, by consuming a product or engaging in an activity they do not enjoy, in order to avoid offering an unwanted signal. Prohibitions on waiving certain rights might be justified in this way; some restrictions on uses of social media, especially by young people, might be similarly justified.

A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are not capable of forming intentions. Accordingly, certain human behavior is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead. This solves our problem because if the function of A's behavior was to mislead, B's ending up misled was not an accident or a mere mistake even if A did not intend to deceive B.